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ABSTRACT
Researchers have always had great interest in traffic safety and the phenomenon
of motor vehicle crashes (MVCs). Though scores of service members are severely injured
or killed in off-duty MVCs each year, few studies have addressed the MVC phenomenon
within the military population and none have conducted a comprehensive evaluation of
the causal factors associated with MVCs involving military personnel.
The main purpose of this dissertation was to gain a greater understanding of the
causal factors associated with serious and fatal off-duty personal MVCs for military
service members with the ultimate goal of preventing future losses. The HFACS-MVC
framework was developed based on the established human error framework HFACS and
used to classify causal factors from archival narratives from Class A and B off-duty
MVCs in the USAF, USN, and USMC. This study identified the human factors trends
associated with off-duty military MVCs and compared main trends for four variables of
interest, specifically for military branch, vehicle type, paygrade, and age group.
The main human factor trends associated with off-duty MVCs were skill based
technique errors related to negotiating curves/turns and regaining road positions and
procedural violations related to speeding and drunk driving. Significant differences were
found between human factors trends associated with MVCs for both vehicle type and
military branch. For vehicle type, the human factors trends for 4W MVCs were
significantly different from those for 2W MVCs, especially at the preconditions level.
However, for military branch, the human factors trends suggest differences in the
investigation and reporting processes for the three branches.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Around the world, motor vehicle crashes (MVCs) result in 1.2 million deaths and
20 to 50 million injuries each year (WHO, 2009). In the United States alone, five to six
million MVCs occur annually resulting in more than 30,000 deaths and over two million
injuries (NHTSA, 2010a). In fact, MVCs consistently rank among the top ten leading
causes of unintentional deaths in the United States and are particularly detrimental to
young males (Evans, 2004; Subramanian, 2009).
1.1 MVC CAUSAL FACTORS
Causal factors for MVCs are commonly classified into one of three basic
categories based on their source – driver, roadway environment, or vehicle. Driver factors
include direct driver causes as well as driver conditions and states. Common driver
factors include speeding, inattention, following too closely, alcohol impairment and
inexperience (Treat, et al., 1979; Wierwille, et al., 2002). Common roadway environment
factors are related to roadway design (e.g. grades, curves), weather, and lighting.
Common vehicle factors are related to controls and displays (e.g. cruise control, ITS),
visibility from the vehicle, and safety systems (e.g. safety belts, ABS). Of these three
causal factor categories, driver factors are the leading cause of the large majority of
MVCs (Sabey & Taylor, 1980; Treat, et al., 1979; Wierwille, et al., 2002).
Finding driver factors messy and nebulous, engineers who study MVCs have
typically eschewed driver factors for roadway environment and vehicle factors. Civil
engineers who design structural systems generally focus on roadway environment factors.
Mechanical engineers who design mechanical systems typically focus on vehicle factors.
1

However, human factors engineers who apply their expertise knowledge of human
behavior to the design of products, processes, and systems focus on driver factors and
their interactions with roadway environment and vehicle factors ("Human Factors,"
2011). Unfortunately, only a small fraction of existing MVC literature contains
comprehensive human factors analyses of MVCs.
1.2 MVCS IN THE MILITARY
The MVC studies that do exist have typically looked at the general, largely
civilian population. However, MVCs have detrimental effects on the military population
as well. With the large majority of military personnel being young males, it's not
surprising that hundreds of our service members are involved in serious and fatal MVCs
around the world each year (GAO, 2005). Sadly, off-duty personal MVCs have gravely
impacted the military for decades.
The military is plagued by hundreds of accidental deaths to service members each
year, of which approximately 40 to 55 percent are the result of MVCs (Ecola, Collins, &
Eiseman, 2010). Losses suffered as a result of MVCs reduce combat readiness by
undermining the ability of the military to successfully prepare and carry out missions
(Markopoulos, 2009; Miles, 2008). The military is negatively affected by direct, medical,
and lost productivity costs associated with severe MVCs. Direct costs include vehicle
damage, property damage, and the costs associated with military training. Medical costs
include amounts paid for hospital and rehabilitation services. Lost productivity costs
include days in the hospital, lost work days, and workplace disruptions.
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For over a decade, US military safety centers have collected and maintained both
quantitative (personnel, roadway environment, vehicle, and event variables) and
qualitative (narrative) information for all MVCs resulting in the hospitalization or death
of a service member. Prior attempts at identifying human causal factors for these mishaps
appear to be inadequate for a comprehensive analysis of MVC causal factors. At times
causal factors were identified inconsistently or incorrectly.
The military has implemented a number of recreation and off-duty safety
programs targeting off-duty MVCs over the years. Traffic safety strategies commonly
used throughout the military include training courses (e.g. Motorcycle Safety Foundation
Basic/Experienced Rider Courses, Military Sportbike Rider Course), educational classes
(e.g. AAA Driver Improvement Program, Alive at 25 Driver’s Awareness Course), and
briefings (e.g. Safety Stand Downs). Off-duty MVC safety efforts often focus on
preventing drinking and driving, drowsy driving, and distracted driving especially related
to cell phone usage behind the wheel.
To further their safety efforts, the United States Air Force (USAF), Navy (USN),
and Marine Corps (USMC) collaborated with researchers in the Industrial Engineering
department at Clemson University to carry out a comprehensive classification and
assessment of MVC causal factors plaguing the military. The records for severe off-duty
MVCs involving military personnel are maintained at service-specific military safety
centers. This research accessed the records of severe off-duty MVCs for the USAF, USN,
and USMC. Approximately 10 years of USN and USAF data and almost five years of
USMC data were provided. The qualitative narrative descriptions provide a rare
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opportunity to study severe off-duty MVCs in the military. Comprehensive classification
and analysis of the causal factors involved in these MVCs exposes the hazards that pose
the greatest threat to our service members on the road. These findings provide a sound
foundation for the development of targeted, data-driven safety strategies.
1.3 HFACS FRAMEWORK
To ensure that the various causal factors associated with MVCs are
comprehensively classified, an appropriate human error framework must be selected for
use. The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) framework
(Figure 1) may be effectively applied to the MVC domain. Based on Reason’s (1990)
model of human error, HFACS was developed by Drs. Wiegmann and Shappell (2000) as
a proactive tool for capturing and classifying causal factors in real world settings.
HFACS has since proven its utility and has been successfully modified for use in several
industries including aviation (military, general aviation, air transport, and commercial),
railroad, mining, construction, and health care just to name a few. The HFACS
framework and its applications are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2 Section 3
“Human Error Models and Frameworks.”

4

Figure 1: Original HFACS Framework (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001)

Though successfully modified and applied to a wide range of domains, the
HFACS framework has not yet been developed for use in the road traffic safety domain.
This need was addressed by the development of the HFACS-MVC framework in the
present study. The HFACS-MVC framework was then applied by HFACS experts to
classify the causal factors associated with severe off-duty MVCs in the military.
1.4 OBJECTIVES
The findings of this study should provide a basis for developing effective and
actionable MVC safety strategies. The military has little control over roadway
environment and vehicle factors, but may be able to positively affect its personnel (Ecola,
et al., 2010). To accommodate this constraint, each of the four independent variables
5

selected for the present study was primarily related to the service member operating a
motor vehicle and captured characteristics that change little over time and could be easily
identified and classified prior to departure on the roads into categories that are distinctly
different from one another.
Each of the branches of the military has a unique subculture that attracts particular
types of people and personalities. The skills and knowledge required to safely operate
two wheeled (2W) vehicles far exceed those required for four wheeled (4W) vehicles.
Officers and enlisted service members have different requirements for entry into the
military and work different types of jobs with different roles, responsibilities, and
expectations. Young males perform the riskiest road behaviors and are the demographic
with the highest rate of involvement for fatal MVCs around the world.
The main purpose of this dissertation was to gain a greater understanding of the
causal factors associated with serious and fatal off-duty personal MVCs for military
service members with the ultimate goal of preventing future losses of military service
members to MVCs. The objectives of the present study were to identify the main causal
factors involved in severe off-duty MVCs for military personnel and conduct
comparisons of causal factor patterns for four independent variables: (1) military
branches: USAF, USN, USMC, (2) vehicle types: 2W and 4W, (3) paygrades: enlisted
and officer, and (4) age groups: 17-20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, and >40 years old.
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In the present study, the human factors trends were identified for service members
seriously or fatally injured in off-duty MVCs and compared across different military
6

branches, vehicle types, paygrades, and age groups. Identification of the human factors
trends provide a basis for developing data-driven safety efforts targeted to the relevant
issues experienced by service members on the roadways. Comparisons of the human
factors trends amongst the groups of service members provide data-driven support for
developing a one-size-fits-all approach or specific targeted (e.g. paygrade-based, agebased) approaches for different groups.
With the goal of preventing future military losses due to MVCs, the five main
research questions addressed in the present study were:
Q1: What are the main human factors trends for serious off-duty MVCs involving
military service members?
Q2: Are the main human factors trends different for MVCs involving service
members from the USAF, USN, and USMC?
Q3: Are the main human factors trends different for MVCs involving 2W and 4W
vehicles?
Q4: Are the main human factors trends different for MVCs involving enlisted and
officer service members?
Q5: Are the main human factors trends different for MVCs involving service
members in different age groups?
1.6 CONTRIBUTIONS
This study provided a methodology for the systematic analysis of MVC causal
factors. HFACS-MVC is a complete and comprehensive human error framework created
for use with off-duty military MVCs. The creation and application of HFACS-MVC
7

contributed to the existing literature supporting the use of HFACS in non-traditional,
non-aviation platforms. The HFACS-MVC framework made it possible to systematically
and comprehensively identify and capture causal factors within the road traffic safety
domain.
The large majority of MVC research has focused on the general population with
few specifically studying the MVC phenomenon in the military. For the present study,
hundreds of severe off-duty mishaps involving service members serving in the USAF,
USN, and USMC were classified using HFACS-MVC. This study has finally shed light
on the specific types of human error affecting our service members on the roadways.
An understanding of specific driving and riding behaviors is necessary for the
effective prevention of future MVCs. To illustrate this point, consider a hypothetical nontransportation situation in the medical field involving a doctor and two patients with the
same illness. One patient tells the doctor that he feels sick while the other tells the doctor
that she has a sore throat, swollen glands, and that her temperature has spiked in the past
hour to 102 °F. How can the doctor help each patient? The doctor cannot accurately
diagnose the first patient without additional information about his specific symptoms but
has enough information to determine that the second patient has strep throat. While the
second patient starts on antibiotics and feels better almost immediately, the first patient
continues to suffer. Likewise, knowing that human error is a key component of MVCs
does not help to prevent future crashes. But knowing that operator error in countersteering is a key factor does contribute to MVC prevention efforts. Safety strategies can
be tailored to address the specific driving and riding errors of our service members.
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With only a finite amount of resources and funding for safety strategies, there is
great value in identifying programs that provide the largest return on investment. This
study provided a new perspective for how to evaluate both current and prior military
MVC safety efforts. The success of a strategy has typically been determined based on the
number or rate of fatalities before and after implementation. The contributions from this
study provided a basis for the evaluation of safety initiatives based on their effects on
specific driver and rider behaviors. By connecting the dates of implementation for
individual safety programs with MVC causal factor patterns, the strengths and
weaknesses of the individual safety programs can be assessed.
There has been recent consideration from the Department of Defense (DoD) to
combine the individual safety centers into one entity that oversees safety for all services
of the military. The present study supported these efforts by providing a universal human
error framework for use throughout the military. Additionally, this study contributed a
database filled with MVC causal factors for three of the four services of the military. The
classification of MVC data with a universal set of HFACS-MVC causal factors provided
the opportunity to compare the quality of MVC investigation and reporting practices
between the military branches. Future efforts using on the causal factor database created
in this study may be used to compare contributing causal factor trends between the
branches to provide data-driven support for or against the unification of safety efforts for
the entire military.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES (MVCS)
Motor vehicle crashes (MVCs) have elicited a great deal of concern since the
advent of automotive transportation. Unfortunately, MVCs continue to plague countries
around the world. Though technological and legislative changes have achieved
significant improvements in motor vehicle safety, MVCs still injure and kill thousands
each year. No one is immune to the devastation that results from MVCs including those
serving in the military for our country.
Automotive transportation’s history began back in 1769 with the Cugnot Steam
Tractor, the world’s first self-propelled vehicle (Bottorff, 2006) . By the early 1900s,
companies in the US and Europe were commercially producing gasoline-powered
automobiles and motorcycles. In 1910, there were already an estimated 130,000 cars and
150,000 motorcycles and tricycles in the US (Shaw, 1910). Motor vehicle production
picked up in the 1950s after a slow spell in the years between the Great Depression and
World War II. The number of vehicles on the road increased and by 1960, there were
over 61,600,000 passenger cars and 574,000 motorcycles were registered in the US (DoT,
2011). These days, there are more than 137,000,000 passenger cars and 7,750,000
motorcycles registered for use on American roads (DoT, 2011).
With the advent of motorized vehicles came the danger of motor vehicle crashes.
Reports of MVC injuries and fatalities were recorded almost immediately. The first
automobile fatalities occurred in the late 19th century. Though the records may be a bit
unclear, the first recorded MVC fatality occurred in Ireland in 1869 when Mary Ward
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was thrown from a homemade steam carriage making a sharp turn (Fallon & O'Neill,
2005). It appears that the first MVC fatality in the US occurred in Ohio a few decades
later, in 1891 when James Lambert’s automobile collided with a hitching post ("World's
First Automobile Accident," 2006). In 1900, Harry Miles became the first person killed
in a motorcycle MVC when he was ejected from a pacing machine during a race in
Massachusetts ("Accident at Bicycle Meet," 1900).
Increased interest and demand of motor vehicles sparked concerns for the safety
of all road users – drivers, passengers, motorcyclists, bicyclists, and pedestrians. Initial
transportation safety efforts focused on making vehicles safer through design and
technological modifications that increased crashworthiness. More recently, safety efforts
have sought to modify driver and rider behaviors.
2.1.1 MVC Terminology and Definitions
There are a variety of terms that are used capture the basic elements of road traffic
safety. A complete set of terminology and definitions used in the present study can be
referenced in Appendix A.
The term “motor vehicle” is used to capture a privately owned non-government,
non-commercial vehicle that can be operated on public highways including motorcycles,
passenger vehicles, and light trucks. For the purposes of the present study, the two types
of motor vehicles are two-wheeled (2W) and four-wheeled (4W) vehicles. The term “2W
vehicle” is used for a powered motor vehicle with two wheels including cruisers, sport,
touring, standard, and dual-purpose motorcycles. The term “4W vehicle” is used for a
powered motor vehicle with four wheels including cars and light trucks.
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An event in which two vehicles collide could be termed an accident, collision, or
crash. An accident, however, implies that the events leading up to a MVC occur by
chance rather than as the result of a combination of causal factors and as such, many have
eschewed this term for more objective terminology. Consequently, the term “motor
vehicle crash (MVC)” is used to capture this event as an event where a motor vehicle in
motion collides with obstacle(s) in the environment and results in injury and/or property
damage.
The US military has a unique set of safety terminology that is specific to adverse
events involving service members. For example, a “mishap” is the term used by the
military to define an adverse event or series of events that result in property damage,
injury, or death. The DoD classifies mishaps according to the severity of their outcomes
like injury, illness, or property damage (Table 1).
Table 1: Mishap Descriptions by Class Severity

Class
A
B
C

Description
Damage: total cost ≥ $1 million or DoD aircraft destroyed
Result: fatality or permanent total disability
Damage: $200,000 ≤ total cost < $1 million
Result: permanent partial disability or 3+ personnel are hospitalized for
inpatient care as a result of a single accident
Damage: $20,000 ≤ total cost < $200,000
Result: nonfatal injury that causes loss of time from work beyond that
day/shift or nonfatal occupational illness or disability that causes loss of
time from work or disability
There are four levels or classes of mishaps (A, B, C, and D), each with a lesser

outcome severity than the last with Class D representing near-miss events. Class A
mishaps are the most severe, resulting in permanent total disability or death. Each of the
subsequent classes captures a lesser outcome severity. Class B mishaps result in
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permanent partial disability or the hospitalization of three or more people as a result of a
single accident.
2.1.2 Operating a Motor Vehicle
Motorists must possess certain knowledge and skill sets in order to operate a
motor vehicle. To safely operate a 2W or 4W motor vehicle on the roadway, a motorist
must be able to search, evaluate, and execute (MSF, 2005). The skills required to
accomplish these tasks include vigilant scanning, good judgment, and smooth control.
Additional factors uniquely affect 2W vehicles such as balance, visibility, and lack of
protection producing additional hazards for riders that do not affect drivers.
Motor vehicle operators must be able to vigilantly scan their environment. It is
important for motorists to maintain awareness and sample their surroundings for the
presence and position of other road users and obstacles. This skill is especially critical for
motorcycle riders. The leading cause of fatalities for riders is the failure of another
vehicle operator to detect, identify, and yield right of way to a 2W vehicle (SCDMV,
2009). Unfortunately, riders of 2W vehicles often find it challenging to vigilantly scan
their environments. With only two mirrors (right side, left side) as opposed to three (right
side, left side, rearview), sampling the surroundings on a 2W vehicle is more challenging
and requires more physical movement than in a 4W vehicle. Rather than solely reference
side mirrors, riders of 2W vehicles often compensate by performing head checks where
they physically move their heads to sample the environment. As such, riders face an
additional challenge in checking their surroundings without affecting their direction of
travel.
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Motor vehicle operators must be able to evaluate the information from their
surroundings and adjust their behaviors accordingly. Motorists must be able to adequately
judge and determine safe distances and speeds while travelling on the road. Operators
must be able to determine whether they are travelling too fast to safely negotiate a curve
or on a slick road. Taking a curve or turn too fast can cause a vehicle to depart from its
lane of travel into another. This is especially critical for operators of 2W vehicles who
take a turn or curve too fast which forces them to either slide out, lay down the
motorcycle, or drift out of the lane. Operators must also be able to determine their
distances relative to other road users and obstacles.
Motorists must be able to operate their vehicles in a smooth and controlled
manner and maintain control while performing various operations. At times, motorists
must react to avoid potential collision. However, sudden turns or lane changes can cause
vehicle to skid, particularly with a slick or slippery road surface (NJMVC, 2011). Motor
vehicle operators should be able to counter-steer (swerve) as necessary to avoid other
road users and obstacles without losing control. Motor vehicle operators must be able to
safely brake without losing control. Control skills are more integral for 2W vehicles than
4W vehicles, especially given that recovery from loss of control is extremely difficult
with 2W vehicles and occur rarely (Elliott, Baughan, & Sexton, 2007).
To slow and stop a motor vehicle safely, the operator should apply steady, gentle
pressure as opposed to slamming on the brake(s) (NJMVC, 2011). Hard braking can
result in a skid, especially on slippery road surfaces like snow or ice surface. Braking for
2W vehicles is trickier than for 4W vehicles. Cars have one brake control which a driver
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controls with the right foot. Motorcycles have two brake controls. A rider controls the
front brakes with the right hand and controls the rear brake with the right foot. To
decelerate safely, breaking force should ideally come 70% from the front brake and 30%
from the rear brake (MSF, 2005). If the braking force is applied too abruptly, the
respective wheel can lock up causing a skid. As such, decelerating is more difficult for
riders of 2W vehicles than it is for drivers of 4W vehicles.
While scanning, judgment, and control are important for both 2W and 4W motor
vehicles, balance is basically a non-issue for drivers of 4W vehicles. Balance is critical
for a safe riding experience and is sensitive to where riders should sit on the motorcycle
and how they should hold their arms (CADMV, 2011). Riders have the additional
challenge of checking their surroundings without it affecting their balance or direction of
travel.
2.1.3 Fatal MVCs in the US
The topic of MVCs is relevant around the world and is extensively studied.
International and national databases exist around the world to collect and track the
characteristics of MVCs, especially fatal MVCs (Luoma & Sivak, 2007). In the US, fatal
MVC records are maintained on both a federal system, NHTSA’s Fatality Analysis
Reporting System (FARS) and state-specific systems. The FARS database contains the
characteristics for all MVCs occurring on public roadways around the US (all 50 States,
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico) that result in the death an involved person within
30 days of the crash. In each state, FARS analysts gather source documents, such as
Police Accident Reports and State Driver Licensing Files, and enter the data elements
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into four forms (accident, vehicle, driver, and person). The accident form includes MVC
demographics (e.g. date, location, weather, and number of vehicles involved). The
vehicle form includes involved vehicle information (e.g. vehicle type, role in MVC, and
impact points). The driver form includes driver qualifications (e.g. driving record and
license status). The person form includes demographics for those involved in the MVC
(e.g. age, role in MVC – driver, passenger, non-motorist, and severity of injuries)
(NHTSA, 2005b). While FARS represents the entire population of fatal MVCs in the US,
it lacks the ability to indicate when a road user is military. Therefore, MVCs that result in
a military fatality are unable to be parsed from those involving civilians given the current
FARS database. Furthermore, FARS does not contain personal information which
prevents the collection of narrative summaries for the MVCs and restricts the level of
detail for data collected about crash locations and involved individuals.
2.1.4 MVC Individual Factors
Historically, most studies have looked at the relationship between single elements
(e.g. gender, age, intoxication, distraction, speeding, and crash demographics) and MVC
involvement. Traditional analyses have identified the typical operator and crash
characteristics. Common categories of demographics are operator (driver/rider), vehicle,
crash, and environmental characteristics. Operator characteristics include age, gender,
and race/ethnicity. Vehicle characteristics include the vehicle make, model, and year.
Crash characteristics include time of day, location, number of vehicles involved, and
configuration of involved vehicles. Environmental characteristics include atmospheric
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and lighting conditions. Some of the operator, vehicle, crash, and environmental
characteristics commonly researched are reviewed in the following section.

Age and Gender
Both within and outside the US, the demographic of drivers with the highest crash
and fatality rates are young males. In fact, males are twice as likely as females to be
killed in MVCs (Evans, 2004). The general relationship between driver age and
involvement in fatal and nonfatal MVCs is presented in Figure 2. In general, drivers
involved in fatal MVCs are younger than drivers involved in non-fatal MVCs. While
people between the ages of 15 and 34 make up 27.5% of the American population, they
represent 42.5% of the drivers killed in MVCs (NHTSA, 2008). Moreover, the highest
fatality and injury rates per 100,000 people are experienced by people aged 21-24 and 1620 respectively (NHTSA, 2008).
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Driver Ages in Fatal and Non-Fatal MVCs
Motor Vehicle Crashes (MVCs) [%]

100%
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90%

Non-Fatal
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30%
20%
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15-24

25-34

35-44

45-54

55-64

65+

Age of Driver (A) [yrs]
Figure 2: Driver Ages for Fatal and Non-Fatal MVCs in the US (NHTSA, 2008)

Alcohol Impairment
Drunk driving has received a substantial amount of attention as well. The
probability of being involved in a MVC is at least two to ten times higher for a driver
with a BAC of 0.08% than for an unimpaired driver (Compton, et al., 2002; Zador, 1991).
Alcohol-impaired driving fatalities represented close to one-third of all US traffic
fatalities in 2007 (NHTSA, 2008). Over one-third (35%) of drunk drivers (BAC of 0.08%
or higher) involved in fatal MVCs in the US are between the ages of 21 and 25 (NHTSA,
2008). At the 0.08 BAC level, one’s vision, balance, perception, reaction time,
concentration, memory, judgment, reasoning, information processing, and speed control
are all affected (NHTSA, 2005a). Observable cues that suggest that a vehicle is likely
being operated by a drunk driver include problems maintaining lane position, speed and
stopping problems, vigilance problems, and judgment problems (NHTSA, 2010b).
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Inattention and Distraction
Driver inattention is involved in one-fourth to one-half of all MVCs in the United
States (Stutts, Reinfurt, Staplin, & Rodgman, 2001). Behaviors such as texting, looking at
external objects, and reaching for a moving object all serve to negatively impact a
driver’s attention. The risk of MVC involvement is two to six times higher for inattentive
drivers compared to alert drivers (Klauer, Dingus, Neale, Sudweeks, & Ramsey, 2006)
Distraction, the primary form of inattention, occurs when the operator divests attention
from the primary driving task in order to attend to an object or activity within or outside
of the vehicle. Distraction comes from many sources – conversing with people in the car
or on the phone, interacting with children in the backseat, or playing with the stereo to
name a few. Young drivers, particularly those under the age of 20, are more likely than
other age groups to be distracted when involved in a MVC.

Speeding
Speeding is a factor in approximately one-third of MVC fatalities (IIHS, 2010).
Positive relationships exist between speed and both crash risk and injury severity; in
high-income countries around the world, approximately 30% of fatal MVCs result from
travelling at “excess or inappropriate” speeds (WHO, 2004). The relationship between
speed and risk of MVCs is that the following three variables are exponentially increased
when speed is increased – distance needed to stop, time needed to stop, and the energy at
impact (IIHS, 2010). Even small increases in speed can increase the risk of a crash, of
being injured, and of being killed. A mere increase in speed of 1 km/h (0.62 mph) may
increase the risk of a fatal MVC by 4-5% (WHO, 2004).
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Inexperience
A large majority of motorcycle riders involved in MVCs lack formal riding
education. A large-scale motorcycle study found that the overwhelming majority of riders
involved in MVCs were self-taught or taught by friends or family and over half had fewer
than five months of experience riding the mishap motorcycle (Hurt, Ouellet, & Thom,
1981). While it is against the law to ride a motorcycle without an endorsement in the US,
25% of the riders killed on 2W vehicles in 2009 did not have motorcycle endorsements
(IIHS, 2011). While it is also against the law in the US to drive a 4W passenger vehicle
without a driver’s license or permit, a smaller percentage (14%) of drivers in 4W fatal
MVCs lacked licensure that same year (IIHS, 2011).

Drowsiness and Fatigue
Sleep, naps, and rest refresh the brain and its mental processing power. When
fatigued, the brain’s mental processing power and speed decreases which affects its
ability to process and react to new information. Symptoms of mental fatigue while
driving or riding include slower reaction times, reduced vigilance and awareness,
impaired memory, impaired decision-making, loss of situational awareness, and degraded
performance. On the road, drowsiness affects everyone; however inexperienced operators
are affected more than experienced operators. Inexperienced operators have not had
enough experience to automatically respond in a skilled manner to unexpected situations
on the road.
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2.1.5 MVC Human Factors
Though studying factors individually provides some insight into the causes of
MVCs, it does not provide the whole picture. Traffic safety literature is replete with
studies looking at the role of operator factors such as gender and age. Unfortunately,
studying only traditional demographics restricts analyses to factors that cannot be
controlled or modified. Ultimately the multifaceted causes of MVC are more complex
than simple demographics can explain. A thorough understanding of MVCs requires an
appreciation of the complexity of human error. Instead of looking at only one or two
variables, a few researchers have sought to identify the variables involved in MVCs using
a systems approach. These studies have greatly contributed to our understanding of MVC
causal factors. Key studies that have comprehensively classified causal factors in MVCs
include Indiana University’s Tri-Level study, Veridian’s Unsafe Driving Acts study,
University of North Carolina’s Serious MVC study, the 100-Car Naturalistic Driving
study, and the Hurt Motorcycle study.

Tri-Level Study
The Tri-Level Study performed by researchers at Indiana University was one of
the first major human factors assessment of causal factors for MVCs (Treat, et al., 1979)
in which the definite, probable, and possible factors resulting in MVCs were identified
and categorized. The study found that 71% of the MVCs involved definite human causal
factors but only 4% and 13% involved definite vehicular and environmental causal
factors respectively. The main human causal factors were found to be recognition errors
(41.4%) and decision errors (28.6%).
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Unsafe Driving Act (UDA) Study
The Veridian Unsafe Driving Act (UDA) Study used an 11-step process to
evaluate the crash, primary cause, and contributing factors of 723 MVCs from four US
locations between 1996 and 1997 (Hendricks, Freedman, Zador, & Fell, 2001). The UDA
Study found that a driver behavioral error caused or contributed to 99% of the MVCs.
The causal factors found to be frequently associated with driver behaviors were driver
inattention (22.7%), vehicle speed (18.7%), alcohol impairment (18.2%), perceptual error
(15.1%), decision errors (10.1%), and incapacitation (6.4%).

100-Car Study
The 100-Car Study in 2006 identified pre-crash causal and contributing factors
from naturalistic data collected by in-vehicle sensors and cameras (Dingus, et al., 2006).
A year of data was collected from each of 100 equipped vehicles provided to drivers in
the Northern Virginia/Metropolitan Washington, DC area. The study focused on the
following driver behavioral factors: driver inattention (including drowsiness), traffic
violations, aggressive driving, and seat belt usage. Driver inattention was a factor in
approximately 80% of the crashes and 60% of the near-crashes. Drowsy driving was a
factor in 12% of the crashes and 10% of the near-crashes.

UNC Serious MVC Study
A 2002 study at University of North Carolina (UNC) Highway Safety Research
Center identified the causal factors involved in over 1,200 serious MVCs in the state
between 1993 and 1997 (Wierwille, et al., 2002). The study determined “willful
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inappropriate behavior” as a principal contributor in the majority of serious incidents
(57%). Both “inadequate knowledge” and “infrastructure” were determined to be
principal contributors, each influential in approximately one-fifth of serious incidents.
Factors such as alcohol impairment, curves, low shoulders, trees, darkness, and the
number of wheels on the vehicle were determined to also be significant.

Motorcycle Study
The first comprehensive assessment of contributing operator (motorcycle and
car), roadway environment, and vehicle causal factors for motorcycle crashes in the US
was the Hurt Motorcycle Study (Hurt, et al., 1981). Between January 1976 and December
1977, a multifaceted research team at the University of Southern California collected and
reconstructed data for over 900 2W MVCs in the Los Angeles area resulting in a range of
rider outcomes from no injury through fatality. Overall, the Hurt Study found that 2W
MVCs were predominantly caused by other motor vehicle operators on the road who
violated the motorcyclists’ right of way. Roadway environment and vehicle factors rarely
contributed to 2W MVCs with weather, lighting, road defects and vehicle defects each
involved in only 2% to 3% of the MVCs. Common contributing human factors were
incorrect selection of braking and evading actions (36%), inadequate execution of
braking and evading actions (38%), attention issues (38%), and alcohol involvement.
Overall motorcycle operators involved in MVCs lacked formal motorcycle training
(92%) and proper motorcycle licensure (46%).
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2.2 US MILITARY
The US military’s roots trace back to the beginnings of our country as an
independent nation in 1776 with the establishment of the Continental Army under the
command of General George Washington. In 1948, the Department of Defense (DoD)
was established as the civilian agency responsible for providing, coordinating, and
developing the armed services of the US.
There are four services or branches of the US Armed Forces that operate under
the DoD – Army, Navy (USN), Marine Corps (USMC), and Air Force (USAF). The US
Army is responsible for military operations on land. The USN is responsible for military
operations at sea. The USMC is responsible for amphibious military operations afloat and
ashore. The USAF is responsible for military operations within the region of aerospace.
An additional branch of the US military operates under the Department of Homeland
Security in peacetime but under the USN in wartime or as directed by the President. This
branch, the US Coast Guard (USCG) is responsible for maritime safety, security, and
stewardship.
2.2.1 US Military Demographics

Paygrades
Each branch of the US military has its own system of ranks and titles. However,
all services use the same paygrade system to represent both salary range and level of
seniority for service members within the command structure. Paygrades may be
categorized according to the three basic types of service members – enlisted, officers, and
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warrant officers. The former categories (enlisted and officer) exist for all military
services while the latter category (warrant officer) exists for all services except the
USAF. Officers outrank warrant officers who outrank enlisted personnel.
Paygrades use a letter-number format where the letter represents the grade group
(E, W, and O for enlisted, warrant, and officer respectively) and the number represents
level of authority and responsibility in an ordinal manner (larger numbers for greater
levels of authority and responsibility). There are nine enlisted grades (E-1 through E-9),
five warrant grades (W-1 through W-5), and 10 officer grades (O-1 through O-10). For
enlisted personnel, the lowest grade is E-1 and the highest grade is E-9. For warrant
officers, the lowest grade is W-1 and the highest grade is W-5. For officers, the lowest
grade is O-1 and the highest grade is O-10. The large majority of service members (84%)
are enlisted (BLS). The remaining service members are primarily officers (15%) and a
mere fraction of the force (1%) are warrant officers.
Enlisted service members sign up to serve within the military structure for a
period of two to four years. Each military service selects positions for its enlisted
personnel based on its needs and the abilities of the service members, and then provides
appropriate training for those positions. Junior enlisted personnel (grades E-1 to E-3/4)
are basically apprentices whose role it is to learn, develop, and apply new (primarily
technical) skills. More senior enlisted personnel (grades E-4/5 and above) include noncommission and senior non-commission officers with increasingly greater expectations
and responsibilities.
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Promotions at the lower enlisted grades (E-1 to E-3 for USN and USMC; E-1 to
E-4 for US Army and USAF) are practically guaranteed as they are based on time in
service and time in grade. Promotions to the higher enlisted grades are more competitive
as they are based on multiple factors, the most restrictive of which are the number of
vacancies for career fields within a grade. For example, in 2011 the chances for USN
enlisted personnel to advance to the paygrades of E-4, E-5, and E-6 were 30.97%,
20.68%, and 10.75% respectively (Faram, 2011).
Officers hold commissions from the US to function in a leadership role within the
military structure. A commission is a document that authorizes a service member to hold
a position in the military for the entirety of one’s term of service. To receive commission,
one must meet certain standards of education and proven skill. A person can train to
become an officer in the military by attending a service academy, going through Reserve
Officer Training Corps (ROTC) or Officer Candidate School (OCS), or by receiving
direct commission. The three service academies under the DoD are the Military Academy
at West Point for the US Army, the Naval Academy at Annapolis for the USN and
USMC, and the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs for the USAF. Upon graduation
from a service academy, one becomes commissioned as an officer in the military. The
ROTC program acts as a preparatory school for commissioning. Many universities
around the country provide ROTC courses that students can take while earning their
college degrees. Upon graduation from college, ROTC students are eligible for
commissioning as an officer in the military. OCS is a program for civilians with four year
college degrees or enlisted service members with four year college degrees or equivalent
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amounts of training or specialized education. Direct commissioning provides civilians
with specific expertise such as doctors, lawyers, and chaplains to be commissioned into
the military as restricted officers.
Officers are required to be upstanding individuals who provide guidance and
oversight to those under their command. With higher levels of responsibility and
authority within the military structure, officers are typically held to higher standards than
enlisted personnel and misconduct is not tolerated. Officer promotions in the military are
regulated by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) enacted by
Congress in 1981. DOPMA laws set the time in service required for promotion and the
percent of applicants that must be denied or passed over for promotion. Promotions at the
lower officer grades (O-2 and O-3) are pretty much automatic based primarily on time in
service/grade with a promotion success rate close to 100% ("Navy - Officer Promotion
Process," 2006). Subsequent promotions to higher officer grades are more restrictive.
DOPMA specifies that 20%, 30%, and 50% of the applicants must be denied promotion
to O-4, O-5, and O-6 positions respectively.
Warrant officers hold warrants from the US to function as highly trained
specialists in the military structure. A warrant is a document that authorizes a service
member to carry out a specific task based on one’s expertise in one’s field. Warrant
officers make up only a miniscule fraction of the armed forces due to service restrictions
and stringent qualification requirements. Only military personnel in the US Army, USN,
and USMC can become a warrant officer; the USAF discontinued this rank in 1959. In
general, warrant officers in the US Army and USMC are selected midcareer while those
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in the USN are selected late career (Fernandez, 2002). With few exceptions, an eligible
enlisted USN or USMC service member can apply for a warrant officer position only
after serving in the military for a minimum of 12 years and attaining at least a paygrade
of E-7. With a requirement for applicants to have served in the military for a minimum
of 12 years, warrant officers are especially likely to be older than other officers and
enlisted personnel.
Warrant officers serve as technical experts in their fields and provide knowledge,
skills, guidance, and oversight. Applicants for warrant officer positions must be
upstanding individuals of good moral character whose records contain no disciplinary
actions/convictions nor substantiated cases of drug/alcohol abuse for the prior three years
(DoN, 2009). To even attain prerequisites for warrant officer positions, service members
must perform as well as or better than their peers and build their skills, responsibilities,
and leadership abilities as they move up the ranks. Indeed, warrant officers in the USN
and USMC have slightly faster rates of promotion than their enlisted peers (Fernandez,
2002). Warrant officer positions are quite competitive and only a small fraction of
applicants receive promotions, particularly in the USN and USMC. In fact, less than onethird of USN and USMC applicants (26% and 22% respectively) were promoted to
warrant officer positions in 2000 (Fernandez, 2002).
The demographic characteristics of active duty enlisted personnel differ from
those of both warrant and commissioned officers (Table 2). The average age for active
duty enlisted service members is 27.1 years old with over half (52.5%) of active duty
enlisted personnel 35 years of age or younger (Segal & Segal, 2004). Officers in the US
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military tend to be older than enlisted personnel. The average age of an active duty
officer is 34.6 years old (Segal & Segal, 2004). The majority of active duty officers
(85.8%) are over the age of 25 in comparison to fewer than half of enlisted personnel
(47.5%) (Segal & Segal, 2004).
Table 2: Demographics for Active-Duty Enlisted and Officer Personnel (Segal & Segal, 2004)

Male
Aged 30+
Married

Enlisted
USAF
80%
64%
56%

USN
86%
67%
50%

USMC
94%
68%
41%

Officer
USAF
82%
97%
71%

USN
85%
70%
66%

USMC
94%
70%
69%

Branches
Over one-third of the US Armed Forces active-duty personnel are in the US
Army. This represents the largest single service component of the military. Smaller
percentages of the US Armed Forces active duty personnel are in the USN and the USAF.
Each of these service components represent approximately one-fourth of the military. The
smallest single service component of the military is the USMC with a little more than
one-tenth of the military.
Since 2000, between 1.3 and 1.4 million active-duty military personnel have
served for our country each year. In 2007, there were a total of 1,365,371 active-duty
DoD military personnel – 37.9% in the US Army, 24.3% in the USN, 24.1% in the
USAF, and 13.7% in the USMC (OneSource). The demographic characteristics of
enlisted and officer personnel in the USAF, USN, and USMC is presented in Table 3.
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Table 3: Demographics for Active-Duty Personnel in USAF, USN, and USMC

Male
Aged 30+
Married
High School (College)

USAF
Enlisted (Officer)
80% (82%)
64% (97%)
56% (71%)
80% (95%)

USN
Enlisted (Officer)
86% (85%)
67% (70%)
50% (66%)
91% (57%)

USMC
Enlisted (Officer)
94% (94%)
68% (70%)
41% (69%)
95% (80%)

The demographics of the military personnel serving in each of the four services
differ from one another (OneSource). The USMC has the youngest active duty force with
an average age of 25.0 years. The US Army, USN, and USAF have slightly older active
duty service members with average ages of 28.4, 28.7, and 29.6 years respectively. The
USMC also has the largest percentage of active duty enlisted personnel with one officer
for every 8.5 enlisted service members. The US Army and USN each have approximately
one officer for every five enlisted service members. With the largest percentage of active
duty officers, the USAF has one officer for every four enlisted service members.
2.2.2 Fatal MVCs in the US Military
Researchers have generally overlooked the MVC phenomenon in the military.
Leadership in the military is concerned with the number of service members who are lost
to non-operational, off-duty PVMCs. To preserve combat capability and save lives, the
military is supported by service-specific safety centers that target the prevention of
mishaps. Each safety center is responsible for maintaining a mishap reporting system and
a mishap database for its service members. The Naval Safety Center (NSC) at Norfolk
Naval Base in Norfolk, Virginia maintains the online reporting system Web-Enabled
Safety System (WESS) for USN and USMC mishaps. The Air Force Safety Center
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(AFSC) at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico maintains the online
reporting system Air Force Safety Automated System (AFSAS) for USAF mishaps.
Prior research is inconclusive in its comparisons of MVC fatality rates for military
and civilians. Some found service members to be more likely than the average civilian
driver to be fatally injured during an MVC (Miller & Sack, 2004) while others have
found MVC fatality rates for military personnel to be lower than the general population
(Carr, 2001; Dellinger, Krull, Jones, Yore, & Amoroso, 2004; Markopoulos, 2009;
OneSource, 2007). Estimated MVC fatality rates for both the US and military populations
are presented in Table 4.
Table 4: MVC Fatality Rates for US and Military Populations (Ecola, et al., 2010)

Population
US
US Military

15-24 year old males
24-35 year old males
All
Army
Air Force
Coast Guard
Marine Corps
Navy

MVC Fatality Rate (per 100,000 population)
37.3
24.1
14.7
17.7
11.9
19.6
27.1
15.9

These MVC fatality rates were provided in a recent technical report prepared by
the Private Motor Vehicle Task Force (PMVTF) for the Defense Safety Oversight
Council (DSOC) (Ecola, et al., 2010). The US fatality rate used a seven-year average of
MVC data from 2000 to 2006 and the military fatality rate used a ten-year average of
MVC data from 2000 to 2009. All branches had MVC fatality rates that were lower than
the US MVC fatality rate for 15-24 year old males and most had rates that were lower
than the US MVC fatality rate for 24-35 year old males. The concerning exception was
the MVC fatality rate for the USMC military branch.
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2.2.3 Military MVC Individual Factors
Common factors involved in fatal USAF 4W MVCs are impaired driving, speed
too fast for conditions, and fatigue or over-extending oneself (DoD, 2003). Common
factors involved in fatal USAF 2W MVCs are exceeded capabilities/lacked proficiency,
speed too fast for conditions, and impaired operators. Similarly, the most common factors
involved in fatal USN and USMC 2W MVCs are speeding and loss of control.
2.2.4 Military MVC Human Factors
Though studying individual demographic and behavioral factors associated with
MVCs in the military provides some insight, there is still much to be learned. Limitations
of prior military MVC studies are that they failed to that they identify causal factors
comprehensively or exhaustively, often used data that were previously collected
containing potential classification errors or inconsistencies, and often targeted just
included a few factors to research. However, even with their limitations, prior studies
have contributed a great amount to what is known about the MVC phenomenon in the
military. Some of the key studies on MVCs in the military are discussed in the following
section. These include the US Army MVC Injury Study, the USMC MVC Fatality Study,
the Fatal Military MVC Study, the USAF-US MVC Comparison Study, and the USAF
MVC Modeling Study.

US Army MVC Injury Study
A longitudinal study was conducted in the 1990s to identify demographic and
behavioral risk factors associated with serious MVCs in the US military (Bell, Amoroso,
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Yore, Smith, & Jones, 2000). After completing HRA surveys in 1992 to capture their
health habits and behaviors, active-duty US Army personnel were followed until one of
three events occurred – they were hospitalized due to injuries sustained in MVCs, they
separated from the military, or the study period ended in 1997. During the six-year study
period, 429 of the 99,981 Army personnel who had completed HRAs were hospitalized
with injuries sustained in MVCs where they were acting as operators or passengers of 4W
motor vehicles. Hazard ratios compared the times to event (hospitalization or
separation/end of study) of the 429 injured and 99,552 uninjured service members to
identify significant associations between demographic and behavioral factors and MVC
injury hospitalizations.
Looking at the demographic factors, both age and paygrade were found to be
significantly associated with MVC injury hospitalization. Compared to service members
over the age of 40, the risk of MVC injury hospitalization was approximately 6 times
higher for 18-20 year old service members (HR=5.89), 4 times higher for 21-25 year old
service members (HR=3.89), and 2 times higher for 26-30 year old service members
(HR=1.93). Compared to officers, the risk of MVC injury hospitalization was
approximately 2.5 times higher for enlisted service members (HR=2.62).
Looking at the behavioral factors, both speeding and drinking and driving or
riding with a drinking driver were found to be significantly associated with MVC injury
hospitalization. The risk of MVC injury hospitalization was around 1.5 times higher for
service members with typical speeding behaviors in excess of 10 mph over the limit than
for service members with typical speeding behaviors within 5 mph of the limit
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(HR=1.52). The risk of MVC injury hospitalization for service members who did not
drive was twice the risk for service members with typical speeding behaviors within 5
mph of the limit (HR=1.98). The risk of MVC injury hospitalization for service members
who indicated drinking and driving or riding with drinking drivers was around 1.5 greater
than the risk for service members who did not (HR=1.45).

USMC MVC Fatality Study
Bowes and Hiatt (2008) identified and compared the contributing factors
associated with MVC fatalities for USMC and US populations. The USMC dataset
contained 464 USMC MVC fatalities (94 2W and 370 non-2W vehicles) that occurred
between FY1999 and FY2007. The general US dataset contained NHTSA FARS data
from the same time period adjusted to match the age-gender demographics of the USMC.
Overall, the MVC fatality rates for the USMC population were lower than those for the
general US population (29 deaths per 100,000 USMC compared to 34.5 deaths per
100,000 US).
By vehicle type, USMC rates generally exceeded US rates for MVCs with non2W vehicles while US rates generally exceeded USMC rates for MVCs with 2W
vehicles. Actually, MVC fatality rates for 2W vehicles were similar for the two
populations until around 2001 when the rates for the USMC began to exceed those for the
general US. Looking at age, the highest USMC fatality rates were found for 19 year olds
for non-2W vehicles and for 25 to 32 years olds for 2W vehicles. Looking at paygrade,
the highest USMC fatality rates were found for E-2 personnel followed by E-3 and E-4
personnel. Furthermore, the risk of MVC fatalities for USMC personnel were
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significantly higher for junior enlisted (E-1 to E-2) who joined the military at least six
months prior and warrant officers compared to senior enlisted personnel (E-7 to E-9).

Fatal Military MVC Study
Hooper et al (2006) identified and quantified factors associated with fatal MVC
events for military service members from all four branches between 1991 and 1995.
Bivariate analyses were used to compare 980 male service member driver fatalities to
12,807 male service member non-MVC fatalities which served as the control group. This
study found that male service members killed in MVCs were more likely to be younger,
enlisted and in the USMC. Looking at age, male service member MVC fatalities were
significantly more likely to be younger than 36 and specifically more likely to be under
the age of 26. Looking at paygrade, male service member MVC fatalities were
significantly more likely to involve enlisted personnel than officers. Looking at service,
male service member MVC fatalities were significantly more likely to be in the USMC
than in the USAF, USN, or US Army.

USAF-US MVC Comparison Study
Carr (2001) selected five operator factors of interest captured by the USAF
(excessive speed, fatigue, impairment, inexperience, and recklessness other than speed)
and quantified their associations with severe MVC events for the USAF and general US
populations. The dataset contained a total of 893 MVCs (182 motorcycle and 711 nonmotorcycle) that resulted in permanent disability or death of a USAF operator, passenger,
bicyclist, or pedestrian between fiscal years 1988 and 1999. The most common event
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factors were impairment (40%), excessive speed (39%), and fatigue (19%). Looking at
just the motorcycle MVCs, the most common event factors were excessive speed (48%),
impairment (32%), and inexperience (16%). Linearity tests of annual trends indicated
small but significant reductions of impairment and excessive speed event factors in
USAF MVCs between FY1988 and FY1999. Multivariate analyses were performed to
compare the risk of MVC fatality for USAF male operators (per 100,000 person years as
estimated using averaged annual USAF personnel strength data from the 12-year period)
to the risk of MVC fatality for licensed male US drivers (per 100,000 licensed drivers as
estimated by NHTSA FARS licensed driver data from 1996). Results of these analyses
indicated that MVCs took the lives of approximately 40% fewer USAF than US licensed
male operators.

USAF MVC Modeling Study
Markopoulos (2009) selected factors of interest from those captured by the USAF
including age and paygrade and studied their associations with off-duty USAF MVCs.
The dataset contained a total of 12,403 2W and 4W MVCs involving USAF operators
between FY1999 and FY2007 that resulted in minor injury, lost time, permanent
disability, or death of one or more USAF service members. Categorical analyses were
performed to determine how each factor related to the rate of MVCs and the severity of
the resulting injuries. Looking at age for MVCs between FY1994 and FY2007 (age data
were not captured prior to FY1994), the young service members between the ages of 17
and 24 had a significantly higher MVC rate than older age groups and were more likely
to have MVCs that resulted in lost time cases and fatalities. Looking at paygrade, enlisted
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service members (Airman, NCO, and Senior NCO) were more likely than officers
(company grade, field grade) to be involved in MVCs, particularly for MVCs that
resulted in lost time cases and fatalities. Comparisons by vehicle type were limited in
value in that they did not compare rates of MVCs for operators of 2W to those for
operators of 4W vehicles but instead looked at the percentage of all MVCs that occurred
on each type of vehicle. In this regard, Markopoulos found that significantly more of the
MVCs involved 4W vehicles with a consistent ratio of two 4W MVCs to every one 2W
MVC.
2.2.5 Military-Civilian Comparisons
It is tempting to merely extrapolate MVC trends identified in the general
predominantly civilian population to the military population. In fact, several similarities
do exist between civilian and military populations. However, there are also several
differences that suggest that the military population is actually quite unique.
Starting with similarities between military and civilian, civilians and service
members of similar ages typically die from the same causes (Segal & Segal, 2004).
MVCs for both civilians and military personnel largely occur on roadways travelled by
the general public.
Next, for both civilian and military populations in the US, young drivers are
involved in more MVCs than other age groups. Military personnel are representative of
the age group typically involved in or affected by MVCs in the general population. The
percentages of people in three young age ranges (15 to 24, 25 to 34, and 35 to 44) are
consistently higher for drivers involved in fatal MVCs than for the people in the general
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population. Almost one fourth (23%) of the drivers involved in fatal MVCs in the US are
between the ages of 15 and 24. About one fifth of the drivers involved in fatal MVCs in
the US are between the ages of 25 and 34 (20%) and 35 and 44 (18%). The percentages
of the general population in these age ranges are 14% apiece. However, the percentages
of people in these age ranges (15 to 24, 25 to 34, and 35 to 44) are consistently greater for
those serving in the military than for both drivers in fatal MVCs and people in the general
population.
Finally, factors commonly associated with fatal MVCs in the military are similar
to those associated with fatal MVCs in the general population. For example, speed and
impairment are significantly associated with fatal MVCs for Air Force service members
{DoD, 2003, Department of Defense Motor Vehicle Safety Initiatives - Report to
Congress}. These factors are common factors associated with fatal MVCs for the general
population, especially for younger age groups (NHTSA, 2008, 2010a).
There are also a number of differences between civilians and military personnel
(Lee & Mather, 2008). First of all, military personnel are younger than their civilian
counterparts. One study found the average age of active duty service members to be 28
years with the average enlisted being 27 years of age and the average officer being 32
years of age. Almost one half (47%) of the active duty military personnel were between
18 and 24 years of age. In contrast, only about one third (37%) of the general population
are between 18 and 24 years of age with a median age for people in the civilian
workforce of 41 years.
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The differences between US military and civilian populations encompass more
than just age. Military personnel are less likely to be Hispanic, slightly more likely to be
white or black, and much likelier to be American Indian or Alaskan native than their nonmilitary peers (Watkins & Sherk, 2008). In addition, the marital rates for enlisted
personnel (49.8%) and military officers (70.4%) differ from those for working civilians
(57.0%) (GAO, 2002). Even more, American military personnel have more formal
education than US civilians. Almost all military members (98%) have high school
degrees compared to 90% of the civilian labor force and 80% of US civilian men between
the ages of 18 and 24 (GAO, 2002; Watkins & Sherk, 2008).
Not everyone in the civilian population is eligible to work in the military. Service
members must meet certain health, intelligence, education, and criminal background
requirements in order to be eligible to join the military. For example, prior to being
accepted to the military, recruits must take the Armed Forces Qualification Tests
(AFQT). The AFQT tests four fields of knowledge – Arithmetic Reasoning, Math
Knowledge, Paragraph Comprehension, and Word Knowledge. The military rejects at
least 75% of applicants with scores in the bottom thirtieth percentile and 100% of
applicants with scores in the bottom tenth percentile (Kilburn, Hanser, & Klerman, 1998).
Further, since serving for the military is a full time job, service members are
automatically unlike the entire general population which contains both employed and
unemployed people. The selection and retention criteria for military personnel make it so
that service members are healthier, fitter, and more sober (use alcohol and drugs less
frequently) than the civilian workforce population (Carr, 2001).
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2.3 HUMAN ERROR MODELS AND FRAMEWORKS
Human error has been defined as a planned sequence of actions that fails to
achieve its desired outcome (Reason, 1990). Numerous human error models have been
developed to explain the breakdown between expected and actual outcomes. Human error
models may be categorized by the perspective in which it was based - cognitive,
ergonomic, behavioral, epidemiologic, and psychosocial. The cognitive perspective
(Rasmussen, 1982) is based on mental processes. The ergonomic perspective (Edwards,
1988) is focused on aspects of design. The behavioral perspective (Petersen, 2003) is
based on responses to external stimuli and the environment. The epidemiologic
perspective (Suchman, 1960) is focused on at-risk populations. The psychosocial
perspective (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993) is based on the effects of social factors.
Using the original single-faceted perspectives as a foundation, subsequent
generations of human error models have taken a multifaceted systems approach to human
error. These models assert that accidents are caused by the combination of multiple
factors. Human error taxonomies that stemmed from these models include the SCM,
SHEL, BeSafe, Wheel of Misfortune, ICAM, and HFACS models.
2.3.1 Swiss Cheese Model (SCM)
James Reason’s model of accident causation commonly referred to as the Swiss
Cheese Model (SCM), has greatly influenced the way that companies and professionals
view human error (Reason, 1990). Reason categorized two types of errors – active and
latent. Active errors are acts that result in immediate and observable outcomes. Latent
errors are issues that may be present for longer periods of time, providing the opportunity
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for failures to occur. The SCM captures active and latent errors in a system of planes.
Successful integration of the planes provides a safe environment for a productive system.
Unsuccessful integration of the layers results in system breakdowns.
So far, Reason has developed three distinct versions of the SCM for various
purposes – Mark I, II, and III. Mark I contained five layers of error - four productive
planes (decision makers, line management, preconditions, and productive activities) and
one destructive plane (defenses). Mark II integrated the defenses into the four productive
planes. Mark III depicted SCM more abstractly and provided descriptions of both shortterm breaches and long-lasting latent conditions.
Of the three versions of SCM, the structure of Mark II may be most applicable for
error classification purposes. Mark II, as seen in Figure 3, has three planes each with
areas where the system is protected and areas where the system is susceptible to
problems. The planes show individual, task/environment, and organization levels of the
system. The individual level relates to the person or people directly involved in an
adverse event. Active failures at the individual level involve unsafe acts which may be
categorized as errors or violations. The difference between an error and a violation is
whether the incorrect selection or execution of an action is intentional (error) or
unintentional (violation). The task/environment level relates to mediating conditions “in
existence immediately prior or at the time of the incident that directly influence human
and equipment performance” (De Landre & Bartlem, 2005). The organization level
relates to management decisions, processes, and practices. These latent factors typically
are not detected until an incident occurs.
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Figure 3: Mark II SCM (Reason, 1990)

2.3.2 Software Hardware Environment Liveware (SHEL) Model
The SHEL model was developed by Edwards (1972, 1988) to identify areas of
potential failures in human-machine interactions. The SHEL model, as seen in Figure 4,
involves three components (software, hardware, and liveware) that interact with one
another within an environment. Software is the non-material aspect, hardware is the
technical aspect and equipment, environment is the external influences, and liveware is
the human aspect. The original SHEL model focused primarily on the relationships
between these components as they relate to man-machine interfaces.
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Figure 4: SHEL Model (Edwards, 1988)

2.3.3 Behavioral Safety (BeSafe) Method
The Behavioral Safety (BeSafe) method is a proactive evaluation tool based on
Reason’s (1990) human error framework created to identify and prevent potential human
errors in a system (Benedyk & Minister, 1998). BeSafe, originally Potential Human Error
Audits, targets accidents that could result from active failures, latent failures, and
violations with a focus on the role of management. Primarily used for product design
safety improvement, BeSafe has four main stages – discovery of active failures and
violations, evaluation of organizational influences, identification of latent failures, and
development of action plans in response to the findings. After determining the latent
failures in the system based upon findings from the first three stages, a BeSafe analysis
seeks to target these failures with preventative strategies.
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2.3.4 Wheel of Misfortune
The Wheel of Misfortune is an abstract framework that can be used as an accident
investigation tool (O'Hare, 2000). Drawing from Reason’s SCM, Rasmussen’s ‘SkillRule-Knowledge’ activities, and Helmreich’s sphere model, the Wheel of Misfortune is a
system with three levels – local actions, local conditions, and global context depicted as
concentric circles as seen in Figure 5 below. The innermost disc represents local actions
or the unsafe acts of individuals or teams. The middle disc represents local conditions or
the internal and external precipitating task demand, interface, and resource factors. The
outer disc represents the global context with recognized and unrecognized hazards related
to the organization’s philosophies, policies, and procedures.

Figure 5: Wheel of Misfortune (O'Hare, 2000)

2.3.5 Incident Cause Analysis Method (ICAM)
ICAM is a structured approach that allows for systematic safety investigations in
different industries (De Landre & Bartlem, 2005; De Landre & Gibb, 2002). ICAM was
developed jointly by Dr. James Reason, BHP Billiton, Dédale Asia Pacific, and the
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Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI, now part of the Australian Transport Safety
Bureau). Some of the objectives of ICAM are to capture the facts, identify the active and
latent hazards, gather the findings, and recommend corrective actions. The ICAM
approach stresses the importance of not apportioning blame in order to focus on
identifying the true issues in the system. The ICAM framework focuses on four main
areas that correspond to Reason’s Mark I SCM – absent/failed defenses, individual/team
actions, task/environmental conditions, and organizational factors.
2.3.6 Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)
HFACS is a comprehensive, user-friendly human error framework created by Drs.
Scott Shappell and Douglas Wiegmann for use as an accident investigation and data
analysis tool (Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997, 2001, 2003). With roots in established
human error philosophies, HFACS provides a systematic way to classify the active and
latent failures described in Reason’s SCM of human error (Reason, 1990). With tiers that
map to the layers of human error in the SCM, the HFACS framework defines the holes in
the SCM to facilitate its application to accident investigation and analysis in real world
operational settings. The four tiers of the HFACS framework are unsafe acts,
preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and organizational influences.
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Figure 6: HFACS Framework (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001)

Unsafe acts are errors (skill-based, decision, and perceptual) and violations that
directly result

in adverse events.

Preconditions are physical,

psychological,

environmental, and interpersonal factors that affect the ability to perform tasks safely.
Unsafe supervision refers to situations in the workplace in which workers are not
provided with adequate support to safely complete required tasks. Organizational
influences are the decisions by those in the topmost positions within the company related
to resources, formal policies and procedures, culture, and climate.
The first tier of the HFACS framework captures the unsafe acts of operators that
directly result in an adverse event (e.g. accident, incident, or near miss). There are five
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categories of unsafe acts in the HFACS-MVC framework in two groups – errors (skill
based, decision, and perceptual) and violations (routine and exceptional).
The second tier of the HFACS framework captures the preconditions for unsafe
acts relate to factors related to environmental, physical, and physiological conditions that
affect performance of operators. The HFACS framework has seven categories of
preconditions for unsafe acts in three groups – environmental factors (technical and
physical), conditions of the operator (adverse mental states, adverse physiological states,
and physical/mental limitations), and personnel factors (personal readiness and
communication/coordination).
The third tier of the HFACS framework captures the unsafe leadership factors that
may affect operator conditions and environmental factors. There are four categories of
unsafe supervision causal factors – inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate
operations, failure to correct known problem, and supervisory violations.
The fourth tier of the HFACS framework relates to organizational influences,
decisions made by upper-level management that may have an effect on supervisory
practices, operator and environmental preconditions, and subsequently the unsafe acts of
its personnel. There are three categories of organizational influences – resource
management, organizational climate, and organizational process.
Four criteria are especially important for validating a framework – reliability,
comprehensiveness, diagnosticity, and usability. The HFACS framework has proven its
validity by demonstrating that it meets all four of these criteria.

47

The first criterion that a framework must meet is reliability. A framework that is
reliable as an investigative tool gathers approximately the same findings every time it is
used. Estimates for reliability are often based on the results of reliability tests looking at
testing various types of reliability such as test-retest, inter-rater, and parallel-forms
reliability. Test-retest reliability indicates a framework’s ability to gather the same
findings consistently over time. Inter-rater reliability indicates a framework’s ability to
gather the same findings consistently between multiple independent investigators.
Parallel-forms reliability indicates a framework’s ability to gather the same findings
consistently with related findings using other tools and techniques. The most relevant and
valuable indicator of reliability for a framework to be used in operational settings by a
variety of individuals throughout an organization is inter-rater reliability.
Inter-rater reliability may be measured statistically using Cohen’s Kappa
coefficient values. Kappa values range from 0.00 to 1.00 with 0.00 indicating no
consistency between raters and 1.00 indicating perfect consistency between the raters.
The better Kappa values range from 0.60 to 1.00 with scores above 0.60 indicating good
consistency between raters, and scores above 0.75 indicating excellent consistency
between raters (Fleiss, 1981). Inter-rater reliability Cohen’s kappa values have been
calculated at the tier and category levels for various domains. Inter-rater reliability was
strong for raters applying the HFACS framework to military aviation accidents in the US
with a Cohen’s kappa of 0.94 (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). Inter-rater reliability was
also strong for raters applying the HFACS framework to commercial aviation accidents
with a Cohen’s kappa score of 0.75 (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). For raters applying
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HFACS to military aviation accidents in the Republic of China’s Air Force, inter-rater
reliability Cohen’s kappa values for each causal category ranged from 0.44 for the lowest
categories through 0.83 for the highest category (Li, Harris, & Yu, 2008). Of the 18
causal categories in the original HFACS model, kappa values were lower than 0.60 for
only four of the 18 causal categories – one category in the preconditions tier, one
category in the supervisory tier, and two categories in the organizational tiers (Li, et al.,
2008).
The second criterion that a framework must meet is comprehensiveness. A
framework that is comprehensive as an investigative tool captures all the different types
of factors associated with an adverse event. With several tiers capturing a breadth of
factors, the HFACS framework is able to capture a variety of factors. Within several
industrial domains, the HFACS framework has proven to be a taxonomy that can
comprehensively identify and address all contributing factors for adverse events.
The third criterion that a framework must meet is diagnosticity. A framework that
is diagnostic as an investigative tool identifies trends and causes. With various levels of
the framework at the tier, category, subcategory, and causal factor or nanocode, the
HFACS framework allows both causes and trends to be tracked. Additionally, these
causes and trends can be viewed at various layers of granularity.
The fourth criterion that a framework must meet is usability. A framework that is
usable as an investigative tool is able to be transferred from theoretical to practical use.
The HFACS framework has shown that is can easily be integrated and accepted for use in
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operational settings. HFACS has been adapted and modified to apply to a variety of
industrial domains.
HFACS was originally designed for use within the USN and USMC to identify
and examine common root causes among aviation-related accidents and has since been
adopted for widespread use by the US Department of Defense (Belland, Olsen, & Lawry,
2009; O'Connor, 2008; O'Connor, Cowan, & Alton, 2010). Successful HFACS
framework extensions and variations for use in industry include the application of
HFACS to commercial aviation and general aviation in the US (Detwiler, et al., 2006;
Shappell, Detwiler, Holcomb, Hackworth, & Wiegmann, 2007; Wiegmann, et al., 2005;
Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001, 2003), civil aviation in India (Gaur, 2005), China (Li, et
al., 2008) and Australia (Lenne, Ashby, & Fitzharris, 2008), and military aviation in
China, Taiwan, and India (Li & Harris, 2006, 2007; Li, Harris, & Chen, 2007). Similarly,
the HFACS framework has been applied to other aviation related fields such as air traffic
control (ATC) (Broach & Dollar, 2002; Hanowski, Olson, Hickman, & Dingus, 2006;
Scarborough, Bailey, & Pounds, 2005) and operations of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) (Boquet, Detwiler, Roberts, Jack, & Wiegmann, 2004) and remotely-piloted
aircraft (Tvaryanas, Thompson, & Constable, 2006). HFACS has also been successfully
applied to non-aviation domains including construction (Walker, 2007), petroleum/gas
(Aas, 2008), mining (Patterson & Shappell, 2010), maritime (Celik & Cebi, 2009), rail
(Baysari, Caponecchia, McIntosh, & Wilson, 2009; Baysari, McIntosh, & Wilson, 2008;
Reinach & Viale, 2006) and several areas of healthcare (Elbardassi, Wiegmann, Dearani,
Daly, & Sundt, 2007; Maurizio, et al., 2010; Milligan, 2006).
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Variations of the original HFACS framework have been created and applied
across a range of industries. To accommodate the idiosyncrasies of their target audiences,
the HFACS framework is modifiable for even the most minor modifications in order to
accommodate the idiosyncrasies of an organization’s target audience (Wiegmann &
Shappell, 2003). Derivative HFACS frameworks are all based upon the basics of the
original HFACS framework. These variations may appear different from the original
HFACS framework due to their unique set of nanocode exemplars and modifications to
wording conventions used in the model. These differences are negligible with regards to
the framework’s validation. Derivative HFACS frameworks have successfully been
applied in a variety of industries. These derivative frameworks include HFACS-ME for
aviation maintenance (Krulak, 2004), HFACS-MI for mining (Patterson, 2009), and
HFACS-RR for railroad (Reinach & Viale, 2006).
Berry (2010) analyzed high-level human error trends across a variety of industries
and created four sets of HFACS causal category benchmarking standards. Binary HFACS
datasets from 17 sources across seven industry types were collected and compared in
order to assess the appropriateness of each dataset for use in benchmarking standard
calculations. For each of the main HFACS causal categories, statistical two-proportion Ztests and False Discovery Rate methodology were applied to determine if any of the
datasets were atypical and worthy of exclusion from calculations. Four sets of
benchmarking standards were created for use in different circumstances (Accident and
Near Miss Non-filtered, Accident and Near Miss Filtered, Accident Non-filtered, and
Accident Filtered). Accident benchmarking standards sets are appropriate for datasets
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containing accident cases and lacking near miss cases. Filtered benchmarking standards
are appropriate for higher quality datasets containing cases that have been thoroughly
investigated, captured, and classified. A typical dataset consisting of accident cases
without near miss cases that were not investigated in a consistent or comprehensive
manner should be compared to the non-filtered accident benchmarking standards set as
captured in Table 5.
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Table 5: HFACS Trend Comparison for Off-Duty MVCs and Non-Filtered Accident Benchmarking Standards (Berry, 2010)

HFACS-MVC Category
Outside Influences
Organizational Influences
Organizational Climate
Organizational Process
Resource Management
Unsafe Supervision
Inadequate Leadership
Planned Inappropriate Ops
Failure to Correct Problem
Leadership Violations
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts
Environmental Conditions
Physical Environment
Technical Environment
Operator Conditions
Adverse Mental State
Adverse Physiological State
Physical/Mental Limitation
Operator Factors
Comm., Coord., & Planning
Personal Readiness
Unsafe Acts of the Operator
Skill Based Errors
Decision Errors
Perceptual Errors
Violations

Off-Duty
MVCs
%
5.4

Main / Secondary Grouping
Accident Benchmarking Standards
Mean
(LCI, UCI)
---------

0.3
0.8
0.2

1.1
7.6 / 52.0
1.9

(0.2, 2.1)
(4.8, 10.3) / (41.1, 62.9)
(0.8, 3.0)

1.0
0.6
0.5
0.1

3.1 / 21.6
3.7 / 22.1
4.8
2.3

(1.5, 4.7) / (13.9, 29.4)
(0.0, 7.4) / (13.6, 30.7)
(0.5, 9.1)
(0.0, 4.8)

18.2
4.1

41.0 / 13.4
13.6

(31.3, 50.7) / (10.4, 16.5)
(7.8, 19.5)

21.5
34.7
12.5

5.3 / 26.4
1.7
14.0 / 2.9

(2.9, 7.7) / (24.2, 28.6)
(0.8, 2.7)
(7.4, 20.5) / (0.7, 5.1)

4.8
0.2

6.9 / 18.8
1.3 / 10.8

(4.5, 9.3) / (10.1, 27.5)
(0.2, 2.4) / (1.9, 19.7)

70.7
28.8
0.8
54.0

64.7
43.1
5.2 / 32.5
10.5 / 25.0

(58.6, 70.5)
(31.5, 54.7)
(3.0, 7.3) / (23.6, 41.4)
(5.3, 15.7) / (21.3, 28.7)

2.3.7 Criticisms to Error Frameworks
Supervisory and organizational factors have historically been overlooked. There
are a number of reasons that most accident databases contain few or even no supervisory
and organizational factors. The higher the tier the harder it is to identify factors. Instead
of observable actions or conditions which are clear-cut, these factors are less tangible and
involve abstract concepts (Li & Harris, 2006). Investigators may not identify factors at
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higher levels if the process is disorganized or lacks a clear, comprehensive framework to
guide the investigation (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). It is important to have good
investigators who ask the right questions and a good framework with which it can be
captured. Likewise, without good databases, coders may feel that they are inferring too
much from the accident report narrative to be able to reliably assign codes at the
organizational level (Li & Harris, 2006). Investigators and coders internal to or working
for a company may be reluctant to identify factors for fear of reprisal if they make the
company look bad (Patterson, 2009). On the flip side, outside personnel who investigate
only certain situations (e.g. OSHA) may only look to identify factors that may have a
larger breadth within the organization.
Various researchers have identified relationships between factors at various levels
of the system for adverse events in different domains. A study comparing fatal and nonfatal mining accidents found that significantly more organizational factors were
associated with fatal than with non-fatal accidents (Patterson, 2009). Another study
describing relationship between factors identified at each of the HFACS levels concluded
that basic relationships exist between organizational factors and factors at the
supervisory, precondition, and unsafe act tiers.
Certain domains are more amenable to having factors at the supervisory and
organizational levels. For example, it may be relatively straightforward to identify
organizational factors in a company where there are clear delineations between people at
the organizational level (head honchos), supervisory level (managers), and individual
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level (worker bees). However, in other domains identifying factors at the higher levels
can be more difficult.
Some critics argue that error frameworks like HFACS capture arbitrary factors
with no relation to the causes of future events (Dekker & Hollnagel, 2004). By modeling
failures as stochastic rather than deterministic, some have deduced that past failures play
no role in predicting future failures. While it is true that no one can completely predict
the future, it seems plausible that some of the factors that have contributed to adverse
events in the past continue to be involved in adverse events in the present and future.
Predicting the future is not a perfect science, but to leave the past in the past only ensures
status quo.
Critics claim that identifying individual factors oversimplifies the complexity of
adverse events. In order to investigate human error, one must identify not only how a
person “erred” but also what was happening at the time that made the selected behavior
seem like the right choice at the time (Dekker, 2001). Critics maintain that identification
of individual factors involved in an adverse event prevents identification of the effects of
factor interactions at the heart of the problem. They speculate that factor interactions can
be understood only by looking holistically by gathering thick behavioral descriptions for
each complex event (Dekker, 2001; Snook, 2002). Ultimately, frameworks like HFACS
actually facilitate the investigation, identification, and classification of factors involved in
adverse events. Without a framework to ensure consideration of all areas which may have
contributed to the event, investigators and researchers may miss factors and experience
bias.
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Studying traditional demographics provides some insight into operator
characteristics, but cannot provide the type of insight necessary for MVC prevention. For
instance, research has found the typical driver/rider involved in fatal MVCs to be a young
male operating a vehicle at night in a rural area. Unfortunately, knowing this profile does
not provide any insight that is easily actionable. In contrast, studying the behaviors that
lead to MVCs and the motivations behind these behaviors provide a platform for targeted
MVC prevention strategies.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS
3.1 HFACS FOR MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES (HFACS-MVC)
Using Wiegmann and Shappell’s HFACS model as a foundation, the HFACSMVC framework was created to capture the contributing factors for MVCs in the
military. Individual factors in the HFACS-MVC framework were identified by reviewing
existing traffic safety literature and subset of military MVC narratives. While the
fundamentals of the original HFACS model exist in the HFACS-MVC framework, some
modifications were made (Table 6). These modifications affect the categories of the tiers
in the model, the categories of unsafe acts in the model, and the perspective from which
the model is framed.
Table 6: Causal Factor Components for HFACS and HFACS-MVC

HFACS
HFACS-MVC

# Tiers
4
5

# Categories
18
19

# Nanocodes
N/A

3.1.1 HFACS-MVC Framework
HFACS-MVC has five tiers – the four tiers of the original HFACS model (unsafe
acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and organizational influences)
plus an additional tier (outside influences). Factors within three tiers (unsafe acts,
preconditions for unsafe acts, and outside influences) are specific to the road user
domain. Factors in the remaining two tiers, unsafe supervision and organizational
influences, are more generic across a variety of domains. The basic framework of
HFACS-MVC is presented in Figure 7. The full framework of HFACS-MVC with causal
factor categories, subcategories, and nanocodes can be referenced in Appendix B.
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Figure 7: HFACS-MVC Framework

To focus on preventing severe personal MVCs affecting military personnel,
HFACS-MVC is framed from the perspective of off-duty service members operating
personal motor vehicles on the road. The unsafe acts and preconditions for unsafe acts are
specific to the individual service members driving or riding motor vehicles. The
supervisory factors are the acts of military personnel serving in leadership roles
overseeing these service members driving or riding motor vehicles. The organizational
factors are the influences of the military as an organization that employs the
aforementioned service members. Outside influence factors capture the instances where
MVCs occur due to no fault of the military motor vehicle operator. Detailed descriptions
of these tiers are provided in a subsequent section.
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At the unsafe acts tier, HFACS-MVC has four factor categories instead of the
original five. Typically, HFACS frameworks have two distinct categories of violations
for routine and exceptional violations. Differentiating between the two types of violations
can be difficult increasing the potential for error during classification. Consider reading a
narrative for a MVC which lists excessive speed (85 mph in a 65 mph zone) as a causal
factor. Is this a routine or an exceptional violation? Turns out, it could be either.
Additionally, exceptional violations, by definition, are rare, isolated events that cannot be
predicted; as such, classifying a violation as routine or exceptional may not provide
additional benefit in its prevention. To minimize unnecessary effort and prevent error,
both violation types are captured in a single violations category in HFACS-MVC.

Unsafe Acts of the Operator
Unsafe acts refer to actions of a motor vehicle operator that directly precede and
result in a MVC. The first tier of the HFACS-MVC framework captures the unsafe acts
of motor vehicle operators in four causal categories (Table 7). The four categories of
unsafe acts in the HFACS-MVC framework are skill based errors, decision errors,
perceptual errors, and violations.
Table 7: Brief Descriptions of Unsafe Acts Causal Categories

UNSAFE ACTS
Errors
Skill Based Errors: These “doing” errors represent highly practiced behavior that occurs
with little or no conscious thought. These errors frequently appear as breakdown
in visual scan patterns, inadvertent activation/deactivation of switches, forgotten
intentions, and omitted items in checklists often appear.
Decision Errors: These “thinking” errors represent conscious, goal-intended behavior that
proceeds as designed, yet the plan proves inadequate or inappropriate for the
situation. These errors typically manifest as poorly executed procedures, improper
choices, or simply the misinterpretation and/or misuse of relevant information.
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Perceptual Errors: These errors arise when sensory input is degraded as is often the case
when operating a vehicle at night, in poor weather, or in otherwise visually
impoverished environments. Acting on imperfect or incomplete information,
drivers and riders run the risk of misjudging distances, rates, or incorrectly
responding to visual illusions.
Violations
Violations: These intentional acts represent bending or breaking of established rules and
regulations. Violations include habitual, rule-bending condoned by the
organization as well as isolated, atypical rule-breaking not tolerated by the
organization.
Skill Based Errors. Skill based errors are “doing” errors where highly practiced
behaviors are inadequately performed. The error occurs not in the selection of a behavior
but in its execution. The four general categories of skill based errors are attention failures,
postural errors, technique errors, and timing errors. One example of a skill based error is
a driver trying to answer his cell phone who fails to notice that the traffic light has turned
red. Another example is a driver who drifts off the road inadvertently and reacts by
jerking the steering wheel too hard in the opposite direction without thinking.
Decision Errors. Decision errors are “thinking” errors where an operator selected
a behavior that proves to be inadequate. Here, the error occurs in the selection rather than
in the execution of a behavior. The six general categories of decision errors are
information processing, planning, prioritizing, situational assessment, procedural and
vehicular. One example of a decision error is a person riding his motorcycle who fails to
adjust his behavior when it starts to rain and starts to coat the road surface. Another
example is a person chooses to pass another vehicle a bad point in the road.
Perceptual Errors. Perceptual errors are errors that occur due to degraded sensory
input. This is often the case when operating a vehicle at night, in poor weather, or in
otherwise visually impoverished environments. In situations with imperfect or incomplete
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information, operators run the risk of misjudging distances, rates, or incorrectly
responding to visual illusions. For instance, an example of a perceptual error is a
motorcycle rider whose vision is impaired by glare causing him to misread the sign for
the exit. Another example is a driver whose perception of a single light on an unlit road at
night leads her to misjudge the distance between her vehicle and the motorcycle in front
of her.
Violations. Violations are conscious decisions to bend or break existing rules and
regulations. Some violations are habitual and condoned by management while other
violations are isolated occur with extreme rarity. The two general categories of violations
are procedural and knowledge related. Speeding, or travelling above the posted speed
limit, is a violation whether it’s by five or 45 miles per hour. Operating a vehicle without
proper licensure such as a valid driver’s license or motorcycle endorsement is also a
violation.

Preconditions for Unsafe Acts
Preconditions for unsafe acts are the surrounding environment, conditions of the
operators, and road user factors that affect performance. The HFACS-MVC framework
has seven categories of preconditions for unsafe acts (Table 8). There are two categories
of environmental factors – technological environment and physical environment. There
are three categories of factors related to conditions of the operator – adverse mental
states, adverse physiological states, and physical/mental limitations. There are two
categories of personal and interpersonal factors for road users – personal readiness and
communication/coordination.
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Table 8: Brief Descriptions of Preconditions for Unsafe Act Causal Categories

PRECONDITIONS FOR UNSAFE ACTS
Environmental Factors
Physical Environment: Issues related to both the operational and ambient environment
such as visibility due to fog, rain, lighting, and road surface conditions.
Technological Environment: Issues related to manmade items in the environment such as
the design and condition of the vehicle, roads, signs, medians, and safety devices.
Conditions of the Operator
Adverse Mental States: Acute psychological and/or mental conditions that negatively
affect performance such as mental fatigue, pernicious attitudes, and misplaced
motivation.
Adverse Physiological States: Acute medical and/or physiological conditions that
preclude safe operations such as illness, intoxication, and the myriad of
pharmacological and medical abnormalities known to affect performance.
Physical/Mental Limitations: Permanent physical/mental disabilities that may adversely
impact performance such as poor vision, lack of physical strength, mental
aptitude, general knowledge, and a variety of other chronic mental illnesses.
Operator Factors
Personal Readiness: Activities performed prior to operating the vehicle required to
perform optimally on the road such as obtaining adequate sleep, limiting the
effects of alcohol, and other preparatory activities.
Communication, Coordination, and Planning: Poor coordination/communication between
road users (vehicle operators, passengers, bicyclists, pedestrians) and planning
prior to operating the vehicle.
Physical Environment. Physical environment refers to factors in the operational
and ambient environment surrounding the operator that affect performance. The two
general categories of physical environment are visibility (due to weather or lighting) and
road surface condition. Take a driver who encounters heavy fog which prevents her from
seeing a vehicle merging into his lane. Or consider a rider who encounters gravel on the
road causing him to lose traction.
Technological Environment. Technological environment refers to factors in the
manmade and technological environment surrounding the operator that affect
performance. The three general categories of technological environment are vehicle
condition, road design, and protective devices on the road. One example is a driver whose
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brakes fail causing her to rear-end the vehicle in front of her. Another example is a rider
who ends up on a portion of the highway with excessive curves because the road hazards
were not pre-empted by any warning signs.
Adverse Mental State. Adverse mental state refers to mental conditions of the
operator that affect performance. The four general adverse mental state categories are
psychology (e.g. risk-taking personality), attitude (e.g. stressed), awareness (e.g.
inattention), and drowsiness (e.g. sleepy but not asleep). One example of an adverse
mental state factor is a distracted driver trying to type a text message who ends up
running a red light without realizing. A second example is a rider, agitated and stressed
after fighting with his fiancée, who takes out his aggression by riding aggressively.
Adverse Physiological State. Adverse physiological state refers to temporary
medical and physiological conditions of the operator that affect performance. These are
not permanent states, but may last several hours or even several days. The four general
categories of adverse physiological states are physiological condition, medical condition,
physical fatigue, and incapacitation. An example of an adverse physiological state factor
is a person who falls asleep while driving causing the car to drift into oncoming traffic.
Another example is a person riding his motorcycle under the influence of alcohol who is
unable to negotiate a sharp curve in the road.
Physical/Mental Limitation. Physical/mental limitation refers to occasions where
a person’s physical or mental abilities are insufficient for adequate driving or riding
performance. The three general physical/mental limitation categories are mental
limitations, physical limitations, and sensory deficiencies. For the most part,
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physical/mental limitation factors may be thought of as conditions diagnosable by a
physician, such as a chronic back problem. For example, a person suffering from sleep
apnea who experiences difficulty staying awake while driving. One major exception to
this generalization relates to a lack of sufficient knowledge for reasons such as
inadequate training or lack of exposure or experience. For example, a person riding a
motorcycle for the first time who applies too much pressure on the rear brake and sends
the motorcycle into a skid.
Personal Readiness. Personal readiness relates to situations where people are
physically or mentally unprepared for the safe operation of a motor vehicle. Activities
performed or omitted before operating a vehicle can have detrimental effects on driving
or riding performance. Take, for example, a person who decides to drive over 500 miles
home for Thanksgiving with a terrible hangover. Or consider someone who heads off to
the beach to watch the sunrise after staying up with friends until 03:00 in the morning.
Communication, Coordination, and Planning. This category relates to inadequate
communication and coordination between various road users as well as planning carried
out prior to getting on the road. For instance, a motorcycle rider who misinterprets
gestures from a truck driver as meaning that the adjacent lane was clear of traffic when
the truck driver is trying to convey his intent to yield right of way to the rider. Another
example of a communication/coordination factor is a driver who enters the left lane ahead
of another driver on the road without signaling.
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Unsafe Supervision
Unsafe supervision relates to the effect of leadership on operator conditions and
environmental factors. There are four categories of unsafe supervision causal factors –
inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate operations, failure to correct known
problem, and supervisory violations (Table 9).
Table 9: Brief Descriptions of Unsafe Supervision Causal Categories

UNSAFE SUPERVISION
Inadequate Supervision: Oversight and management of personnel and resources including
training, professional guidance, and operational leadership among other aspects.
Planned Inappropriate Operations: Management and assignment of work including
aspects of risk management, crew pairing, operational tempo, etc.
Failure to Correct Known Problem: Instances where deficiencies among personnel,
equipment, training, or other related safety areas are “known” to the supervisor
yet are allowed to continue uncorrected.
Supervisory Violations: The willful disregard for existing rules, regulations, instructions,
or standard operating procedures by management during the course of their duties.
Inadequate Supervision. Inadequate supervision relates to the failure of leadership
to provide its personnel with adequate and appropriate training, guidance, resources, and
oversight. An example of an inadequate supervision factor is a supervisor who fails to
provide adequate information to her service members about motorcycle training courses
offered through the military.
Planned Inappropriate Operations. Planned inappropriate operations relate to the
improper management of personnel by leadership. Inappropriate operations include poor
project planning and scheduling of personnel. While acceptable during emergency
situations, these plans are inadequate for normal non-emergency situations. An example
of a planned inappropriate operations factor is a supervisor who creates a schedule
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assigning one of his service members to the early shift without considering that he and
his wife have a newborn baby at home.
Failure to Correct Known Problems. Failure to correct known problems relates to
inadequate correction by leadership of hazards and deficiencies known to affect its
personnel. An example of a failure to correct factor is a supervisor who learns of his
service members recent struggles with alcohol but does nothing to intervene.
Supervisory Violations. Supervisory violations relate to the willful disregard of an
organizations rules and regulations by people in leadership positions. An example of a
supervisory violation factor is a supervisor who is aware of shift-rest schedule regulations
but decides to not abide by them when creating work schedules for her service members.

Organizational Influences
Organizational Influences. Organizational influences relate to the effects that
decisions made by upper-level management have on supervisory practices, operator and
environmental preconditions, and unsafe acts of its personnel. There are three categories
of organizational influences – resource management, organizational climate, and
organizational process (Table 10).
Table 10: Brief Descriptions of Organizational Influences Causal Categories

ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES
Resource Management: How an organization manages its human, monetary, and
equipment resources.
Organizational Climate: Prevailing atmosphere/vision within the organization including
such things as policies, command structure, and culture.
Organizational Process: Formal process by which the vision of an organization is carried
out including operations, procedures, and oversight among others.
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Resource Management. Resource management relates to decisions made at the
highest levels regarding the allocation and maintenance of organizational assets. Budget
cuts, common in times of economic difficulty, can amplify these resource issues. An
example of a resource management causal factor is an organization that replaces its full
day training program with a cursory online module in an attempt to save money.
Organizational Climate. Organizational climate relates to an organization’s
policies both explicit and tacit that can set the stage for adverse events. An example of an
organizational climate factor is an organization whose culture captured by Rear Admiral
Grace Murray Hopper’s quote “it’s always easier to ask forgiveness later than it is to get
permission” (Williams, 2004).
Organizational Process. Organizational process relates to the manner in which
standard operating procedures are established, updated, and followed within an
organization. An example of an organizational process factor is an organization without
any formal process in place for updating established standard operating procedures as
changes occur.

Outside Influences
Outside Influences. Outside influences captures MVCs that occur completely
outside the control of a military road user that often result from unsafe behaviors of other
road users completely outside the control of a military operator. An example of an
outside influence factor is a service member struck head-on on his way home from work
by a drunk driver travelling in the opposite direction of traffic.
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3.1.2 HFACS-MVC Training
Becoming an HFACS-MVC specialist involves an extensive amount of training
and experience in applying human factors principles to the management of human error.
Expertise as an HFACS specialist and Certified HFACS Professional are prerequisites for
becoming an HFACS-MVC specialist.
First, the specialists learned to use HFACS for accident analysis purposes. As
such, the specialists participated in the Basic HFACS Training Workshop taught by the
original creators of HFACS, Drs. Shappell and Wiegmann. During this intensive two-day
course, HFACS specialists were taught how to use the HFACS framework to identify and
manage human error. To gain proficiency, the specialists coded several sets of potential
causal factors from different domains such as driving. A few of these are captured in
Table 11; a complete set is provided in Appendix C. They also coded several sets of
actual cases using real-world data.
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Table 11: HFACS Category Coding Samples

Causal Factor
While waiting to turn onto the highway, a driver started to
inch forward when he saw an oncoming truck in the right
lane of traffic. He tried to stop the vehicle, but accidentally
hit the gas instead forcing the truck to swerve to avoid a
collision.
The driver drove 10 to 15 mph over the posted speed limit
on the highway.
The driver was physically impaired after going out for a few
drinks.
Though considered an authority figure, an officer drove his
police vehicle faster than the posted speed limit and did not
signal before changing lanes.
The state did not allocate adequate funding for road
maintenance or sufficient highway patrol.

HFACS Category
Skill Based Error

Violation
Adverse
Physiological
State
Supervisory Violation
Resource Management

Then, the HFACS specialists became certified as HFACS professionals. Certified
HFACS professionals must demonstrate advanced knowledge and skills using HFACS by
passing a comprehensive written exam, applying HFACS to a practical real-world
situation, and submitting a sample HFACS work product.
Finally, the HFACS professionals were trained to use the HFACS-MVC
taxonomy. HFACS-MVC specialists became familiarized with the HFACS-MVC
framework and nanocode guide (Appendix B). The HFACS-MVC nanocodes are
arranged by causal category starting at the unsafe act level. To code a causal factor using
the guide, go to the section containing the appropriate HFACS-MVC causal factor
category, select the appropriate subcategory, and find the desired causal factor. The
nanocode is the subcategory abbreviation followed by the number assigned the particular
causal factor.
Training to be HFACS-MVC specialists was similar to the HFACS specialist
training. Samples of causal factors specific to MVCs were again coded, this time at the
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nanocode level using the HFACS-MVC framework and nanocode guide. A few of these
causal factors are captured in Table 12; a complete set is provided in Appendix D. The
HFAC-MVC specialists also coded several complete MVC cases using real-world data.
Table 12: HFACS-MVC Nanocode Coding Samples

Causal Factor

HFACS-MVC
Category
While waiting to turn onto the highway, a Skill Based Error
driver started to inch forward when he saw
an oncoming truck in the right lane of
traffic. He tried to stop the vehicle, but
accidentally hit the gas instead forcing the
truck to swerve to avoid a collision.
The driver travelled 10 to 15 mph over the Violation
posted speed limit on the highway.

HFACS-MVC
Nanocode
ATT4
Inadvertent
operation of wrong
control

VPRO1 Speeding 1019 mph over the
speed limit
The driver was physically impaired after Adverse
PC2 “Impairment due
going out for a few drinks.
Physiological State to drugs or alcohol”
Though considered an authority figure, an Supervisory
SV
officer drove his police vehicle faster than Violation
the posted speed limit and did not signal
before changing lanes.
The state did not allocate adequate funding Resource
RM
for road maintenance or sufficient highway Management
patrol.
3.2 MILITARY MVC DATA
The military is supported by service-specific safety centers that focus on mishap
prevention. Each safety center is responsible for maintaining a mishap reporting system
and database for its service members. The Naval Safety Center (NSC) at Norfolk Naval
Base in Norfolk, Virginia maintains the online reporting system for USN and USMC
mishaps. The Air Force Safety Center (AFSC) at Kirtland Air Force Base in
Albuquerque, New Mexico maintains the online reporting system for USAF mishaps.
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Among the records maintained at the safety centers are those for severe (Class A and
Class B) off-duty mishaps.
Over the past decade, the NSC has actually maintained two mishap reporting
systems – Safety Information Management System (SIMS) and Web Enabled Safety
System (WESS). Mishaps were initially reported through SIMS. However, with limited
functionality for exporting data and reporting results, SIMS was replaced with a new
system, WESS available for use starting in 2002 (DoD, 2001; "US Naval Safety Center
Selects JReport 6," 2003). In 2004, NSC required that WESS be the exclusive mishap
reporting system used for all USN and USMC mishaps. WESS contains fields for
investigators to capture narrative summaries, contributing factors (personnel, roadway,
environmental, vehicular, and event), and related recommendations. With both SIMS and
WESS, NSC personnel review each report submitted for USN and USMC Class A and B
mishaps and assign all applicable causal codes. The list of applicable causal codes may
be referenced in the glossary of the Navy and Marine Corps Mishap and Safety
Investigations Manual (DoN, 2005). The AFSC has maintained the mishap reporting
system Air Force Safety Automated System (AFSAS) for many years. AFSAS contains
fields for investigators to enter mishap details, record narrative synopses, indicate
contributing causal and non-causal factors (personnel, roadway, environmental,
vehicular, and event), and submit recommendations.
3.2.1 Data from Safety Centers
Based on the scope of the research, the populations of interest included all USN,
USMC, and USAF cases where service members were victims of severe (Class A/B) off71

duty MVC mishaps. With specific interest in 2W and 4W off-duty MVCs, mishaps
involving service members as pedestrians (e.g. joggers, post-crash outside vehicle) or
riders of bicycles or all-terrain vehicles were excluded from this study. The specific
parameters for MVC demographic and narrative mishap data requested from the
respective safety centers are presented in Table 13.
Table 13: Data Requested from Safety Centers

Data
Population of Interest
Requested Cases

Eliminated Cases

Content
USN, USMC, and USAF cases where service members were
victims of severe (Class A/B) off-duty MVC mishaps
Demographic and narrative data fields for the following cases:
•
Mishap Severity: A/B
•
Duty Status: Off-duty
•
Accidental Death Type: MVC
•
Vehicle Type: 2W/4W
•
Position of Service Member: Operator
Service members acting as passengers, pedestrians, bicyclists,
and riders of all-terrain vehicles
Narratives containing insufficient detail

Upon completion of all appropriate services’ documentation, the safety centers
provided both quantitative (personnel, roadway environment, vehicle, and event
demographics) and qualitative (narrative) information for each mishap stripped of any
personal identifiers such as names and social security numbers to maintain the privacy of
mishap victims. Sample mishap narratives from several MVCs are presented in Appendix
E.
Demographic data were provided for each service as individual worksheets in
separate Microsoft Excel files (Table 14). The USAF narratives were provided as
individual Microsoft Word files with one document per case. Narratives for the USN and
USMC were provided in two Notepad text files, one for each of the military services.
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Unfortunately, the USMC data was limited in that only four years of cases were provided
and the demographic file lacked data related to service member ages and paygrades.
Table 14: Data Provided by Safety Centers

Content
USAF demographics
USAF narratives
USN demographics
USN narratives
USMC demographics
USMC narratives

File Type
Microsoft Excel 972003 Worksheet (.xls)
Microsoft Word 972003 Document (.doc)
Microsoft Excel 972003 Worksheet (.xls)
Text Document (.txt)
Microsoft Excel 972003 Worksheet (.xls)
Text Document (.txt)

File Created
2/02/2010

Dates Queried
10/01/1998 –
9/30/2008

11/23/2009
/27/2008
/2 /2008
/27/2008

10/01/1999 –
5/30/2008
10/01/2004 –
3/15/2008

3/25/2008

3.2.2 Data for Coders
The datasets provided by the NSC were modified prior to classification with
HFACS-MVC. The demographic and narrative data for 1300 MVC cases were provided
by the safety centers. The datasets provided contained all mishaps resulting in severe
injury or death of any service member, regardless of his/her seating position
(operator/passenger). With a focus on preventing military losses from MVCs, cases
where service members acted as passengers in or on vehicles were eliminated. After
eliminating these cases, there were 1161 off-duty MVCs available for classification – 474
USAF, 517 USN, and 171 USMC. The USAF cases occurred between October 1998 and
September 2008. The USN cases occurred between October 1999 and May 2008. The
USMC cases occurred between October 2004 and March 2008.

73

3.3 DATA CLASSIFICATION
Data classification was conducted by eight HFACS-MVC specialists in teams of
two. The coders were students in the Industrial Engineering department at Clemson
University – four were undergraduate students and four were doctoral students with a
concentration in Human Factors. All coders were highly trained in using HFACS and had
extensive experience coding hundreds of cases from multiple domains with varying
degrees of detail.
Teams of coders generally classify cases with an HFACS framework using one of
two methods – the arbitration method and the consensus method (Berry, 2010). Early
HFACS studies typically used the arbitration method where a pair of experts classified
each case independently and a third expert arbitrated any discrepancies. More recently,
HFACS studies have increasingly gravitated towards using the more efficient consensus
method in which two or more experts classify cases together. If disagreements arise
during coding, the experts discuss the situation until they are able to reach a consensus.
Previous studies have demonstrated high levels of inter-rater reliability for the HFACS
causal categories (Shappell, et al., 2007; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2004; Wiegmann, et al.,
2005; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001, 2003). Furthermore, the consensus method fosters a
shared understanding among the experts improving the consistency between experts at
the nanocode level of detail. As such, the coders used the consensus method to classify
the MVC mishaps in teams of two or three.
For each MVC, a team of coders read the narrative, determined its causal factors,
and determined the appropriate nanocode for each factor using the HFACS-MVC
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framework and nanocode guide. Suppose a team read a case where a service member was
unable to negotiate a curve due to his speed (90 mph in a 65 mph zone) and crossed over
the center lane into oncoming traffic. Looking at the HFACS-MVC causal categories at
the unsafe acts level, the coders would identify the service members speeding as a
violation and his inability to safely negotiate a curve as a skill based error. Looking at the
HFACS-MVC causal factor nanocodes, the coders would identify speeding as a
procedural violation, specifically a VPRO2 “Speeding 20-29 mph over the speed limit”
and the skill based error as a technique error, specifically a TQ7 “Failed to negotiate
curve/turn/bend/ramp.” Whenever any debate arose as to whether a causal factor was a
decision error or violation, the coders erred on the side of caution and classified these
ambiguous factors as decision errors rather than as violations.
Initially, the coders were unsure how to classify the four main factors related to
alcohol, drunk driving, buzzed driving, alcoholism, and driving with a hangover. The
teams classified drunk driving using two codes – one in the unsafe acts tier (violation for
drinking and driving – VDD) and one in the preconditions tier (physical condition for
impairment due to alcohol – PC2). The teams used the latter precondition code, PC2 to
classify buzzed driving, interpreted for this study as having positive blood alcohol
content under the legal limit of 0.08%. Both alcoholism and hung over were classified
with codes in the preconditions tier. The teams classified alcoholism as a physical/mental
limitation factor (PMO) and hung over as a personal readiness factor (PR4).
Inevitably, not every case could be classified. Some narratives lacked adequate
description or sufficient detail due to poor documentation practices. A narrative capturing
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only the paths travelled by vehicles involved in a MVC prior to collision from an aerial
perspective or a narrative focusing on events post-MVC may prove inadequate for
identifying the behaviors and conditions of the human operators. Other narratives were
omitted completely due to the nature of the MVCs. It is not always possible to determine
the chain of events leading up to a MVC, especially for single-vehicle crashes without
passengers or witnesses.
3.4 DATA ANALYSES
Data analyses were performed using Microsoft Excel 2010 and Minitab 16
Statistical Software. To determine the overall HFACS-MVC trends for the population,
data were coded and organized using Microsoft Excel 2010. A master file was created
that consolidated the Microsoft Excel files from the various branches of the military.
Cases with only an outside influence causal factor were deleted; cases with an outside
influence and at least one service member causal factor were retained. The presence or
absence of a causal factor for each of the 19 HFACS-MVC categories was indicated with
a binary variable of 0 (no causal factor from that category) or 1 (at least one causal factor
from that category).
To compare the HFACS-MVC trends between subsets of the population, data
were analyzed using Minitab 16 Statistical Software. First, a Chi-Square statistical test
was performed to identify the existence of significant differences between subsets. If the
Chi-Square statistic was significant, Odds Ratio statistical tests was performed to
determine the direction and magnitude of significant difference(s).
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3.4.1 Variables of Interest
This study looked at the relationships between each of four independent variables
and one dependent variable (Table 16). Both the independent (vehicle type, service,
paygrade, and age) and dependent (number of cases involving factors from each HFACSMVC causal factor category) variables were categorical. Vehicle type reflected whether
the military operator was riding a 2W or driving a 4W motor vehicle at the time of the
MVC. Service reflected whether the military operator served as a member of the United
States Air Force, Navy, or Marine Corps. Rank reflected whether the military operator
served as an enlisted service member or as an officer. Age group reflected the age of the
military operator was at the time of the MVC in one of six groups (17-20, 21-25, 26-30,
31-35, 36-40, or >40).
Table 15: Research Variables

Independent Variable
Vehicle Type
Service
Rank
Age Group

Variable Levels
2W, 4W
USAF, USN, USMC
Enlisted, Officer
17-20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, >40

Dependent Variable
Number of cases
with HFACS-MVC
causal categories and
nanocodes

The six age groups selected for the present study were based on those for prior
MVC studies. The age group sets used in prior MVC studies in the general population by
NHTSA, the USAF population by Carr and Markopoulos are presented in Table 17.
NHTSA provides information related to the vehicle occupants killed in fatal US MVCs
such as age in its FARS database. Not including occupant age groups younger than 16
years of age, who were assumed to be passengers based on age restrictions for licensure,
there are eight FARS age groups. The age groups used in the two USAF MVC studies by
Carr and Markopoulos reflect the younger demographic of the US military with upper
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limits of 40 and 50 years of age compared to an upper limit of 74 years of age from
FARS for the general US population.
Table 16: Comparison of Age Groups Used in MVC Studies

NHTSA FARS
16-20
21-24
25-34
45-54
55-64
65-74
>74
Unknown

USAF
(Carr, 2001)
17-20
21-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
41-45
46-50
>50

USAF
(Markopoulos, 2009)
17-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
>40

USAF, USN, USMC
Present Study
17-20
21-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
>40

Contingency tables may be used to present the relationships between two
categorical variables in matrix format with r rows and c columns with r*c cells. For this
dissertation, the independent variables will be presented across the rows and the
dependent variable will be presented down the columns. The individual cells contain
counts for cases where a particular causal factor category was present or absent. The
following 2x2 contingency table (Table 18) presents the relationship between vehicle
type and number of cases with at least one violation.
Table 17: Sample Contingency Table

Vehicle Type
2W
4W

HFACS-MVC Causal Category
Absence of Causal Category
a
c

(e.g. Violation)
Presence of Causal Category
b
d

Hypothesis testing for each independent variable compares the observed and
expected values for each HFACS-MVC causal category at the different variable levels.
The observed values represent the actual data while the expected values represent
theoretical data where there are no differences between variable levels. The general null
(H0) and alternate (H1) hypotheses are as follows:
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H0 :
H1 :
where

is the observed value and

3.4.2 Pearson’s Chi-Square (
Pearson’s Chi-Square (

)
) Test for Independence (Equation 1) is a nonparametric

test that compares the distributions for two categorical variables using frequencies. It
basically addresses whether the two variables in a contingency table are statistically
related to one another (Scanlan, 2007). The null hypothesis for the Chi-Square Test for
Independence assumes statistical independence between the independent variable (e.g.
2W, 4W) and dependent variable (causal factor patterns). The alternate hypothesis (H1)
states that there is a statistical relationship of the causal factor patterns between variables.
In other words, different levels of the independent variable exhibit similar causal factor
patterns. To determine the relationship between the independent and dependent variables
of interest, the Pearson’s Chi-Square Test of Independence was conducted at a
significance level of p=0.05.
Equation 1: Pearson’s Chi-Square (

∑

[

(

)

) Test of Independence

]

Pearson’s Chi-Square Test of Independence has two underlying assumptions: (1)
sample is randomly selected and (2) expected frequencies are sufficiently large
("Electronic Statistics Textbook," 2011). To prevent the occurrence of Type II errors,
sample sizes should meet expected cell count requirements or have the ability to be
corrected using a statistical correction. For small (2x2) tables, the minimum expected
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count requirement for each cell is five. If the minimum expected count requirements are
not met, statistical corrections such as Yates’ correction or Fisher’s exact test should be
applied (McDonald, 2009). For small (2x2) tables, Fisher’s exact should be used with
small sample sizes (<1000) while Yates’ correction should be used with large sample
sizes (≥1000). For larger tables, the minimum expected count requirement is five for 80%
of the cells and zero for none of the cells. For larger tables, an exact test or a randomized
test should be used with small sample sizes (<1000) while no correction should be used
for large sample sizes (≥1000).
3.4.3 Odds Ratio (OR)
While the Pearson’s Chi-Square Test of Independence determines whether two
variables are statistically related, it does not quantify this relationship. For determining
the direction and strength of relationships between two categorical variables, the Odds
Ratio (OR) descriptive statistic may be used. The odds ratio is a measure of effect size
that compares the likelihood of a binary outcome for two or more levels of a categorical
independent variable. Odds ratios are used with categorical independent variables and
binary dependent variables.
To illustrate the basic concepts behind the odds ratio, a sample (2x2) contingency
table is presented below with marginal totals for the variable levels and the grand total
(Table 19). The independent variable, vehicle type, is in the rows and the dependent
variable, HFACS-MVC causal category, is in the columns. The odds ratio for these
variables compares the likelihood that a case contains a violation for 2W and 4W vehicle
operators.
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Table 18: Sample Contingency Table with Marginal and Grand Totals

Vehicle Type
2W
4W
Total

HFACS-MVC Causal Category - Violation
Absence
Presence
a
b
c
d
a+c
b+d

Total
a+b
c+d
a+b+c+d

Using the notations from the sample contingency table above, the odds ratio
descriptive statistic is presented in Equation 2. Possible values for the odds ratio are
rational values between zero and infinity with a neutral value of one (Declerq, 2001).
When the odds ratio is equal to one, the outcome is equally likely for both levels of the
independent variable. When the odds ratio is greater than one, the outcome is more likely
for that level of the independent variable. When the odds ratio is less than one, the
outcome is more likely for that level of the independent variable.
Equation 2: Odds Ratio (OR) Descriptive Statistic

⁄
⁄

An odds ratio only looks at two levels for both the independent and dependent
variables. To use the odds ratio statistic for an independent variable with three or more
levels, each level may be captured in multiple (2x2) contingency tables and the odds
ratios for each table should be calculated (Uebersax, 2006). For example, an independent
variable with three levels would calculate the odds ratio for three separate (2x2)
contingency tables.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS, DATA AND OVERALL TRENDS
The military safety centers provided a total of 1300 Class A and B off-duty MVC
cases that occurred between October 1999 and March 2008 (Table 20). Of these cases,
1161 involved military service members as motor vehicle operators. About one-fourth of
the cases provided were eliminated from the dataset prior to analyses. Excluded cases
were caused exclusively by sources external to the service member (lacked at least one
unsafe act committed by the military operator) or were unable to be coded (lacked
insufficient narrative information or detail). The final dataset contained at total of 883
cases, 797 Class A and 86 Class B mishaps, which resulted in 704 fatalities and 179
serious injuries. In each case, the involved service member was operating a motor vehicle
on the roadway when he/she committed at least one unsafe act that contributed to the
MVC.
Table 19: Cases Classified

Dates
Total

FY99-08

Provided
[Operator, Passenger]
1300
[1161, 139]

Eliminated
[Without UA, Uncodeable]
278
[216, 62]

Analyzed
883

Some but not all of the years between FY99 and FY08 contained full datasets.
MVC cases were provided for most, but not all, of FY2008. Some years, MVC cases
came from all three branches (USAF, USN, and USMC) while other years, they came
from only one or two of these branches. One military branch provided MVC cases for the
one year period of FY1999. Two military branches provided MVC cases for the five year
period from FY2000 through FY2004. All three military branches provided MVC cases
for the four year period from FY2005 through FY2008.
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An average of 73.6 MVC cases occurred each month. The distribution of MVCs
over the 12 months of the year is presented in Figure 8. The month of March had the
fewest cases per month with 55 cases. The months of July and August had the most cases
per month with 90 cases each.

MVC Cases by Month
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Figure 8: MVC Cases by Month

An average of 126.1 MVC cases occurred each day. The distribution of MVCs
over the seven days of the week is presented in Figure 9. Wednesday had the least cases
per day with 68 cases while Saturday had the most cases per day with 212 cases. More
cases occurred on Saturday and Sunday than from Monday through Thursday combined.
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MVC Cases by Day
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Figure 9: MVC Cases by Day of the Week

An average of 36.8 MVC cases occurred each hour. The distribution of MVCs
over 24 hours in the day is presented in Figure 10. Fewer cases occurred in the morning
and early afternoon hours with the least number of cases occurring between 0900 and
1000. More cases occurred in the late afternoon and late night hours with the greatest
number of cases occurring between 0200 and 0300.
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MVC Cases by Time of Day
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Figure 10: MVC Cases by Time of Day

4.1 HFACS-MVC TRENDS
The following section presents the HFACS-MVC trends associated with off-duty
crashes. All cases in the final dataset contained at least one unsafe act. The dataset
contained 883 cases with a total of 2,642 nanocodes across the five HFACS-MVC tiers
(Figure 11). The overwhelming majority of nanocodes (n=2,559) were from the lower
two tiers, unsafe acts (n=1,622) and preconditions to unsafe acts (n=937). The remaining
nanocodes were from the upper two tiers, unsafe leadership (n=22) and organizational
influences (n=13) and the fifth tier, outside influences (n=48).
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HFACS-MVC Nanocodes by Tier

Unsafe Act n=1622
Precondition n=937
Supervisory n=22

Organizational n=13
Outside Influence n=48

Figure 11: HFACS-MVC Tiers, percentage of nanocodes (N=2,642)

The frequencies and percentages of cases associated with the HFACS-MVC
causal categories for all five tiers are presented in Table 21. Each case could contain
factors from several causal categories. As such, it was possible for the sum of the
percentages of cases associated with each causal category to exceed 100%.
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Table 20: Frequency and Percentage of Cases, number and percent of cases with presence of at least one causal factor in category

HFACS-MVC Category
Outside Factors
Outside Influences
Organizational Influences
Organizational Climate
Organizational Process
Resource Management
Unsafe Leadership
Inadequate Leadership
Planned Inappropriate Operation
Failed to Correct Known Problem
Leadership Violations
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts
Environmental Conditions
Physical Environment
Technical Environment
Operator Conditions
Adverse Mental State
Adverse Physiological State
Physical/Mental Limitation
Operator Factors
Communication, Coordination & Planning
Personal Readiness
Unsafe Acts of the Operator
Skill Based Errors
Decision Errors
Perceptual Errors
Violations

#

(%)

48

(5.4)

3
7
2

(0.3)
(0.8)
(0.2)

9
5
4
1

(1.0)
(0.6)
(0.5)
(0.1)

161
36

(18.2)
(4.1)

190
306
110

(21.5)
(34.7)
(12.5)

42
2

(4.8)
(0.2)

624
254
7
477

(70.7)
(28.8)
(0.8)
(54.0)

* N = 883

The frequencies and percentages of cases associated with the HFACS-MVC
causal factor subcategories for the two most populated tiers, preconditions for unsafe acts
and unsafe acts, are presented in Tables 22 and 23. Again, cases could contain factors
from several causal subcategories so the sum of the percentages can be over 100%.
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Table 21: Preconditions for Unsafe Act Subcategories, number and percent of cases with presence of factor in subcategory

HFACS-MVC Precondition Subcategories
Physical Environment
Surface Conditions
Visibility
Physical Environment, Misc.
Physical Environment, Other
Technological Environment
Protective Devices on Road
Vehicular Tech. Environment
Design
Tech. Env. Other
Adverse Mental State
Attitude
Awareness
Drowsiness
Psychology
Adverse Mental State, Other
Adverse Physiological State
Physiological Condition
Medical Condition
Incapacitation
Adverse Physiological State, Other
Physical/Mental Limitation
Mental Limitation
Sensory Deficiency
Physical Limitation
Physical/Mental Limitation, Other
Personal Readiness
Personal Readiness
Personal Readiness, Other
Communication, Coordination, & Planning
Communication
Coordination
Planning
Comm., Coord., & Planning, Other

#

(%)

121
49
7
3

(13.7)
(5.5)
(0.8)
(0.3)

14
5
17
2

(1.6)
(0.6)
(1.9)
(0.2)

38
55
67
58
2

(4.3)
(6.2)
(7.6)
(6.6)
(0.2)

276
9
42
1

(31.3)
(1.0)
(4.8)
(0.1)

101
1
0
8

(11.4)
(0.1)
(0.0)
(0.9)

2
0

(0.2)
(0.0)

11
1
31
1

(1.2)
(0.1)
(3.5)
(0.1)

* N = 883

The top three preconditions for unsafe act subcategories associated with MVCs in
descending order were physiological conditions, surface conditions, and mental
limitations. Approximately one-third of the MVCs contained at least one physiological
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condition causal factor. Much smaller percentages of the MVCs were associated with
surface conditions and mental limitations, each present in only around one-tenth of the
cases.
Table 22: Unsafe Act Subcategories, number and percent of cases with presence of factor in subcategory

HFACS-MVC Unsafe Act Subcategories
Skill Based Errors
Attention Failure
Postural Error
Technique Error
Timing Error
Unknown Control Error
Skill Based Error, Other
Decision Errors
Information Processing Error
Prioritization Error
Procedural Decision Error
Situational Assessment Error
Vehicular Decision Error
Decision Error, Other
Violations
Procedural Violation, Speed
Procedural Violation, Drunk Driving
Procedural Violation, Other
Knowledge Violation
Violation, Other

#

(%)

92
1
428
15
115
4

(10.4)
(0.1)
(48.5)
(1.7)
(13.0)
(0.5)

5
53
61
147
1
1

(0.6)
(6.0)
(6.9)
(16.6)
(0.1)
(0.1)

307
219
78
36
8

(34.8)
(24.8)
(8.8)
(4.1)
(0.9)

* N = 883

The top unsafe act subcategories associated with MVCs in descending order were
technique errors, procedural speeding violations, procedural drunk driving violations,
situational assessment errors, unknown control errors, and attention failures. Of these
unsafe act subcategories, four were errors (three skill based errors and one decision error)
and two were violations (both procedural in nature). Almost one-half of off-duty MVCs
contained at least technique error causal factor. Around one-third and one-fourth of
MVCs contained at least one procedural speeding and procedural drunk driving violation
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respectively. Between one-tenth and one-fifth of MVCs were associated with each of the
situational assessment error, unknown control error, and attention failure subcategories.
Two of the subcategories, physiological condition and drunk driving violation, are
related. The drunk driving violation subcategory exclusively captured factors reflecting a
conscious disregard of the laws related to being over the legal drinking limit and
operating a motor vehicle (in the US, the legal drinking limit is below a blood alcohol
content of 0.08%). The physiological condition subcategory exclusively captured factors
related to being impaired due to the drugs or alcohol which relates to being intoxicated
(drunk) as well as to being impaired (buzzed), hung-over, etc. Simply put, all cases with
drunk driving violations will have physiological condition factors but not all cases with
physiological condition factors will have drunk driving violations. In this dataset, 276
cases were associated with impairment from drugs or alcohol – 219 cases associated with
operator intoxication from being drunk with a BAC over 0.08% and 57 cases associated
with operator impairment from drugs or from being buzzed with a BAC under 0.08%.
The most common causal factor nanocodes associated with off-duty MVCs
involving US military service members are presented in Table 21. Of the 15 most
commonly classified nanocodes, 10 causal factors were at the unsafe act level (four skill
based errors, one decision error, and five violations) and five causal factors were at the
precondition for unsafe act level (one environmental condition factor and four operator
condition factors). As discussed, PC2 and VDD are related to one another with PC2
capturing the physiological effects related to driving drunk (VDD) as well as other
physiological impairments. Assuming all VDD factors are already captured by the PC2
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nanocode, the top five nanocodes associated with off-duty MVCs were impairment due to
drugs or alcohol/drunk driving (PC2), failure to negotiate curve or turn (TQ7), failure to
modify behavior for hazards (SA2), lost control for an unknown reason (LCU), and oversteered or overcorrected to regain position on road (TQ6).
Table 23: Common causal factors associated with off-duty military MVCs

Ranking
1
2

Description of Nanocode
Impairment due to drugs or alcohol
Failure to negotiate curve or turn

Nanocode
PC2
TQ7

Tier
PC
UA

3
4
5
6

Drunk driving
Situational assessment
Lost control, due to unknown reason
Over-steered or overcorrected to regain position

VDD
SA2
LCU
TQ6

UA
UA
UA
UA

7
8
9
10

Limited experience or proficiency
Speeding, unknown illegal speed
Slippery road surface
Mental fatigue, drowsy

ML4
VPRO0
SC1
AMF1

PC
UA
PC
PC

11
12
13
13

Inadvertent drifting out of lane
Speeding, 20-29 mph over the speed limit
Speeding, 10-19 mph over the speed limit
Speeding, 40+ mph over the speed limit

ATT5
VPRO2
VPRO1
VPRO4

UA
UA
UA
UA

13

Personality style

PSY1

PC

Detailed analyses of HFACS-MVC categories, subcategories, and nanocodes
were conducted for the lower two tiers, unsafe acts and preconditions to unsafe acts. The
upper two tiers, unsafe leadership and organizational influences, were excluded from
analysis due to the paucity of factors identified. The fifth tier, outside influences, was
excluded from analysis because it captures factors associated with non-military personnel
and is therefore outside the scope of this effort.
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4.2 UNSAFE ACT TRENDS
All cases contained at least one unsafe act by the service member operating the
motor vehicle. The 883 cases contained one (n=365), two (n=341), three (n=141), four
(n=28) or even five (n=8) unsafe act causal factors per case. The percentage of cases
containing at least one factor from each of the four unsafe act causal categories is
presented in Figure 12. The leading unsafe act causal categories associated with off-duty
MVCs were skill based errors and violations followed by decision errors. Of the 883
cases in the dataset, approximately three-fourths contained at least one skill based error,
one-half contained at least one violation, and one-fourth contained at least one decision
error. Only a handful of cases involved perceptual errors.
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Unsafe Acts Associated with Off-Duty MVCs
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Figure 12: Unsafe Act Categories, percentage of total cases with at least one factor per category (N=883)

4.2.1 Unsafe Acts over Time
The trend lines for unsafe act categories involved in MVCs between FY1999 and
FY2008 are presented in Figure 13. The temporal trends for all four unsafe act categories
remained stable and some may have even increased slightly.
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HFACS-MVC Unsafe Act Categories by Fiscal Year
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Figure 13: Unsafe Act Category Temporal Trends, percentage of cases per fiscal year with at least one factor per category

4.2.2 Skill Based Errors
Most cases (n=624) contained at least one skill based error. These 624 cases
contained one (n=555), two (n=66), or three (n=3) skill based error nanocodes per case. A
total of 696 skill based error nanocodes were identified. Breakdowns of decision errors
associated with MVCs by subcategory and nanocode are presented in Figures 14 and 15.
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Skill Based Error Causal Factor Subcategories
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Figure 14: Skill Based Error Causal Factor Subcategories, percentage of total cases with at least one factor per subcategory (N=883)
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Figure 15: Skill Based Error Causal Factors, count of skill based error nanocodes (N=696)

The most common skill based error subcategory captured technique errors. These
technique errors typically captured operators who travelled too fast to safely negotiate a
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curve or turn (TQ7) or who overcorrected trying to maintain or regain their position on
the road (TQ6). Other common causal subcategories of skill based errors were control
errors and attention errors.
4.2.3 Decision Errors
Several hundred cases (n=254) contained at least one decision error. These 254
cases contained either one (n=239) or two (n=5) decision error nanocodes per case. A
total of 269 decision error nanocodes were identified. The breakdowns of decision errors
associated with MVCs by subcategory and nanocode are presented in Figures 16 and 17.

Decision Error Causal Factor Subcategories
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Figure 16: Decision Error Causal Factor Subcategories, percentage of total cases with at least one factor per subcategory (N=883)
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Decision Errors Associated with MVCs
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Figure 17: Decision Error Causal Factors, count of decision error nanocodes (N=269)

The most common subcategory of decision errors was related to situational
awareness. In particular, these decision errors were made by operators who should have
but did not modify their behaviors on the road to accommodate for travel conditions
(SA2). Other common sub-categories of decision errors were procedural errors and
prioritization errors. Prioritization decision errors were often committed by operators who
made decisions based on inappropriate prioritizations (PRI1) or ignored cautions or
recommendations from others (PRI2). Procedural decision errors typically involved
operators who selected an inappropriate maneuver (DPRO2), decided to pass or change
lanes at an improper time or location (DPRO3), or failed to yield the right of way
(DPRO1).
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4.2.4 Violations
Over half of the cases (n=477) contained at least one violation. These 477 cases
contained one (n=327), two (n=129), three (n=19), or four (n=2) violations per case. A
total of 650 violation nanocodes were identified. The breakdowns of violations associated
with MVCs by subcategory and nanocode are presented in Figures 18 and 19.

Violation Causal Factor Subcategories
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Figure 18: Violation Causal Factor Subcategories, percentage of total cases with factor in subcategory (N=883)
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Violations Associated with MVCs
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Figure 19: Violation causal factors, count of violation nanocodes (N=650)

The most common violation subcategories were procedural in nature. Over onethird of the cases contained procedural violations were related to speeding. One-fourth of
the cases contained drunk driving violations. In fact, the top violation nanocode was
VDD which captured service members who operated motor vehicles with a BAC of
0.08% or greater.
4.3 PRECONDITION TRENDS
Most cases contained at least one causal factor from the preconditions tier
(n=583). The 583 cases with preconditions had one (n=351), two (n=153), three (n=52),
four (n=18), five (n=9), or even six (n=2) precondition causal factors per case. The
percentage of cases associated with each of the three groups of precondition
subcategories (environmental conditions, operator conditions, operator factors) is
presented in Figure 20.
99

Precondition Causal Category Groups
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Figure 20: Precondition Causal Category Groups, percentage of total cases with at least one factor per group (n=883)

The most common groups of precondition causal categories associated with offduty MVCs were operator conditions followed by environmental conditions and finally
operator factors. Of the 883 MVC cases in the dataset, over half contained operator
conditions, one-fifth contained environmental conditions, and one-twentieth contained
operator factors.
4.3.1 Preconditions over Time
The trend lines for the three groups of precondition causal categories involved in
MVCs between FY1999 and FY2008 are presented in Figure 21. The temporal trends for
all three precondition groups remained stable suggesting no real changes in the trends
over time.
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Figure 21: Temporal Trends of Precondition Causal Category Groups

4.3.2 Environmental Conditions
Environmental conditions include physical environment and technological
environment causal categories. A large majority of the cases classified lacked any
environmental condition causal factors (n=703). Figure 22 shows the percentage of cases
associated with each of the two environmental condition categories.

101

Environmental Condition Categories in MVCs
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Figure 22: Environmental Condition Categories, percentage of total cases with at least one factor per category (N=883)

One-fifth of the cases (n=180) contained at least one physical or technical
environmental condition factor. The 180 cases containing environmental conditions had
one (n=142), two (n=32), or three (n=6) environmental condition nanocodes per case. A
total of 224 environmental condition nanocodes were identified. Breakdowns of
environmental conditions associated with MVCs by subcategory and nanocode are
presented in Figures 23 and 24.

102

Environmental Condition Subcategories
100%

Cases (C) [%]

80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Pres: SC

Pres: VIS Pres: MIS

Pres:
PHYO

Pres: PPE

Pres:
TMVC

Pres: DES Pres: TEO

HFACS-MVC Subcategories
Figure 23: Environmental Condition Subcategories, percentage of total cases with at least one factor per subcategory (N=883)
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Figure 24: Environmental Condition Causal Factors, count of environmental condition nanocodes (N=224)

Environmental conditions include physical and technological environment causal
categories. A large majority of the 224 environmental condition nanocodes were physical
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environment factors (n=186) rather than technological environment factors (n=38). The
physical environment factors typically involved surface conditions (SC1-3) and visibility
issues (VIS1-2). The technological environment factors typically involved road sign
(PPE4) and road design (DES2) issues.
4.3.3 Operator Conditions
Operator conditions include adverse mental state, adverse physiological state, and
and physical/mental limitation causal categories. Figure 25 shows the percentage of
cases associated with each of the three operator condition causal categories. The leading
operator condition causal categories associated with off-duty MVCs were adverse
physiological state factors followed by adverse mental state factors. Of the 883 MVC
cases in the dataset, one-third contained adverse physiological state factors, one-fifth
contained adverse mental state factors, and one-tenth contained physical/mental
limitation factors.
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Figure 25: Operator Condition Categories, percentage of total cases with at least one factor per category (N=883)

The majority of cases contained at least one operator condition factor (n=492).
These 492 cases contained one (n=363), two (n=94), three (n=26), or four (n=9) operator
condition nanocodes per case. A total of 665 operator condition nanocodes were
identified. Breakdowns of operator conditions associated with MVCs by subcategory and
nanocode are presented in Figures 26 and 27.
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Figure 26: Operator Condition Subcategories, percentage of total cases with at least one factor per subcategory (N=883)
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Figure 27: Operator Condition Causal Factors, count of operator condition nanocodes (N=665)

Most operator conditions captured were adverse mental conditions (n=226) and
adverse physiological conditions (n=329) rather than physical/mental limitations (n=110).
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The adverse mental condition factors were related to drowsiness (ML4), breakdowns in
awareness (AW1), and the psychological makeup of operators (PSY1). The adverse
physiological state factors were related to operator impairment due to drugs and/or
alcohol (PC2). The physical/mental limitation factors were related to lack of experience
or proficiency of service members with the vehicles they were operating or with the areas
in which they were travelling (ML4).
4.3.4 Operator Factors
Operator factors include personal readiness and communication, coordination, and
planning causal categories. Figure 28 shows the percentage of cases associated with each
of the two operator factor categories. By far, the leading operator factor causal category
was communication, coordination, and planning followed by personal readiness.
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Figure 28: Operator Factor Categories, percentage of total cases with at least one factor per category (N=883)

Only 44 cases were associated with any operator factors. The 44 cases containing
operator factors had one (n=41), two (n=2), or three (n=1) operator factors per case. A
total of 48 operator factor nanocodes were identified. The overwhelming majority of the
operator factors classified were communication, coordination, and planning factors
(n=46) rather than personal readiness factors (n=2). Breakdowns of operator factors
associated with MVCs by subcategory and nanocode are presented in Figures 29 and 30.
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Figure 29: Operator Factor Causal Factor Subcategories, percentage of cases with at least one factor per subcategory (N=883)
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Figure 30: Operator Factor Causal Factors, count of operator factor nanocodes (N=48)
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CCPO

Common operator factor subcategories include communication and planning. In
particular, these factors were related to inadequate travel planning by the operator prior to
departure (PLA1) and communciation between an operator and other road users (COM5).
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS, COMPARISONS OF TRENDS
The following section presents the general trends associated with off-duty MVCs
for each of the independent variables. Nonparametric statistical analyses were conducted
to compare HFACS-MVC causal factor patterns for each independent variable. For
statistically significant causal categories, odds ratios were calculated and causal factor
(nanocode) comparisons were included. Insufficient cell counts prevented calculations of
valid Pearson Chi-Squares for the perceptual error and personal readiness causal
categories.
Again, the four independent variables of interest were military branch, vehicle
type, paygrade, and age group. For each independent variable, contingency tables were
created and presented alongside Pearson Chi-Square and Odds Ratio statistics for each
HFACS-MVC unsafe act and precondition category (except Technical Environment and
Personal Readiness which lacked sufficient cell counts). These can be found in Appendix
F for military branch comparisons, in Appendix G for vehicle type comparisons, in
Appendix H for paygrade comparisons, and in Appendix I for age group comparisons.
5.1 MILITARY BRANCHES: USAF, USN, USMC
The dataset contained about ten years of MVCs from both the USAF and USN. In
contrast, the dataset contained only about three years of MVCs from the USMC. Similar
percentages of cases were eliminated from all three services’ datasets due to an absence
of unsafe acts committed by the service member. Interestingly, a notably larger
proportion of cases were eliminated from the USN dataset than from both the USAF and
USMC datasets.
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As such, the large majority of classified cases involved operators in the USAF
(43%) and USN (42%) and a much smaller percentage involved operators in the USMC
(15%). There were a total of 1,384 nanocodes, 942 nanocodes, and 316 nanocodes
classified for cases in the USAF, USN, and USMC. As such, there were 3.7 factors per
case for the USAF, 2.5 factors per case for the USN, and 2.4 factors per case for the
USMC.
5.1.1 Temporal Trends
The number of cases in the final dataset from each branch by fiscal year is
provided in Figure 31. Again, keep in mind that the dataset for FY2008 was limited and
contained less than a full year of MVCs.
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Figure 31: Temporal Trends of MVC Cases by Military Branch

5.1.2 Unsafe Act Trends
The unsafe act trends by military branch are shown in Figure 32. The leading
unsafe act causal categories associated with off-duty MVCs for the USAF, USN, and
USMC were skill based errors followed by violations and decision errors with few, if
any, perceptual errors. Differences in unsafe act category trends between the three
branches were significant for skill based errors (
(

= 6.906, p<0.01) and violations

=30.997, p<0.01) but insignificant for decision errors (
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=0.264, ns).
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Figure 32: Unsafe Act Categories by Branch, percent of cases per branch with at least one factor per category

Approximately two-thirds of USAF cases and three-fourths of USN and USMC
cases contained skill based errors. The difference between the percentages of USN and
USMC cases associated with skill based errors was insignificant (

=0.868, ns).

However, the differences between the percentages of USN and USMC cases and the
percentage of USAF cases associated with skill based errors were significant.
Specifically, MVCs in the USAF were associated with significantly fewer skill based
errors than MVCs in both the USN (

=5.926, p<0.05) and the USMC (

=6.906,

p<0.05). The relative odds of a service member having a MVC involving one or more
skill based errors was approximately 1.5 times greater in the USN (OR=1.47) and almost
two times greater in the USMC (OR=1.84) than in the USAF.
The percentages of USAF, USN, and USMC cases associated with each of the
skill based error subcategories are presented in Figure 33. Common skill based error
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subcategories for all three military branches were related to technique, attention, and
control. The three main skill based error subcategories associated with cases for all three
branches were related to technique, control, and attention. Technique errors were
associated with the highest percentage of MVCs for service members in the USAF
followed by service members in the USN and USMC. The opposite trend was identified
for errors related to loss of control due to unknown reasons which were associated with
the highest percentage of MVCs for service members in the USMC followed by service
members in the USN and eventually those in the USAF. In fact, less than one-twentieth
of the USAF cases were associated with loss of control for unknown reasons.
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Figure 33: Skill Based Error Subcategories, percentage of cases per branch with at least one factor in subcategory

The USAF cases contained 281 skill based error nanocodes. The USN contained
297 skill based error nanocodes. The USMC cases contained 114 skill based error
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nanocodes. The skill based error nanocodes associated with each of the three military
branches are presented in Figure 34.
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Figure 34: Skill Based Error Causal Factors, counts of nanocodes per branch

The three most common skill based errors associated with USAF MVCs were all
related to technique (TQ7, TQ6, and TQ2). The most common skill based errors
associated with USN MVCs were related to technique (TQ7, TQ6), control (LCU), and
attention (ATT5). The most common skill based errors associated with USMC MVCs
were related to technique (TQ6, TQ7) and control (LCU).
Approximately one-fourth of USN and USMC cases and one-third of USAF cases
contained decision errors. Any differences amongst the branches in the percentages of
cases containing decision errors were insignificant (

=0.264, ns).

The percentages of USAF, USN, and USMC cases associated with each of the
decision error subcategories are presented in Figure 35. The decision error subcategory
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trends for MVCs were similar across the military branches. The most common decision
errors subcategories in MVCs for all three branches were related to situational
assessment, procedures, and prioritization. However, MVCs in the USAF were associated
with more prioritization errors than MVCs in either the USN or the USMC.
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Figure 35: Decision Error Subcategories, percentage of cases per branch with at least one factor in subcategory

A little less than one-half of USN and USMC cases and two-thirds of USAF cases
contained violations. Differences between the percentages of USN and USMC cases
associated with violations were insignificant (

=0.868, ns). In comparison, about and

two-thirds of USAF cases contained violations. The percentage of cases associated with
violations was significantly higher in the USAF than in both the USN (
p<0.05) and the USMC (

=34.607,

=23.015, p<0.05). In fact, the relative odds of having a MVC

involving one or more violations was over two times greater for a service member in the
USAF than in the USN (OR=2.38) or the USMC (OR=2.63).
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The percentages of USAF, USN, and USMC cases associated with each of the
violation subcategories are presented in Figure 36. The main violation subcategories
associated with cases for all three branches were all procedural in nature – speeding,
drunk driving, and other. Around one-third of the USN and USMC cases but closer to
one-half of the USAF cases were associated with speeding violations. Around one-fourth
of the cases for all three branches were associated with drunk driving violations with the
highest involvement seen for USAF cases and the least involvement seen for USMC
cases. The USAF and USN contained similar percentages of cases associated with other
procedural violations. A smaller percentage of USMC cases contained other procedural
violations. Interestingly, the percentage of cases associated with knowledge-related
violations for the USAF was approximately twice those for both the USN and USMC.
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Figure 36: Violation Subcategories, percentage of cases per branch with at least one factor in subcategory
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The USAF cases contained 340 violation nanocodes. The USN contained 236
violation nanocodes. The USMC cases contained 74 violation nanocodes. The violation
nanocodes associated with each of the three military branches are presented in Figure 37.
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Figure 37: Violation Causal Factors, counts of nanocodes per branch

The violations associated with MVCs for the three military branches were similar.
The most common violation associated with MVCs for all three branches was drunk
driving (VDD). For the USAF, the top three violations were drunk driving (VDD) and
travelling 10-29 mph over the speed limit (VPRO1, VPRO2). For the USN, the top three
violations were drunk driving (VDD), travelling at an unknown speed in excess of the
posted limit (VPRO0), and travelling 30-39 mph over the speed limit (VPRO3). For the
USMC, the top three violations were drunk driving (VDD), travelling at an unknown
speed in excess of the posted limit (VPRO0), and travelling 20-29 mph over the speed
limit (VPRO2). The USAF cases contained a much smaller percentage of violation
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nanocodes classified with the nanocode VPRO0 which captures speeding at unknown
speeds over the posted limit than cases for both the USN and USMC.
5.1.3 Precondition Trends
Overall, the MVC data for the three military branches exhibited similar trends at
the preconditions level. Across the board, the USAF generally had the highest
percentages of cases with at least one factor from each precondition causal category for
six of the seven precondition causal categories with the only exception being personal
readiness. The differences between the USAF as compared to the USN and USMC were
most noticeable in their percentages of cases containing AMS and PML causal factors.
The preconditions for unsafe act trends for the USAF, USN, and USMC are shown in
Figure 38.
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Figure 38: Preconditions Causal Categories, percentage of cases per branch with at least one factor in category
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These trends suggest that there are differences in the preconditions associated
with USAF, USN, and USMC MVCs. Looking at environmental conditions, significant
differences were found between the branches for physical environment factors
(

=8.852, p<0.05) and technological environment factors (

=17.716, p<0.01). Looking

at operator conditions, significant differences were found between the branches for
adverse mental state factors (
(

=100.399, p<0.01) and physical/mental limitation factors

=22.459, p<0.01) but not for adverse physiological state factors (

=5.084, ns).

Looking at operator factors, significant differences were found between branches for
communication, coordination, and planning factors (

=18.713, p<0.01).

Physical environment factors were associated with approximately one-fourth of
the USAF cases and between one-tenth and one-fifth of the USN and USMC cases. No
significant differences were found for physical environment factors between the USMC
and the USAF (

=2.322, ns) or the USN (

=0.304, ns). However, there was a

significant difference for physical environment factors between the USAF and the USN
(

=8.388, p<0.05). In fact, the relative odds of a service member having a MVC

associated with one or more physical environment factors was over 1.5 times greater in
the USAF than in the USN (OR=1.72).
Similar percentages of USAF, USN, and USMC cases were associated with each
of the four physical environment subcategories (Figure 39). The main physical
environment subcategories for all three branches were related to surface conditions and
visibility. Higher percentages of surface condition and visibility factors were found in
cases for the USAF than for either of the other two military branches.
121

Physical Environment Subcategories
100%

USAF
USN
USMC

Cases (C) [%]

80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Surface Conditions

Visibility

Physical
Environment, Misc

Physical
Environment, Other

HFACS-MVC Subcategories
Figure 39: Physical Environment Subcategories, percentage of cases per branch with at least one factor in subcategory

The USAF cases contained 106 physical environment nanocodes. The USN
contained 58 physical environment nanocodes. The USMC cases contained 22 physical
environment nanocodes. The physical environment nanocodes by military branch are
presented in Figure 40.
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Figure 40: Physical Environment Causal Factors, count of nanocodes per branch

The physical environment conditions associated with MVCs were similar across
the military branches. The most common physical environment conditions associated
with MVCs in the USAF, USN, and USMC were related to surface conditions (SC1-2)
and visibility (VIS2). Slippery road surface condition (SC1) was the leading physical
environment factor associated with MVCs for all three military branches.
Technological environment factors were associated with less than one-tenth of the
USAF cases, a miniscule percentage of the USN cases, and none of the USMC cases. No
significant difference was found for technological environment factors between cases in
the USN and USMC (

=3.283, ns). However, the percentage of cases in the USAF

associated with technological environment factors was significantly higher than the
percentages of cases in both the USN (

=9.404, p<0.05) and USMC (

=10.188,

p<0.05). The relative odds of a service member having a MVC containing one or more
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technological environment factors in the USAF were three times greater than in the USN
(OR=3.125) and infinitely greater than in the USMC (OR=∞).
Few if any of the cases for all three branches were associated with any of the four
technological environment subcategories (Figure 41). The main technological
environment subcategories were related to the vehicle, protective devices on the road, and
design of the road. Miniscule percentages of cases for the USN contained factors from
any of the technological environment subcategories. Higher percentages of cases for the
USAF contained road design and protective devices technological environment
subcategories.
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Figure 41: Technological Environment Subcategories, percentage of cases per branch with at least one factor in subcategory

The USAF cases contained 29 technological environment nanocodes. The USN
contained 9 technological environment nanocodes. The USMC cases did not contain any
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technological environment nanocodes. The technological environment nanocodes
associated with each of the three military branches are presented in Figure 42.
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Figure 42: Technological Environment Causal Factors, count of nanocodes per branch

Technological environment conditions associated with USAF cases all related to
the road environment. The top technological environment factors for the USAF captured
inadequate signs (PPE4) and inadequate road design (DES2). Technological environment
conditions associated with USN cases were related to the road environment and vehicle
environment. The top technological environment nanocodes for the USN captured
deficiencies associated with the vehicle (TVEH1), vehicular equipment (TVEH2),
guardrails (PPE2), and road design (DES2).
Over one-third of USAF cases contained adverse mental state factors. In
comparison, around one-tenth of USN and USMC cases contained adverse mental state
factors. MVCs in the USN and USMC contained similar percentages of adverse mental
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state factors (

=1.100, ns). However, the percentage of MVCs in the USAF associated

with adverse mental state factors was significantly different from the percentages of
MVCs in both the USN (

=86.945, p<0.05) and USMC (

=30.473, p<0.05). The odds

of a service member having a MVC involving one or more adverse mental state factors in
the USAF was over four times greater than in the USMC (OR=4.17) and over six times
greater than in the USN (OR=6.25).
The percentages of USAF, USN, and USMC cases for all three branches
associated with each of the adverse mental state subcategories are presented in Figure 43.
The main adverse mental state subcategories for all three branches were related to mental
fatigue/drowsiness, awareness, and attitude. However, the USAF had higher percentages
of its cases associated with all five of the adverse mental state subcategories compared to
both the USN and the USMC. This discrepancy was especially true for adverse mental
state factors related to psychology and awareness.
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Figure 43: Adverse Mental State Subcategories, percentage of cases per branch with at least one factor in subcategory

The USAF cases contained 172 adverse mental state nanocodes. The USN
contained 37 adverse mental state nanocodes. The USMC cases contained 17 adverse
mental state nanocodes. The adverse mental state nanocodes associated with each of the
three military branches are presented in Figure 44.
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Figure 44: Adverse Mental State Causal Factors, count of nanocodes per branch

Though there were similar numbers of MVCs classified for the USAF and USN,
USAF cases contained over four times as many adverse mental state factors as USN
cases. For the USAF, the top adverse mental state factors were personality style (PSY1)
followed by drowsiness (AMF1) and inattention/distraction (AW1). The top adverse
mental state factor for both the USN and USMC was drowsiness (AMF1). Other adverse
mental state factors associated with both the USN and USMC were inattention/distraction
(AW1) and stress (A7).
Over one-third of USAF and USN cases and one-fourth of USMC cases contained
adverse physiological state factors. Any differences between the percentages of MVCs
associated with adverse physiological state factors in the USAF, USN, and USMC were
insignificant (

=5.084, ns). The percentages of MVCs associated with the adverse

physiological state subcategories for each military branch is presented in Figure 45.
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Figure 45: Adverse Mental State Subcategories, percentage of cases per branch with at least one factor in subcategory

The top physical/mental limitation subcategories associated with cases for all
three branches captured physical condition followed by mental limitation and
incapacitation factors. Larger percentages of USAF and USN cases were associated with
physiological conditions than USMC cases with physiological condition factors identified
in one-third of the USAF and USN cases and one-fourth of the USMC cases. Higher
percentages of cases were associated with mental limitations, medical conditions, and
incapacitation in the USAF than in the USN and USMC. The percentage of USAF cases
associated with mental limitation factors was approximately double and over triple the
percentages of cases associated with mental limitation factors in the USN and USMC
respectively. The percentage of USAF cases associated with incapacitation factors was
approximately double and over triple the percentages of cases associated with mental
limitation factors in the USMC and USN respectively.
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Approximately one-fifth of USAF cases contained physical/mental limitation
factors. In comparison, less than one-tenth of USN and USMC cases contained
physical/mental limitation factors. No significant difference in percentages of cases
containing physical/mental limitation factors was found between the USN and the USMC
(

=1.988, ns). However, the percentage of USAF MVCs associated with

physical/mental limitation factors was significantly different from the percentages of
MVCs in both the USN (

=13.681, p<0.05) and USMC (

=13.494, p<0.05). The

relative odds of a service member having a MVC involving one or more physical/mental
limitation factors in the USAF was over two times greater than in the USN (OR=2.27)
and over four times greater than in the USMC (OR=4.17).
The percentages of USAF, USN, and USMC cases associated with each of the
physical/mental limitation subcategories are shown in Figure 46. For all three branches,
the most common physical/mental limitation subcategory for MVCs captured mental
limitation factors. A higher percentage of cases were associated with mental limitations
for the USAF than the USN or USMC.
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Figure 46: Physical/Mental Limitation Subcategories, percentage of cases per branch with at least one factor in subcategory

The USAF cases contained 61 physical/mental limitation nanocodes. The USN
contained 34 physical/mental limitation nanocodes. The USMC cases contained only 7
adverse mental state nanocodes. The physical/mental limitation nanocodes associated
with each of the three military branches are presented in Figure 47.
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Figure 47: Physical/Mental Limitation Causal Factors, count of nanocodes per branch

The top physical/mental limitation factor associated with cases for all three
branches involved limited experience or proficiency (ML4). In fact, limited experience or
proficiency was the primary physical/mental limitation factor classified for the USAF and
the sole physical/mental limitation factor classified for the USN and the USMC.
Factors from the category of communication, coordination, and planning were
present in less than one-tenth and one-twentieth of cases in the USAF and USN
respectively. Insignificant differences in the percentages of cases associated with
communication, coordination, and planning factors were found between the USMC and
both the USN (

=2.107, ns) and the USAF (

=3.090, ns). However, a significant

difference was found between the percentages of cases associated with communication,
coordination, and planning factors for the USN and USAF (

=17.000, p<0.05). The

relative odds of a service member having a MVC associated with one or more
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communication, coordination, and planning factors was over five times greater in the
USAF than in the USN (OR=5.56).
Small percentages of cases for all three branches were associated with each of the
four communication, coordination, and planning subcategories (Figure 48). The leading
communication, coordination, and planning subcategory for all three branches captured
planning factors. The USAF contained higher percentages of cases associated with all
four communications, coordination, and planning subcategories.
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Figure 48: Comm., Coord., and Planning Subcategories, percentage of cases per branch with at least one factor in subcategory

The USAF cases contained 35 communication, coordination, and planning
nanocodes. The USN cases contained 5 communication, coordination, and planning
nanocodes. The USMC cases contained 6 communication, coordination, and planning
nanocodes. The communication, coordination, and planning nanocodes associated with
each of the three military branches are presented in Figure 49.

133

Communication, Coordination, and Planning

Count (C) [#]

50

USAF
USN
USMC

25

0

COR1

COR2

COM1

COM2

COM3

COM4

COM5

PLA1

CCPO

HFACS-MVC Nanocodes
Figure 49: Comm., Coord., and Planning Causal Factors, count of nanocodes per branch

For all three branches, the leading communication, coordination, and planning
factor associated with MVCs was related to poor travel planning (PLA1). In fact, poor
travel planning was the primary communication, coordination, and planning factor
classified for the USAF and the sole communication, coordination, and planning factor
classified for the USN and the USMC. Following poor travel planning, the next most
common communication, coordination, and planning factor classified for the USAF was
related to inadequate transfer of knowledge between road users (COM5).
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5.2 VEHICLE TYPES: 2W, 4W
The final dataset contained cases involving operators of both 2W and 4W
vehicles. Though more cases involved 4W vehicles (n=548), a sizeable portion of the
cases involved 2W vehicles (n=335). There were a total of 978 and 1,664 nanocodes
classified for cases involving 2W and 4W vehicles respectively. As such, there were 2.9
factors per case for 2W MVCs and 3.0 factors per case for the 4W MVCs.
5.2.1 Temporal Trends
The temporal trends comparing MVCs by vehicle type are shown in Figure 50.
This comparison used the percentages of MVCs that involved 2W and 4W vehicles each
fiscal year. This was done to account for any differences in the number of services
providing MVC data each fiscal year.
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Figure 50: Temporal Trends of MVC Cases by Vehicle Type

Earlier in the decade between FY1999 and FY2008, 2W vehicles were involved
in approximately one third of the total MVCs each year. Over time, however, there was
an upward trend in the involvement of 2W vehicles relative to 4W vehicles involved in
MVCs each fiscal year. The data suggest that the contributing percentages of 2W and 4W
MVCs are trending towards a 50/50 split where half of the MVCs involve 2W vehicles
and half of the MVCs involve 4W vehicles each year.
5.2.2 Unsafe Act Trends
The unsafe act trends for 2W and 4W MVCs are shown in Figure 51. The
percentages of cases associated with the four categories of unsafe acts were practically
identical for 2W and 4W MVCs. No significant differences were found between 2W and
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4W MVCs for skill based errors (
violations (

=0.642, ns), decision errors (

=0.745, ns), or

=0.490, ns).

Unsafe Act Causal Categories Associated with MVCs by
Vehicle Type
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Figure 51: Unsafe Acts for 2W and 4W MVCs, percentages of cases containing at least one factor in category

Even though no significant differences were identified at the causal category
level, the causal subcategories associated with MVCs for each vehicle type were
identified. The percentages of 2W and 4W cases associated with skill based error causal
factor subcategories are presented in Figure 52. The main skill based error subcategories
were similar for 2W and 4W MVCs. Common skill based error subcategories for both
vehicle types were related to technique, attention, and control. However, 2W MVCs were
associated with more technique errors while 4W MVCs were associated with more
attention errors and control errors.
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Figure 52: Skill Based Error Subcategories, percentage of cases per vehicle type with at least one factor in subcategory

The percentages of 2W and 4W cases associated with decision error causal factor
subcategories are presented in Figure 53. The decision error subcategory trends for
MVCs were almost identical for the two vehicle types. The most common decision errors
subcategories for both 2W and 4W MVCs were related to situational assessment,
procedures, and prioritization.
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Figure 53: Decision Error Subcategories, percentage of cases per vehicle type with at least one factor in subcategory

The percentages of 2W and 4W cases associated with violation causal factor
subcategories are presented in Figure 54. The main violation subcategories were similar
for 2W and 4W MVCs. Common violation subcategories for both vehicle types related to
speeding and drunk driving. However, 2W MVCs were associated with more speeding
and knowledge violations while 4W MVCs were associated with more drunk driving
violations.

139

Violation Subcategories by Vehicle Type
100%

2W
4W

Cases (C) [%]

80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Pres: VPROSpeed

Pres: VPRO-Other

Pres: VKNO

Pres: VDD

Pres: VO

HFACS-MVC Precondition Causal Categories
Figure 54: Violation Subcategories, percentage of cases per vehicle type with at least one factor in subcategory

5.2.3 Precondition Trends
The precondition trends for 2W and 4W MVCs are shown in Figure 59. These
trends suggest that differences exist in the preconditions associated with 2W and 4W
MVCs. Several of the causal pattern trends for preconditions were found to be
significantly different for MVCs involving 2W and 4W vehicles.
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Figure 55: Preconditions by Vehicle Type, percentage of cases per vehicle type with at least one factor in category

Looking at environmental conditions, the difference between 2W and 4W MVCs
was significant for physical environment factors (
technological environment factors (

=6.397, p<0.05) but not for

=0.675, ns). Approximately one-tenth of the 2W

cases and one-fifth of the 4W cases were associated with physical environment factors.
The relative odds of a service member having a MVC associated with one or more
physical environment factors was over 1.5 times greater in a 4W vehicle than on a 2W
vehicle (OR=1.61). About one-twentieth of the cases for both 2W and 4W vehicles were
associated with technological environment factors.
The percentages of 2W and 4W cases associated with each of the physical
environment subcategories are presented in Figure 56. The leading physical environment
subcategories for both vehicle types were surface conditions followed by visibility.
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Higher percentages of cases were associated with surface condition and visibility
physical environment factors for 4W vehicles compared to 2W vehicles.
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Figure 56: Physical Environment Subcategories, percentage of cases per vehicle type with at least one factor in subcategory

The 2W vehicle cases contained 51 physical environment nanocodes. The 4W
vehicle cases contained 135 physical environment nanocodes. The physical environment
nanocodes associated with the two vehicle types are presented in Figure 57.
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Figure 57: Physical Environment Causal Factors, count of nanocodes by vehicle type

The leading physical environment causal factors for both 2W and 4W MVCs were
related to road surface conditions followed by visibility issues. For 4W MVCs, the most
common physical environment factors were slippery road conditions (SC1) followed by
inadequate visibility issues stemming from insufficient lighting (VIS2) and ambient
weather conditions (VIS1). For 2W MVCs, the most common physical environment
factors were road surface debris (SC2) followed by slippery road conditions (SC1) and
inadequate visibility due to insufficient lighting (VIS2). Fewer 4W MVCs were
associated with road surface debris (SC2) and obscured view of traffic due to interaction
of vehicle and environment (VIS3) compared to 2W MVCs. Fewer 2W MVCs were
associated with slippery road surface (SC1) and inadequate visibility due to weather
conditions like sun glare, fog, rain, or snow (VIS1) compared to 4W MVCs.
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Looking at operator conditions, significant differences were found between 2W
and 4W MVCs for all causal categories – adverse mental state factors, adverse
physiological state factors, and physical/mental limitation factors. Cases for 4W vehicles
contained more adverse mental and physiological state factors. Cases for 2W vehicles
contained more physical/mental limitation factors.
Approximately one-fifth of 2W cases and one-fourth of 4W cases contained
adverse mental state factors. Cases for 2W vehicles were associated with significantly
fewer adverse mental state factors compared to cases for 4W vehicles (

=4.159,

p<0.05). The relative odds of a service member having a MVC associated with one or
more adverse mental state factors was almost 1.5 times greater in a 4W vehicle than on a
2W vehicle (OR=1.43).
The percentages of 2W and 4W cases associated with adverse mental state
subcategories are presented in Figure 58. Similar percentages of 2W and 4W cases were
associated with attitude and awareness adverse mental state subcategories. The leading
adverse mental state subcategories for 2W and 4W cases were drowsiness and
psychology respectively. The top adverse mental state subcategory for 2W cases was
psychology. One-tenth of the 2W cases but less than one-twentieth of the 4W cases were
associated with psychology factors. The top adverse mental state subcategory for 4W
cases was drowsiness. Around one-tenth of the 4W cases but less than one-fortieth of the
2W cases were associated with drowsiness factors.

144

Adverse Mental State Subcategories
100%

2W
4W

Cases (C) [%]

80%

60%
40%
20%
0%

Attitude

Awareness

Drowsiness

Psychology

Adverse Mental
State, Other

HFACS-MVC Subcategories
Figure 58: Adverse Mental State Subcategories, percentage of cases per vehicle type with at least one factor in subcategory

The 2W vehicle cases contained 73 adverse mental state nanocodes. The 4W
vehicle cases contained 153 adverse mental state nanocodes. The adverse mental state
nanocodes associated with the two vehicle types are presented in Figure 59.
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Figure 59: Adverse Mental State Factors, counts of adverse mental state nanocodes per vehicle type

The leading adverse mental state causal factors associated with both 2W and 4W
MVCs were drowsiness (AMF1), personality style (PSY1), and inattention/distraction
(AW1). However, 2W and 4W MVCs contained different proportions of these adverse
mental state factors. More 2W MVCs were associated with personality style (PSY1) than
4W MVCs. More 4W MVCs were associated with drowsiness (AMF1) than 2W MVCs.
For 2W MVCs, the most common adverse mental state factors are personality style
(PSY1) followed by inattention/distraction (AW1) then drowsiness (AMF1). For 4W
MVCs, the most common adverse mental state factors are drowsiness (AMF1) followed
by inattention/distraction (AW1) then personality style (PSY1).
Slightly less than one-fifth of 2W cases contained adverse physiological state
factors. In comparison, almost one-half of 4W cases contained adverse physiological
state factors. Cases for 2W vehicles were associated with significantly fewer adverse
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physiological state factors than cases for 4W vehicles (

=57.639, p<0.01). The relative

odds of a service member having a MVC associated with one or more adverse
physiological state factors was almost 3.5 times greater in a 4W vehicle than on a 2W
vehicle (OR=3.35).
The percentages of 2W and 4W cases associated with adverse physiological state
subcategories are presented in Figure 60. The top adverse physiological state subcategory
for both 2W and 4W cases captured physiological conditions. However, the percentages
of the cases associated with physiological conditions were different for each of these
vehicle types. Two-fifths of the 4W cases compared to one-fifth of the 2W cases
contained at least one physiological condition causal factor. The percentages of cases
involving incapacitation also differed by vehicle type. Almost one-tenth of the 4W cases
but none of the 2W cases contained incapacitation causal factors.
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Figure 60: Adverse Physiological State Subcategories, percentage of cases per vehicle type with at least one factor in subcategory

The 2W vehicle cases contained 64 adverse physiological state nanocodes. The
4W vehicle cases contained 265 adverse physiological state nanocodes. The adverse
physiological state nanocodes associated with the two vehicle types are presented in
Figure 61.
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Figure 61: Adverse Mental State Causal Factors, count of nanocodes per vehicle type

The leading adverse physiological state factor associated with both 2W and 4W
MVCs was impairment due to drugs or alcohol (PC2). In fact, impairment was the
primary adverse physiological state factor classified for 4W MVCs and the sole adverse
physiological state factor classified for 2W MVCs. Following impairment, the next most
common adverse physiological state factor classified for 4W MVCs was incapacitation
due to falling asleep (INC2). None of the 2W MVCs contained incapacitation factors
related to falling asleep or otherwise.
In contrast to adverse mental and physiological state factors, physical/mental
limitation factors are associated with significantly more MVCs for 2W vehicles than 4W
vehicles (

=90.376, p<0.01). Less than one-twentieth of 2W cases contained

physical/mental limitation factors compared to over one-fourth of 4W cases. The relative
odds of a service member having a MVC associated with one or more physical/mental
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limitation factors was over eight times greater on a 2W vehicle than in a 4W vehicle
(OR=8.33).
The percentages of 2W and 4W cases associated with each of the physical/mental
limitation subcategories are presented in Figure 62. The leading physical environment
subcategory for both vehicle types captured mental limitation factors. However, the
percentage of cases with mental limitation factors was eight times higher for 2W vehicles
than for 4W vehicles. In fact, one-fourth of all 2W cases contained at least one mental
limitation causal factor compared to one-thirtieth of the 4W cases.
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Figure 62: Physical/Mental Limitation Subcategories, percentage of cases per vehicle type with at least one factor in subcategory

The 2W vehicle cases contained 87 physical/mental limitation nanocodes. The
4W

vehicle

cases

contained

23

physical/mental

limitation

nanocodes.

The

physical/mental limitation nanocodes associated with the two vehicle types are presented
in Figure 63.
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Figure 63: Physical/Mental Limitation Causal Factors, counts of nanocodes per vehicle type

The leading physical/mental limitation factor associated with both 2W and 4W
MVCs captured inadequacies in proficiency or experience. In fact, limited
experience/proficiency (ML4) was the primary physical/mental limitation factor
classified for 4W MVCs and the sole physical/mental limitation factor classified for 2W
MVCs.
Looking at operator factors, few cases for either vehicle type – two percent of 2W
MVCs and six percent of 4W MVCs – contained communication, coordination, and
planning factors. The difference between the percentages of 2W and 4W MVCs
associated with communication, coordination, and planning factors was found to be
significant (

=6.684, p<0.05). The relative odds of a service member having a MVC

associated with one or more communication, coordination, and planning factors was over
2.5 times greater on a 4W vehicle than in a 2W vehicle (OR=2.70).
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The percentages of 2W and 4W cases associated with each of the communication,
coordination, and planning subcategories are presented in Figure 64. The leading
communication, coordination, and planning subcategories for both vehicle types were
planning followed by communication. The percentage of cases associated with planning
causal factors was higher for 4W vehicles than for 2W vehicles.

Comm., Coordination, and Planning Subcategories
100%

2W
4W

Cases (C) [%]

80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Communication

Coordination

Planning

HFACS-MVC Subcategories

Comm., Coord.,
Planning, Other

Figure 64: Comm., Coord., and Planning Subcategories, percentage of cases per vehicle type with at least one factor in subcategory

The 2W vehicle cases contained 9 communication, coordination, and planning
nanocodes. The 4W vehicle cases contained 37 communication, coordination, and
planning nanocodes. The communication, coordination, and planning nanocodes
associated with the two vehicle types are presented in Figure 65.
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Figure 65: Comm., Coord., and Planning Causal Factors, counts of nanocodes per vehicle type

The top communication, coordination, and planning causal factors associated with
both 2W and 4W MVCs were poor travel planning (PLA1) and inadequate knowledge
transfer (COM5). Similar proportions of cases for 2W MVCs were associated with poor
travel planning and inadequate knowledge transfer. In comparison, a larger proportion of
cases for 4W MVCs were associated with poor travel planning than with inadequate
knowledge transfer.
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5.3 PAYGRADES: ENLISTED, OFFICER
Paygrade data were provided for cases from the USAF and USN but not for cases
from the USMC. The overwhelming majority of cases involved enlisted service
members. A much smaller percentage of cases involved officers with only one warrant
officer in the entire dataset. Due to the uniqueness of the warrant officer population and
its singular representation in the dataset, the warrant officer case was excluded. A small
fraction of the cases (n=10) involved operators with unknown paygrades which were
excluded from the dataset.
The final paygrade dataset contained 739 cases involving enlisted (n=689) and
officer (n=49) service members in the USAF and USN (Figure 66). There were a total of
2,167 and 131 nanocodes classified for cases involving enlisted and officer paygrades
respectively. As such, there were 3.2 factors per case for enlisted paygrades and 2.7
factors per case for officer paygrades.
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Figure 66: Enlisted, Officer, and Warrant Service Members Involved in MVCs (USAF and USN; excluding USMC)

5.3.1 Temporal Trends
The temporal trends for MVCs by paygrade are shown in Figure 67. These trends
used the percentages of MVCs that involved officer and enlisted paygrades each fiscal
year. This was done to account for any differences in the number of services providing
MVC data each fiscal year.
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Figure 67: Temporal Trends of MVC Cases by Paygrade

A comparison of the relative contributions of officer and enlisted paygrades
indicate stable trends over time. Enlisted personnel were consistently involved in over
90% of MVCs each year.
5.3.2 Unsafe Act Trends
The unsafe act trends for MVCs by paygrade are shown in Figure 68. Overall,
trends for unsafe act causal categories were similar for MVCs involving enlisted and
officer paygrades. No significant differences between enlisted and officer MVCs were
found for skill based or decision errors. However, a significant difference was found
between enlisted and officer MVCs for violations.
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Figure 68: Unsafe Acts for Officers and Enlisted Personnel, percentage of cases containing at least one factor per category

Around two-thirds of the cases for both paygrades contained skill based errors. A
slightly higher percentage of cases for enlisted paygrades contained skill based errors
than cases for officer paygrades. The difference between the percentages of cases
associated with skill based errors for enlisted and officer paygrades was found to be
insignificant (

=1.584, ns).

The skill based error subcategories associated with MVCs by military paygrade
are presented in Figure 69. The skill based error subcategory trends for MVCs involving
enlisted and officer paygrades were generally similar. Common skill based error
subcategories for MVCs for both paygrades were related to technique and control.
However, MVCs involving enlisted service members were associated with more attention
errors than MVCs involving officers.

157

Skill Based Error Subcategories
100%

Enlisted
Officer

Cases (C) [%]

80%
60%
40%
20%

0%
Pres: ATT

Pres: POS

Pres: TQ

Pres: TM

Pres: LCU

Pres: SO

HFACS-MVC Subcategories
Figure 69: Skill Based Error Subcategories, percentages of cases per paygrade containing at least one factor per subcategory

Around one-third of the cases for both paygrades contained decision errors. A
slightly higher percentage of cases for officer paygrades contained decision errors than
cases for enlisted paygrades. The difference between the percentages of cases associated
with decision errors for enlisted and officer paygrades was found to be insignificant
(

=1.413, ns).
The decision error subcategories associated with MVCs by military paygrade are

presented in Figure 70. The decision error subcategory trends were similar for MVCs
involving enlisted and officer paygrades. The most common decision errors subcategories
for MVCs for both paygrades were related to situational assessment, procedures, and
prioritization. However, MVCs involving officers were associated with more
prioritization errors than MVCs involving enlisted personnel.

158

Decision Error Subcategories
100%

Enlisted
Officer

Cases (C) [%]

80%
60%
40%
20%

0%
Pres: IP

Pres: PRI

Pres: DPRO

Pres: SA

Pres: DMVC

Pres: DO

HFACS-MVC Subcategories
Figure 70: Decision Error Subcategories, percentages of cases per paygrade containing at least one factor per subcategory

Around three-fifths of the cases for enlisted paygrades and two-fifths of the cases
for officer paygrades contained violations. The difference between the percentages of
cases associated with violations for enlisted and officer paygrades was found to be
significant (

=5.162, p<0.05). The relative odds of a service member having a MVC

associated with one or more violations was two times greater with an enlisted paygrade
than an officer paygrade (OR=1.96).
The percentages of enlisted and officer cases associated with each of the violation
subcategories are presented in Figure 71. The main violation subcategories associated
with cases for both paygrades were procedural in nature – speeding, drunk driving, and
other. Higher percentages of cases were associated with virtually all of the violation
subcategories for enlisted than for officer paygrades, especially for the top two violation
subcategories. Looking at the leading violation subcategory, over one-third of enlisted
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cases compared to one-fourth of the officer cases were associated with speeding
violations. The next most common violation subcategory, drunk driving, was associated
with over one-fourth of the enlisted cases less than one-fifth of the officer cases.
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Figure 71: Violation Subcategories, percentage of cases per paygrade with at least one factor in subcategory

Cases for enlisted paygrades contained 543 violation nanocodes. Cases for officer
paygrades contained 26 violation nanocodes. The violation nanocodes associated with
each of the two paygrades are presented in Figure 72.
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Figure 72: Violation Causal Factors, counts of nanocodes per paygrade

The violations associated with MVCs for the two paygrades were similar. The
most common violation associated with MVCs for both paygrades was drunk driving
(VDD). For enlisted paygrades, the top violations were drunk driving (VDD), travelling
at an unknown speed in excess of the posted limit (VPRO0), and travelling 10-19 mph
over the speed limit (VPRO1). For officer paygrades, the top violations were drunk
driving (VDD), travelling 20-29 mph over the speed limit (VPRO2), and travelling 40
mph or more over the speed limit (VPRO4).
5.3.3 Precondition Trends
The precondition trends for cases involving enlisted and officer paygrades are
shown in Figure 73. The trends for the two paygrades appear to be fairly similar for
environmental conditions, operator conditions, and operator factors.
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Figure 73: Preconditions for MVCs by Paygrade, percentages of cases containing at least one factor per category

There were minor differences between the precondition categories associated with
MVCs for enlisted and officer paygrades but these were found to be insignificant.
Specifically, no significant differences were found between MVCs for enlisted and
officer paygrades for physical environment (

=1.158, ns), technological environment

(

=0.072, ns), adverse mental state (

(

=1.361, ns), physical/mental limitation (

coordination, and planning (

=0.753, ns), adverse physiological state
=1.467, ns) or communication,

=1.093, ns) causal categories.

The percentage of cases associated with precondition subcategories are presented
in Figure 74. The trends were generally similar for preconditions subcategories associated
with enlisted and officer MVCs. However, a much higher percentage of physiological
condition factors were associated with enlisted MVCs than with officer MVCs.
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Figure 74: Precondition Subcategories by Paygrade,
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5.4 AGE GROUPS: 17-20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, >40
Age data were provided for cases from the USAF and USN cases but not for cases
from the USMC. The breakdown of cases by age group is presented in Figure 75. As
expected, involved service members were quite young. The most common age of
involved service members was 21 years. The large majority of involved service members
were under the age of 30 (78.1%) with close to half (48.7%) between the ages of 19 and
23. Only a fraction of cases involved service members under the age of 20 (1.4%) or over
the age of 39 (4.3%).

MVC Cases by Age Group

17-20
21-25
26-30
31-35
36-40

>40

Figure 75: MVC Cases by Age of Service Member Operating Vehicle (USAF and USN; excluding USMC)

There were a total of 450, 1,081, 385, 193, 134, and 83 nanocodes classified for
cases involving 17-20, 21-25, 26-30, 32-35, 36-40, and >40 year old service members
respectively. As such, the average number of factors per case was similar across age
groups. Cases involving 17-20, 21-25, and 36-40 year old service members contained
slightly more than 3 factors per case and MVCs involving 26-30, 31-35, and over 40
year old service members contained slightly fewer than 3 factors per case.
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5.4.1 Temporal Trends
Temporal trends for cases by age group are shown in Figure 76. The percentages
of cases for all six age groups remained stable between FY1999 and FY2009. MVCs
consistently involved young service members, particularly those under the age of 26. The
trends indicate that approximately 30% and 40% of MVCs each fiscal year involved
service members between the ages of 17-20 and 21-25 respectively.

Age-Related Trends by Fiscal Year
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Figure 76: Temporal Trends for MVCs by Paygrade, percentages of cases containing at least one factor per category

5.4.2 Unsafe Act Trends
The unsafe act trends by age group are shown in Figure 77. The unsafe act
category trends were generally similar across age groups. The leading unsafe act causal
categories associated with MVCs for all age groups were skill based errors followed by
violations and then decision errors for all age groups except the oldest (>40). Differences
in MVC causal category trends by age group were insignificant for both skill based errors
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(

=4.286, ns) and decision errors (

= 3.570, ns). However, the MVC causal category

trends by age group were significantly different for violations (

=20.453, p<0.01).

Presence of Unsafe Act Categories in MVCs by Age Group
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Figure 77: Unsafe Acts by Age Group, percentages of cases with at least one factor per category (USAF, USN)

The percentage of cases associated with violations was highest for the second
youngest age group (21-25). In fact, almost two-thirds of the cases for 21-25 year old
service members contained violations. The percentage of cases with violations for 21-25
year old service members was not significantly higher than the percentages of cases with
violations for 31-35 year old (

= 1.373, ns) or 36-40 year old (

= 2.059, ns) service

members. However, the percentage of cases with violations for 21-25 year old service
members was significantly higher than the percentages of cases with violations for 17-20
year old service members (
(

=6.139, p<0.05), 26-30 year old service members

=5.964, p<0.05), and service members over the age of 40 (

=15.495, p<0.01). The

relative odds of a 21-25 year old service member having a MVC involving one or more
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violations was over 1.5 times greater than a 17-20 year old (OR=1.64) or 26-30 year old
(OR=1.66) service member and 4.5 times greater than a service member over the age of
40 (OR=4.50).
The percentage of cases associated with violations was lowest for the oldest group
of service members (>40). Less than one-third of the cases for service members over the
age of 40 contained violations. The percentage of cases with violations for service
members over the age of 40 was significantly lower than the percentages of cases with
violations for 17-20 year old (
old (
(

= 5.857, p<0.05), 21-25 year old (see above), 26-30 year

= 5.663, p<0.05), 31-35 year old (

= 7.040, p<0.01), and 36-40 year old

=4.390, p<0.05) service members. The odds of a service member over the age of 40

having a MVC involving one or more violations was at least 2.5 times less than a service
member in any other age group. Specifically, the relative odds of a service member over
the age of 40 having a MVC involving one or more violations was over 2.5 times less
than 17-20 year old (OR=0.36), 21-25 year old (see above), 26-30 year old (OR=0.37),
31-35 year old (OR=0.30), and 36-40 year old (OR=0.36) service members.
One-fourth to two-thirds of MVCs for all age groups contained violations. The
percentages of cases associated with each of the violation subcategories for the six age
groups are presented in Figure 78. The leading violation subcategories associated with
cases for all six age groups were speeding and drunk driving. For the younger age groups
(17-35), the top violation subcategory associated with MVCs was speeding. The highest
percentages of cases associated with speeding violations were found for service members
aged 17-20 (37%) and 21-25 (41%). For older age groups (36+), the top violation
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subcategory associated with MVCs was drunk driving. The highest percentages of cases
associated with drunk driving violations were found for service members aged 31-35
(30%) and 36-40 (40%).

Violation Subcategories
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Figure 78: Violation Subcategories, percentage of cases per age group with at least one factor in subcategory

There were 106, 287, 88, 51, 33, and 11 violation nanocodes identified for cases
involving 17-20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, and >40 year old service members
respectively. The violation nanocodes associated with the six age groups are presented in
Figure 79.
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Figure 79: Violation Causal Factors, counts of nanocodes per age group

The most common violations for all six age groups were procedural violations
related to drunk driving and speeding. The most common violation for all six age groups
was drunk driving (VDD). The most common speeding violations for 21-25 year old
service members were travelling at an unknown but unsafe speed (VPRO0) and travelling
40+ mph over the speed limit. The most common speeding violations for 26-30 year old
service members were travelling 40+ mph over the speed limit (VPRO4) and travelling
10-19 mph over the speed limit (VPRO1). The most common speeding violations for 3135 year old service members were travelling at an unknown illegal speed (VPRO0) and
travelling 20-29 mph over the speed limit (VPRO2). The most common speeding
violations for 17-20 year old and 36-40 year old service members were travelling at an
unknown illegal speed (VPRO0) and travelling 10-19 mph over the speed limit (VPRO1).
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While two-thirds to three-fourths of MVCs for all age groups contained skill
based errors, no significant differences were found between age groups at the causal
category level (

=4.286, ns). The percentages of cases associated with skill based error

causal factor subcategories by age group are presented in Figure 80. The main skill based
error subcategories were similar for MVCs involving service members of all ages.
Common skill based error subcategories for both vehicle types were related to technique,
attention, and control. However, technique errors were associated with fewer MVCs for
36-40 and >40 year old service members, control errors were associated with fewer
MVCs for 36-40 year old service members, and attention errors were associated with
fewer MVCs for 21-25 year old service members compared to other age groups.

Skill Based Error Subcategories
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Figure 80: Skill Based Error Subcategories, percentages of cases per age group with at least one factor per subcategory (USAF, USN)

One-fourth to two-fifths of MVCs for all age groups contained decision errors
(

= 3.570, ns). The percentages of cases associated with decision error causal factor

170

subcategories by age group are presented in Figure 81. Overall, the main decision error
subcategory trends for MVCs were fairly similar across all age groups. Common decision
error subcategories for both vehicle types were related to situation assessment,
procedures, and prioritization. Compared to other age groups, MVCs were associated
with fewer situational assessment errors for 36-40 year old service members, fewer
control errors for service members over the age of 40, and fewer prioritization errors for
21-25 year old service members. Interestingly, MVCs for older service members (aged
36-40 and over the age of 40) were associated with more prioritization errors than
compared to other age groups.

Decision Error Subcategories
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Figure 81: Decision Error Subcategories, percentages of cases per age group with at least one factor per subcategory (USAF, USN)

5.4.3 Precondition Trends
The precondition trends by age group are shown in Figure 82. The leading
precondition causal categories associated with off-duty MVCs for all age groups was
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adverse physiological state followed by adverse mental state, physical environment, and
physical/mental limitation. There were minor differences between precondition
categories associated with MVCs for the six age groups. Most of these differences were
insignificant, specifically those between age groups for physical environment (
ns), technological environment (
physical/mental limitation (
planning (

=3.395, ns), adverse mental state (

=10.432, ns) factors. However, the difference between age groups was found
=14.162, p<0.05).

Precondition Causal Categories
Associated with MVCs by Age Group
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Figure 82: Preconditions for Unsafe Acts: Presence of Causal Categories

The percentage of cases associated with adverse physiological state factors was
highest for the second oldest group of service members (36-40) followed by the second
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youngest group of service members (21-25) and lowest for the oldest group of service
members (>40). Approximately one-half or more of the cases for 21-25 year old and 3540 year old service members contained adverse physiological state factors.
Comparatively, the other age groups were not nearly as likely to contain adverse
physiological state factors with approximately one-third or less of their cases associated
with adverse physiological state factors. Only one-fifth of cases involving service
members over the age of 40 contained adverse physiological adverse physiological state
factors.
The percentage of cases with adverse physiological states for 36-40 year olds was
significantly higher than the percentages of cases for service members ages 17-20
(

=7.244, p<0.01), 26-30 (

=6.116, p<0.05), and over 40 (

=7.092, p<0.01). The

odds of a service member between the ages of 36 and 40 having a MVC involving at least
one adverse physiological state factor was approximately 4 times greater than a service
member over the age of 40 (OR=3.93) and 2.5 times greater than a 17-20 year old
(OR=2.58) or 26-30 year old (OR=2.41) service member.
The percentage of cases with adverse physiological states for 21-25 year olds was
significantly higher than the percentages for 17-20 year olds (
year olds (

=4.880, p<0.05) and >40

=4.277, p<0.05). The odds of a 21-25 year old service member having a

MVC involving at least one adverse physiological state factor was over 1.5 times greater
than a 17-20 year old service member (OR=1.60) and almost 2.5 times greater than a
service member over the age of 40 (OR=2.44).
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The percentages of cases associated with adverse physiological state
subcategories by age group are presented in Figure 83. Subcategory trends were similar
across age groups with the exception of 36-40 year old and over 40 year old service
members with higher and lower percentages of MVCs with physiological conditions
respectively.
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Figure 83: Adverse Physiological State Subcategories, percentage of cases per age group with at least one factor in subcategory

There were 49, 142, 45, 27, 22, and 8 adverse physiological state nanocodes
identified for cases involving 17-20 year old, 21-25 year old, 26-30 year old, 31-35 year
old, 36-40 year old, and over 40 year old service members respectively. The adverse
physiological state nanocodes associated with the six age groups are presented in Figure
84.
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Figure 84: Adverse Physiological State Causal Factors, counts of nanocodes per age group

The majority of the adverse physiological state factors associated with all six age
groups captured impairment due to drugs or alcohol (PC2). The other common adverse
physiological state factor associated with all six age groups captured incapacitation due to
falling asleep (INC2).
Though HFACS-MVC preconditions were insignificant across age groups for
environmental condition categories, the subcategory trends were presented for MVCs
involving the different age groups in Figure 85. Similar trends were found for
environmental condition subcategories across age groups except visibility which were
associated with a higher percentage of MVCs for 36-40 year old service members.
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Figure 85: Environmental Condition Subcategories, percentage of cases per age group with at least one factor per subcategory

Though HFACS-MVC preconditions were insignificant across age groups for
operator condition categories other than adverse physiological state, these subcategory
trends were presented for MVCs involving the different age groups in Figure 86. Fairly
similar trends were found for operator condition subcategories across age groups. Slight
differences were observed for awareness which was associated with a higher percentage
of MVCs for service members over age 40 and a lower percentage of MVCs for 31-35
year old service members and mental limitations which were associated with higher
percentages of MVCs for younger service member age groups.
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Operator Condition Subcategories
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Figure 86: Operator Condition Subcategories (excl. APS), percentage of cases per age group with at least one factor per subcategory

Though HFACS-MVC preconditions were insignificant across age groups for
operator factor categories, the subcategory trends were presented for MVCs involving the
different age groups in Figure 87. Similar trends were found for operator factor
subcategories across age groups.
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Figure 87: Operator Factor Subcategories, percentage of cases per age group with at least one factor per subcategory
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION, DATA AND OVERALL TRENDS
Prior studies have identified several demographic and behavioral characteristics
associated with MVCs in the US for both the general and military populations. However
no studies to date have comprehensively and systematically identified the human factors
causes associated with MVCs in the military. The present study demonstrated that it is
possible to modify and apply an established human error framework to classify the
underlying human factors causes associated with MVCs in a comprehensive and
systematic manner. Furthermore, this classification provided the opportunity to identify
the main human factors trends associated with severe off-duty MVCs.
This chapter presents a discussion of the key findings from the present study. The
main human factors trends associated with off-duty MVCs in the present study are
reviewed. These trends are compared to those from existing literature for MVCs in the
military, MVCs in the general population, and accidents in other industries. To account
for variations in the overall quality and level of detail applied when identifying
contributing factors at all four of the HFACS framework tiers, comparisons to other
industries used the HFACS benchmarking standards from a non-filtered dataset
containing accidents from a range of sources (Berry, 2010). The implications of these
trends and their comparisons are discussed.
6.1 UNSAFE ACT TRENDS
The temporal trends for the unsafe acts affecting military personnel involved in
serious off-duty MVCs remained stable between FY1999 and FY2008. Unfortunately,
these trends suggest that intervention strategies implemented over the past decade have
178

been unsuccessful in sufficiently reducing the underlying errors and violations performed
by service members on the roadways.
At the unsafe acts tier, the human factors trends for serious off-duty MVCs
captured high levels of skill based errors and violations. Skill based errors were mainly
related to technique, specifically driving or riding techniques for negotiating curves/turns
and regaining positions on the roadways. Violations were mainly related to procedures,
specifically breaking laws and regulations by exceeding posted speed limits and
operating motor vehicles while legally intoxicated with a BAC of 0.08% or more.
Serious off-duty MVCs contained a lower level of decision errors and virtually no
perceptual errors. Decision errors were mainly related to situational assessment,
specifically failing to modify behaviors for potential hazards like selecting legal but
inappropriate speeds for travel conditions or pressing on when falling asleep.
While direct comparisons between the unsafe act causal category levels are not
possible due to differences in the definitions and calculations used in prior studies, it is
possible to compare the overall trends found in the existing MVC literature. For skill
based errors, prior studies have identified braking, lane-control, and overcorrection errors
as factors in MVCs (Evans, 2004; NHTSA, 2009). For violations, prior studies have
identified speeding over the posted speed limits, drunk driving/riding, aggressive
driving/riding, and operating a vehicle without legal licensure as factors in MVCs. For
decision errors, prior studies have identified travelling too fast for road conditions and
improper lane changing as factors in MVCs. These findings from existing literature on
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MVCs in the general population are similar to those from the present study of off-duty
MVCs in the military.
The unsafe act levels associated with serious off-duty MVCs in the military from
the present study and both fatal MVCs from prior studies in the general population (Iden
& Shappell, 2006) and accidents in other occupational industries (Berry, 2010) are
presented in Table 22. It appears that unsafe act category levels are generally comparable
between off-duty MVCs in the military and MVCs in the general US population with the
possible exception of skill based errors. In both off-duty MVCs and MVCs in the general
population, unsafe act levels were higher for skill based errors and violations and lower
for decision errors followed by perceptual errors. The unsafe act category levels were less
similar between off-duty MVCs in the military and accidents in other occupational
industries. In most industries, unsafe act levels are higher for skill based errors followed
by decision errors and lower for violations followed by perceptual errors. Compared to
accidents in other industries, off-duty military MVCs contained higher levels of skill
based errors and violations and lower levels of decision errors and perceptual errors.
These comparisons suggest that serious MVCs for both military personnel and the
general population are associated with a higher level of violations than accidents in other
domains.
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Table 24: MVC and Industry HFACS Unsafe Act Trends

SBE
DE
PE

Military Off-Duty
MVCs
70.7%
28.8%
0.8%

General Population
MVCs
49%
30%
2%

Occupational
Industry Accidents
64.7%
43.1%
5.2%

VIO

54.0%

52%

10.5%

HFACS Category

The differences between the human factors trends for off-duty MVCs in the
military and prior studies for other industries may be expected considering the nature of
the domain and the serious/fatal nature of the MVCs targeted in the present study. With
the combination of a skill-dependent process and a task environment that allows little
time to react to hazards, it is not surprising that severe off-duty MVCs contain a higher
percentage of skill based errors and a smaller percentage of decision errors than other
occupational industries.
The unsafe act trend of greatest concern is likely the high percentage of off-duty
MVCs with violations. Violation trends were almost identical for severe off-duty MVCs
in the military and fatal MVCs in the general population as found in prior studies by
(Iden & Shappell, 2006; Wierwille, et al., 2002). However, violation levels are noticeably
higher for off-duty MVCs than for accidents in occupational industries. Violations are not
condoned in other domains the way they are for motor vehicle operators on the roadways.
Speeding violations are so commonplace that the large majority of drivers in the US
admit to travelling at speeds in excess of the posted speed limit (Allstate, 2011). Young
males are the likeliest demographic for risk-taking and committing violations on the road.
And fatal events have been shown to involve significantly more violations than less
serious non-fatal and near-miss events (Wiegmann, et al., 2005). As such, the high levels
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of violations in MVCs are likely the result of several factors including the domain which
condones violations, the population of interest comprised of young, male risk-takers, and
the severity of the Class A and B MVCs included in the present study.
6.2 PRECONDITION TRENDS
The temporal trends for preconditions for unsafe acts affecting military personnel
involved in serious off-duty MVCs remained stable between FY1999 and FY2008.
Unfortunately, these trends suggest that intervention strategies implemented over the past
decade have been unsuccessful in sufficiently reducing the conditions and factors
affecting service members operating motor vehicles on the roadways.
At the preconditions tier, the human factors trends for serious off-duty MVCs
captured higher levels of adverse physiological state, adverse mental state, and physical
environment factors followed by a lower level of physical/mental limitation factors.
Serious off-duty MVCs contained low levels of technological environment and
communication, coordination, and planning factors and virtually no personal readiness
factors.
Adverse physiological state factors were mainly related to physiological
conditions and to a lesser extent incapacitation, specifically being impaired due to drugs
or alcohol and falling asleep. Adverse mental state factors were mainly related to mental
fatigue, psychology, and awareness, specifically drowsiness, personality style
(particularly related to risk-taking), and attention issues. Physical environment factors
were mainly related to surface conditions and visibility, specifically slippery or debriscovered roads and insufficient lighting. Physical/mental limitation factors were mainly
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related to

mental limitations, specifically limited experience or proficiency.

Technological environment factors were mainly related to road sign and design issues.
Communication, coordination, and planning factors were mainly related to poor travel
planning and inadequate knowledge transfer.
As was the case at the unsafe act tier, the specific levels of each HFACS causal
category at the preconditions tier cannot easily be compared directly due to definition and
calculation differences. For instance, NHTSA uses the causal factor category
“inattention” to capture a mix of factors including distraction, fatigue, physical condition,
emotional condition and looked but did not see. Further, NHTSA defines “distraction” is
several different ways over the past decade referencing fewer factors in at present than
five years ago. However, general comparisons can be made for the key trends identified
in the present study and those found in existing MVC literature.
For adverse physiological states, prior studies have identified alcohol
use/impairment and falling asleep as factors in MVCs. For adverse mental states, prior
studies have identified inattention, drowsiness, and mental/emotional state as factors in
MVCs. For physical environment conditions, prior studies have identified slick roads,
adverse weather conditions, and visibility issues as factors in MVCs. For physical/mental
limitations, prior studies have identified inadequate knowledge and limited experience
and exposure as factors in MVCs. For technological environment conditions, prior
studies have identified road design, signs/signals/intersections, and vehicle problems as
factors in MVCs. These findings suggest that the preconditions that affect service
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members on the roads are the basically the same as those that affect roads users in the
general population.
The precondition causal category levels associated with serious off-duty MVCs in
the military from the present study and two groupings of category standards (Berry,
2010) based on accidents in various occupational industries are presented in Table 26.
For each of the accident benchmarking standards, the main grouping captures the average
category level from a larger group of datasets and the secondary grouping captures the
average category level from a smaller group of datasets with more thorough
investigations for that particular category.
Table 25: MVC and Industry HFACS Preconditions for Unsafe Act Trends

HFACS Category
PhyE
TechE

Off-Duty MVCs
18.2%
4.1%

Accident Benchmarking Standards
41.0% [13.4%]
13.6%

AMS
APS
PML
CCP
PR

21.5%
34.7%
12.5%
4.8%
0.2%

5.3% [26.4%]
1.7%
14.0% [2.9%]
6.9% [18.8%]
1.3%

The levels of physical and technological environment conditions for off-duty
MVCs were lower than the levels for the main grouping of accidents in other industries.
The level of physical environment conditions for MVCs was similar to the level for the
secondary grouping of accidents in other industries suggesting that these factors are
typically investigated and captured with to higher level of detail for MVCs. The higher
level of detail likely reflects the relative ease of detection and is able to be determined
irrespective of the other details surrounding a MVC. Additionally investigators are
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accustomed to capturing weather and road conditions which are standard portions of the
forms used during crash scene investigations. Technological environment conditions may
be less prevalent for MVCs compared to other industries due to the limited involvement
of technology for motor vehicle operators compared to workers in other industries who
may have to operate several pieces of equipment and tools increasing the probability of
experiencing a technological issue that contributes to an event. As such, the lower levels
of physical and technological environment factors associated with off-duty MVCs
compared to other occupational industries likely reflect a relative lack of association
between environmental conditions and MVCs as well as a fairly successful management
of potentially hazardous environmental conditions.
The levels of adverse mental state conditions for off-duty MVCs were higher than
the main grouping but similar to the secondary grouping of accidents in other industries.
The higher level of adverse mental state conditions in the present study may reflect the
susceptibility of motor vehicle operators to these types of factors, particularly of motor
vehicle operators in the military. Inattention/distraction and drowsiness are prevalent
factors for MVCs in the general population (Hendricks, et al., 2001). Furthermore, as part
of a courageous force with stressful jobs and demanding schedules, military personnel
may be particularly susceptible to adverse mental state conditions like drowsiness,
overconfident attitudes, and risky personality styles.
The levels of adverse physiological state conditions were much higher for offduty MVCs than for accidents in other industries. For the same reasons mentioned in the
prior paragraph, military personnel run a real risk of falling asleep on the roads. A bigger
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issue, however, is that of alcohol impairment which is known to be associated with a
large portion of serious and fatal MVCs in the US each year. Several skills integral to
driving and riding performance including attention, vision, perception, information
processing, psychomotor, and steering are significantly degraded by alcohol. The higher
level of adverse physiological state conditions in the present study likely reflects a
domain that is deeply sensitive to the negative effects of alcohol. There have been recent
improvements in this area with downward trends in alcohol-related MVCs for both the
military and civilian populations, but this is still a top area in need of mitigation.
The levels of physical/mental limitation conditions for off-duty MVCs was
similar to the main grouping and higher than the secondary grouping of accidents in other
industries. Both age and experience have been shown to affect MVC fatality rates for
drivers in the general population (Evans, 2004). The relationships between age,
experience, and MVC fatalities may be reflected in the slightly elevated level of
physical/mental limitation conditions for off-duty MVCs compared to that of other
industries. Even though level of physical/mental limitation conditions was not
abnormally high, this is an area that could benefit from mitigation efforts. These efforts
should focus on providing opportunities for service members to practice their driving and
riding skills in order to increase their levels of experience and proficiency.
The levels of both categories of operator factors for off-duty MVCs were lower
than the levels for both the main and secondary groupings of accidents in other industries.
The lower level of communication, coordination, and planning factors likely stems from
the nature of the domain in the present study. While miscommunications can and do
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occur on the roads, they tend to be difficult to capture especially for fatal MVCs.
Furthermore, the concept of coordination amongst road users is slightly foreign and is not
as applicable as the concept of coordination amongst workers in other industries. As
such, the communication, coordination, and planning causal category primarily captured
planning factors. The lower level of personal readiness factors may be a result of
inadequate investigation, reporting, or classification for this causal category. In support of
the notion that HFACS experts under-classified personal readiness factors was the fact
that many off-duty MVCs involved fatigue-related factors such as drowsiness and falling
asleep but only one contained the personal readiness factor capturing lack of sleep. The
HFACS experts may have overlooked personal readiness factors because they were not
accustomed to classifying this category and didn’t consider classifying sleep-related
issues as anything other than operator conditions or because they did not equate off-duty
driving or riding to being at work as referenced within the HFACS framework.
6.3 UPPER TIER TRENDS
A limited number of causal factors for MVCs were classified at the supervisory
and organizational tiers in the present study. The causal category levels associated with
serious off-duty MVCs in the military from the present study and benchmarking
standards associated with accidents in various occupational industries are presented in
Table 27. The levels of supervisory and organizational causal categories for off-duty
MVCs were lower than the main and secondary groupings of accidents in other
industries. These lower levels are likely the result of inadequacies in MVC investigation
and documentation processes. In all industries, investigation and identification of causal
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factors at the upper HFACS tiers are less obvious and more difficult. However, the nature
of the industry also complicates the investigation into higher level causal factors.
Additional challenges are introduced by the fact that these MVCs occur while service
members are off-duty which raises the question of who to consider as people in
supervisory and organizational roles – those in leadership positions above the service
members within the structure of the US military, those acting in positions of authority
within the structure of state law enforcement, or both.
Table 26: HFACS Trend Comparison for Off-Duty MVCs and Non-Filtered Accident Benchmarking Standards

HFACS Category
Outside Influences

Off-Duty MVCs
5.4

Accident Benchmarking Standards
-----

Organizational Influences
Organizational Climate
Organizational Process
Resource Management
Unsafe Supervision

0.3
0.8
0.2

1.1
7.6 / 52.0
1.9

1.0
0.6
0.5
0.1

3.1 / 21.6
3.7 / 22.1
4.8
2.3

Inadequate Leadership
Planned Inappropriate Ops
Failure to Correct Problems
Leadership Violations

No industry benchmarking standards were available for comparison to the level of
outside influences factors associated with off-duty MVCs. However, more factors were
classified at the outside influence tier than at the uppers supervisory and organizational
tiers combined. Perhaps this is because identification of outside influence factors which
ultimately capture the unsafe acts of other road users are easier to identify than factors
which capture inadequate leadership or organizational influences that act upon military
road users.
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION, COMPARISONS OF TRENDS
A handful of studies have looked at the demographic and behavioral
characteristics associated with MVCs in the military but none have done so based on a
comprehensive and systematic classification of human factors causes. The present study
was able to successfully identify and compare the main human factors trends associated
with severe off-duty MVCs for service members by military branch, vehicle type,
paygrade, and age group.
This chapter presents the key findings for severe off-duty MVCs across military
branches, vehicle types, paygrades, and age groups found in the present study. The main
human factors trends associated with off-duty MVCs for each of these demographic
variables are reviewed and compared to those from existing literature for MVCs in both
the military and general populations. Implications of human factors trends and
comparisons found in the present study are discussed.
7.1 MILITARY BRANCHES: USAF, USN, USMC
Interestingly, there were noticeable differences in the number of factors classified
for serious off-duty MVCs involving USAF, USN, and USMC service members. Both
the average and maximum number of factors classified per case were greatest for USAF
MVCs. In fact, USAF MVCs contained an additional causal factor per case on average
compared to USN and USMC MVCs. The differences in the number of causal factors
classified may reflect differences in the quality of MVC investigation and documentation
processes across the three military branches. As such, readers are cautioned to refrain
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from drawing conclusions about potential differences in the MVC causal factor trends
across the branches based on the findings in the present study.
7.1.1 Unsafe Acts
The main HFACS-MVC unsafe act causal category trends associated with serious
off-duty MVCs involved skill based errors and violations for all three military branches.
Though no significant differences between branches were identified for decision errors,
there were significant differences for skill based errors and violations. Specifically,
USAF MVCs contained a lower percentage of skill based errors and a higher percentage
of violations than both USN and USMC MVCs. In general, HFACS-MVC unsafe act
subcategory levels were similar or higher for USAF MVCs and similar or lower for
USMC MVCs.
Skill based error category and subcategory differences across the three branches
were most intriguing. This was the only HFACS-MVC causal category involving a
significantly lower level for USAF MVCs. An interesting trend was found for the
percentages of MVCs associated with the skill based error causal factor nanocode “LCU”
which captured loss of control for unknown reasons. In many cases, skill based errors
classified as “LCU” would likely have been classified using other skill based error
nanocodes if the MVC narrative had provided additional information or detail. The
branches with the highest percentage of MVCs associated with “LCU” skill based errors
were the USMC followed by the USN and finally the USAF. The differences between
branches for “LCU” suggest imply that MVC data provided by the USAF were of better
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quality and contained more detail compared to MVC data provided by the USN and the
USMC.
Serious off-duty MVCs contained significantly higher levels of skill based errors
for military personnel in the USN and USMC compared to military personnel in the
USAF. Higher percentages of MVCs involving USN and USMC personnel contained
skill based errors related to attention compared to MVCs involving USAF personnel. A
higher percentage of MVCs involving USAF personnel contained skill based errors
related to technique compared to MVCs involving USN and USMC personnel.
USAF MVCs were associated a significantly higher percentage of violations than
USN and USMC MVCs. At first, this trend was surprising as service members in the
USMC are younger and more predominantly male compared to service members in the
USN and especially the USAF. With young males committing the most violations on the
roads like speeding, racing, and drunk driving, USMC MVCs were expected to have the
highest percentage of violations, not the lowest. However, as is discussed in further detail
shortly, any difference between the percentages of violations associated with MVCs in
the three branches is likely an artifact of the higher quality of MVC investigations in the
USAF.
7.1.2 Preconditions for Unsafe Acts
The main HFACS-MVC precondition causal category trends associated with
serious off-duty MVCs were significantly higher in the USAF than in the USN and often
the USMC for all precondition categories except adverse physiological state (and
personal readiness which was excluded from analysis). These findings most likely reflect
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differences in investigation and reporting practices across the three branches. The USN
and USMC appear to be under-investigating and/or under-reporting causal factors from
most HFACS-MVC causal categories while the USAF appears to have more thorough
investigation and reporting practices. The more thorough investigation and reporting
process allowed more instances where causal factors could be identified and classified,
resulting in an increased number of causal factors classified for USAF MVCs.
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7.2 VEHICLE TYPES: 2W, 4W
Given that only an estimated 10% of military personnel own motorcycles, it
initially seemed surprising that over one-third (38%) of the serious and fatal off-duty
MVCs between FY1999 and FY2008 involved service members operating 2W vehicles.
However, MVCs are more hazardous and less survivable on 2W vehicles than in 4W
vehicles. In fact, riders of 2W vehicles are 35 times more likely than drivers of 4W
vehicles to be fatally injured in a MVC (NHTSA, 2007). As reflected here, the small
subset of riders in the military is disproportionately represented in the set of Class A and
B off-duty personal MVCs included in the present study.
7.2.1 Unsafe Acts
The main HFACS-MVC unsafe act causal category trends associated with serious
off-duty MVCs were almost identical for 2W and 4W vehicles. Though no significant
differences between 2W and 4W MVCs were identified at the causal category level, there
appeared to be some differences at the unsafe act subcategory level for skill based errors
and violations.
Though safe operation of a 2W vehicle is more challenging and requires a greater
level of skill, 2W MVCs did not contain significantly more skill based errors than 4W
MVCs. However, the additional intricacies associated with riding 2W vehicles are
captured at the skill based error subcategory level where 2W MVCs had a higher
percentage of technique errors. In comparison, 4W MVCs had higher percentages of
control errors for unknown reasons and attention errors.
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The less forgiving nature of riding 2W vehicles is reflected at the violation
subcategory level where 2W MVCs were associated with a higher percentage of speeding
violations than 4W MVCs. The greater difficulty of recovery from errors on 2W vehicles
along with the positive relationship between speed and severity of MVC may help to
explain this finding.
Additional differences in violation subcategories between 2W and 4W vehicles
were the higher percentage of knowledge violations for 2W MVCs and the higher
percentage of drunk driving violations for 4W MVCs. Like fatal MVCs in the US
population, 2W MVCs in the present study were associated with a higher percentage of
knowledge violations (i.e. lack of licensure) compared to 4W MVCs. However, the actual
percentages with unlicensed 2W and 4W motor vehicle operators were higher for fatal
MVCs in the US population than for serious off-duty MVCs in the military population
perhaps reflecting the composition of the underlying military population of citizens and
legal immigrants with fairly clean driving/riding records.
7.2.2 Preconditions for Unsafe Acts
In contrast to unsafe act trends, the main HFACS-MVC precondition causal
category trends associated with serious off-duty MVCs were quite different for 2W and
4W vehicles. Significant differences between 2W and 4W MVCs at the causal category
level were found for all precondition categories except technological environment (and
personal readiness which was excluded from analysis).
A significantly higher percentage of 4W MVCs contained physical environment
factors and were associated with more surface condition and visibility factors. Further
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differences between vehicle types exist at the physical environment nanocode level which
indicates that 2W MVCs involved more surface debris and obscured visibility conditions
while 4W MVCs involved more slippery road surface and weather visibility conditions.
These findings make sense considering that riders are more likely to operate 2W vehicles
in better weather and environmental conditions.
A significantly higher percentage of 4W MVCs contained adverse mental state
factors and were associated with more drowsiness factors. However, 2W MVCs were
associated with more psychology factors perhaps reflecting a difference between 2W and
4W operator personality styles especially for risk-taking.
A significantly higher percentage of 4W MVCs contained adverse physiological
state factors and had a higher percentage of cases associated with alcohol/drug
impairment and falling asleep. This could again be related to rider preference with
regards to weather, environmental, and lighting conditions which may limit the amount of
associations of impairment and falling asleep with off-duty MVCs. However, the absence
of any occurrences of falling asleep on 2W MVCs may be an artifact of the nature of 2W
MVCs which would not really allow for recovery if the rider actually did fall asleep on
the vehicle.
A significantly higher percentage of 2W MVCs contained physical/mental
limitation factors related to limited experience/proficiency. These findings are similar to
those from prior studies which have found that a high percentage of riders in fatal 2W
MVCs had only a matter of a few months of experience operating the mishap motorcycle.
The much higher percentages of both lack of experience/proficiency and knowledge
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violations for 2W MVCs stresses how critical it is for riders to have adequate levels of
experience and proficiency prior to operating 2W vehicles. This is especially true for
service members in situations where they are trying to ride for the first time (by
themselves or with friends) without adequate instruction or understanding and where they
are riding with one or more people in situations that exceed their skill levels.
A significantly higher percentage of 4W MVCs contained communication,
coordination, and planning factors and were associated with more pre-travel planning
factors. Again, this is likely related to the rider preference for operating 2W vehicles in
more agreeable weather and visibility conditions.
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7.3 PAYGRADES: ENLISTED, OFFICER
The percentage of enlisted personnel was higher for those in serious off-duty
MVCs from the present study (93%) than for service members in the general US Active
Duty military population (84%) (OneSource). The disproportion between MVCs by
paygrade was not unexpected given that prior military MVC studies have found enlisted
personnel to have higher MVC fatality rates than officers (Bowes & Hiatt, 2008; Hooper,
et al., 2006). Furthermore, both the present study and a prior study of MVCs involving
Army service members contained the same percentage (93%) of enlisted personnel (Bell,
et al., 2000).
7.3.1 Unsafe Acts
The main HFACS-MVC unsafe act causal category and subcategory trends
associated with serious off-duty MVCs were fairly similar for enlisted and officer
paygrades, particularly for errors. There was a significant difference between enlisted and
officer MVCs for violations.
A significantly higher percentage of enlisted MVCs contained violations and were
associated with higher percentages of almost all violation subcategories especially
speeding and drunk driving. This discrepancy may reflect the differences between
enlisted and officer paygrades with regards to age, educational background, marital status
and especially their roles and responsibilities within the military. Enlisted personnel are
held to a high standard of conduct, but tend to have some slack from the military when it
comes to traffic offenses. However, officers are held to an even higher standard of
conduct and are expected to act reasonably and responsibly both on and off duty. The
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military does not tolerate officers being convicted of serious moving traffic violations
such as speeding, reckless driving, or driving while intoxicated. Even seasoned officers
can expect to be discharged if convicted for driving under the influence (DUI). Based on
these high expectations and the severe consequences of violating procedures, it is only
logical that significantly fewer MVCs involved violations for officers than for enlisted
personnel.
7.3.2 Preconditions for Unsafe Acts
The main HFACS-MVC preconditions for unsafe act causal category trends
associated with serious off-duty MVCs were similar for enlisted and officer paygrades
suggesting that they are negatively affected by basically the same general preconditions
on the roads. Though no significant differences in enlisted and officer MVC trends were
identified for any precondition causal categories, there were some interesting trends at the
subcategory level.
Officer MVCs were associated with higher percentages of road surface, visibility,
awareness, incapacitation (particularly falling asleep), and planning factors than enlisted
MVCs. Looking at these trends together suggests that officers may have performed their
pre-travel planning inadequately particularly by selecting poor travel times and durations
which increased their exposure to hazards. For example, selecting a poor departure time
or route may increase the risk of encountering adverse weather and lighting conditions or
of experiencing personal conditions related to attention and fatigue. These trends are not
surprising considering that officers are more likely to have families (particularly spouses
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and children) and be juggling several different roles and responsibilities that compete for
their time.
Enlisted MVCs were associated with higher percentages of factors related to
operator impairment and lack of experience/proficiency than officer MVCs. These
findings were in line with what is known about the enlisted military population. Enlisted
personnel are typically younger with fewer responsibilities within the military compared
to officers and have relatively less education and experience both in life and in operating
motor vehicles. The serious MVCs in the present study reflect their lower levels of
experience and proficiency particularly with 2W vehicles.

Additionally, the

comparatively high percentage of MVCs with impairment for enlisted personnel suggests
that they may not grasp the entirety of all the ramifications of drunk driving/riding on
both their personal and professional lives.
A significantly higher percentage of 2W MVCs contained physical/mental state
factors and had a much higher percentage of cases associated with limited
experience/proficiency. These findings are similar to those from prior studies which have
found that a high percentage of riders in fatal 2W MVCs had only a matter of a few
months of experience operating the mishap motorcycle.
7.4 AGE GROUPS: 17-20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, >40
The majority (81%) of military personnel in the present study were under the age
of 30 with the largest portion in the 21-25 year old age group. These findings were
similar to those from prior studies which found that younger military personnel under the

199

age of 26 were most likely to be involved in serious MVCs (Bell, et al., 2000; Hooper, et
al., 2006).
7.4.1 Unsafe Acts
The main HFACS-MVC unsafe act causal category and subcategory trends
associated with serious off-duty MVCs were fairly similar for service members in the six
age groups, particularly for errors. For the most part, error subcategory trends also
appeared fairly similar for MVCs involving the six age groups. However, significant
differences were found for the percentages of MVCs associated with violations for 21-25
year old and over 40 year old service members.
At the subcategory level of decision errors, an interesting result was the higher
percentages of MVCs associated with prioritization decision errors for older (36-40 and
>40 year old) service members. Older service members are generally busy with families
at home and several off-duty roles and responsibilities that compete for their time.
Prioritization decision errors may relate to placing a higher priority on an off-duty role or
responsibility than on personal safety on the roadway.
At the category level of violations, 21-25 year old service members and service
members over the age of 40 had the highest and lowest percentages of MVCs associated
with violations respectively. In fact, 21-25 year old service members had a significantly
higher percentage of MVCs associated with violations than both the next youngest (17-20
year old) and next oldest (26-30 year old) age groups. MVCs involving 21-25 year old
service members had the highest percentage of speeding violations and a higher
percentage of drunk driving violations than both 17-20 year old and 26-30 year old
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service members. These findings, particularly the association with speeding, has been
identified in prior MVC studies which have found young males as the most likely
demographic to engage in risky behaviors such as speeding and racing.
In contrast to the younger service members, MVCs for the oldest age group (>40
year old) were associated with a significantly lower percentage of violations than all
other age groups. The violation subcategory trends showed that MVCs had decreasing
percentages of speeding violations with increased age starting with 26-30 year old service
members. Furthermore, MVCs involving the oldest group of service members (>40 years
old) were associated with much lower percentages of both speeding and drunk driving
violations than other age groups.
7.4.2 Preconditions for Unsafe Acts
The main HFACS-MVC precondition causal category trends associated with
serious off-duty MVCs were fairly similar for service members in the six age groups. The
only precondition causal category associated with significantly different percentages of
MVCs across age groups was adverse physiological state. Significantly higher
percentages of MVCs were associated with adverse physiological state factors for 36-40
year old service members compared to all age groups except 31-35 year olds and for 2125 year old service members compared to the youngest (17-20 year old) and oldest (>40
years old) service members. These differences predominantly reflected the relative
involvement of alcohol impairment/drunk driving for service members in different age
groups.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The overall purpose of the present study was to identify the main human factors
trends associated with serious off-duty MVCs involving military personnel with the end
goal of preventing future losses of service members to MVCs. The five main research
questions as outlined in Chapter 1 were addressed.
Q1: What are the main human factors trends for serious off-duty MVCs involving
military service members?
At the unsafe acts level, the main human factors trends for serious off-duty MVCs
are skill based errors and violations related to procedures. At the preconditions level, the
main human factors trends for serious off-duty MVCs are adverse physiological states,
adverse mental states, and physical environment conditions.
Now that the main human factors trends associated with serious off-duty MVCs in
the military have been identified and assessed using the HFACS-MVC framework, the
next step is to select which problems to address first and the manner with which to target
them. Prevention efforts based on the skill based error trends identified in the present
study should focus on technique skills related to negotiating curves/turns and regaining
road positions. Providing military personnel with opportunities to practice these specific
skills may help to reduce their involvement in MVCs. Prevention efforts based on the
violation trends identified in the present study should focus on procedural violations
related to speeding and drunk driving. Enforcing existing rules and implementing stricter
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penalties for military personnel who commit speeding and drunk driving violations may
help to reduce their involvement in MVCs.
Q2: Are the main human factors trends different for MVCs involving service
members from the USAF, USN, and USMC?
The main human factors trends for USAF, USN, and USMC MVCs are generally
similar for unsafe acts but significantly different for preconditions. Specifically, 4W
MVCs are more affected by physical environment, adverse mental state, adverse
physiological state, and communication, coordination, and planning factors while 2W
MVCs were more affected by physical and mental limitations.
Similarities between the three military branches for some human factors trends
but not others may indicate that some trends are universal for service members and others
are service-specific or may actually reflect differences in MVC data quality across the
branches. The quality of an investigation process and subsequently the data captured
during the investigation may affect the number and types of factors identified. Data
quality differences across branches are provided in more detail in the limitations section
of this chapter.
Due to the differences between data quality for MVCs in the USAF, USN, and
USMC, it is not possible to make any valid conclusions about similarities or differences
in human factors trends between the three military branches. Prior to performing further
comparisons of MVC human factors trends, the MVC investigation and reporting
practices should be evaluated and compared amongst the USAF, USN, and USMC
military branches.
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Q2: Are the main human factors trends different for MVCs involving 2W and 4W
vehicles?
At the unsafe acts causal category level, the main human factors trends for 2W
and 4W MVCs are not significantly different though 2W MVCs are associated with more
technique errors and knowledge violations. At the preconditions causal category level,
the main human factors trends for 2W and 4W MVCs are significantly different with 4W
MVCs associated with more physical environment, adverse mental state, adverse
physiological state, and communication, coordination, and planning factors and 2W
MVCs were associated with physical and mental limitations.
Differences in human factors trends for MVCs involving 2W and 4W vehicles
suggest that military personnel may benefit most from vehicle-specific prevention
strategies. These findings suggest that there may be benefit in developing additional
vehicle-specific strategies based on the problem areas for 2W and 4W MVCs identified
in the present study.
Q4: Are the main human factors trends different for MVCs involving enlisted and
officer service members?
At both the unsafe acts and preconditions category levels, the main human factors
trends for MVCs are generally similar for enlisted and officer personnel. The only
difference between human factors trends between paygrades is in violations which are
associated with a higher percentage of MVCs for enlisted personnel.
Similarities between the human factors trends for MVCs involving enlisted and
officer paygrades suggest that creating specialized prevention strategies for officers and
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enlisted personnel may not be necessary. However, the significantly higher percentage of
violations for enlisted MVCs may be a reflection of the underlying differences between
paygrades related to authority, accountability, and responsibility. As such, one potential
strategy to combat these violations involves changing the standards to which enlisted
service members are held by enforcing existing rules and implementing stricter penalties
for enlisted personnel who receive moving traffic citations both on and off base.
Q5: Are the main human factors trends different for MVCs involving service
members in different age groups?
At both the unsafe acts and preconditions category levels, the main human factors
trends for MVCs are generally similar for service members in different age groups except
for violations and adverse physiological states. Significantly higher percentages of MVCs
involving 21-25 year old service members and significantly lower percentages of MVCs
involving service members over the age of 40 are associated with violations (particularly
speeding and drunk driving) and adverse physiological states (particularly impairment
due to alcohol) compared to MVCs for other age groups.
The similarities between human factors trends for MVCs involving all age groups
suggest that prevention strategies may not need to be targeted towards specific age
groups. Additionally, other age groups could potentially benefit from prevention
programs that are currently in place but only mandated for young service members such
as AAA DIP. Instead, larger streamlined prevention programs should be developed and
provided to all military personnel that can be followed up with smaller age-specific
programs.
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Any age-specific programs, if deemed necessary, should be applied to areas in
which they can make the most impact. Though one of the age groups with the most
unique human error trend profile is that for service members over the age of 40, it may be
more sensible to focus resources set aside for age-specific strategies to younger age
groups due to the relative lack of involvement of older service members in off-duty
MVCs. The 21-25 year old and 17-20 year old service member age groups may be the
best candidates for age-specific strategies. Both age groups are involved in high
percentages of serious off-duty MVCs with unique human factors trends for MVCs and
may be able to benefit from tailored preventions specialized to the nuances unique to
their specific age groups.
8.2 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS
The present study had several strengths including the data set, framework, and
methods used for classification. First, the MVCs provided by the service centers
contained the entire population of Class A and B off-duty MVCs for all three military
branches, not just a subset that would require extrapolation to the larger military
population. Using the same framework and methodology for classification of human
factors trends for MVCs in all three branches offers a potential for comparisons across
branches in the future.
Next, the present study used original MVC narratives to identify the causal factors
instead of previously identified human factors data containing potential errors and
inconsistencies. Focusing solely on MVCs where service members were operating a
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motor vehicle, multiple HFACS experts evaluated each MVC which reduced bias or
oversight on the part of a single individual.
Finally, causal factors were identified and classified using an established human
error framework (HFACS) already adopted throughout the military and modified
specifically for the MVC domain. Using an HFACS-based framework for classification
of MVCs allowed for comparisons of human factors trends across multiple industries.
The present study had a few limitations as well including sample size and data
quality. Though almost a decade of data was classified for USAF and USN MVCs, there
was only a few years of data for USMC MVCs. Further complicating matters were
differences between the variables captured for MVCs by the different military branches.
On a related topic, due to the archival nature of the data, the quality of available data was
restricted by what was originally investigated and documented for each MVC.
Several findings from the present study suggest that investigation and reporting
practices for USAF MVCs were superior to those for USN and USMC MVCs. First,
several of the HFACS experts coding the off-duty MVCs commented on the relative lack
of detail contained in the narratives for MVCs in the USMC compared to the USN and
especially the USAF. Next, the counts of causal factors classified for each MVC and for
MVCs overall were so much higher for the USAF cases than either USN or USMC cases.
Further, the frequencies of classifying skill based errors with the “LCU” nanocode which
captured loss of control for unknown reasons were highest for USMC MVCs followed by
USN MVCs and lowest for USAF MVCs. Also, MVCs contained a higher percentage of
skill based errors related to technique in the USAF compared to both the USN and
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USMC. Additionally, USAF MVCs were associated with significantly higher levels of
virtually all precondition causal categories and had similar or higher percentages of
almost all subcategories. Finally, there were only a few causal factors classified at the
upper two HFACS-MVC tiers in the entire study and all were identified in MVCs from
the USAF.
More thorough investigations may capture less salient factors (e.g. poor driving
technique as opposed to speeding) and provide more opportunities for causal factors to be
identified increasing the number of causal factors classified. Based on the findings of the
present study, it is likely that the similarities and differences in the main trends are
indicative of underlying differences in MVC data quality and reflect differences in
investigation and reporting practices across the three branches. As such, any significant
differences between human factors trends for MVCs in the USAF, USN, and USMC may
be an artifact of better data quality for USAF MVCs, not an indication of differences in
the underlying human factors trends across branches.
8.3 UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Findings from the present study have generated a new set of additional questions
related to the study of human factors trends associated with MVCs. Future analyses of the
HFACS-MVC data from the present study might look at the human factors trends over
time in order to find how the main issues have been changed throughout the years.
Comparisons of the human factors trends for other demographic factors such as
geographic locations and time since deployment may provide additional insight into the
profile of service members who at-risk for off-duty MVCs.
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Based on the results of the present study, future studies should look at differences
in investigation and reporting practices for MVCs in the USAF, USN, and USMC.
Identification of these differences would provide the basis for streamlining investigation
and reporting practices across the branches and for comparing the human factors trends
across branches. Additional research should develop and evaluate previous, current, and
future prevention strategies to combat the common human factors plaguing military
MVCs. A historical look at the human factors trends in combination with a timeline of
implemented prevention programs can aid in evaluating the effectiveness of prior
programs on the causal factors associated with MVCs. Additional benefits may result
from applying the prospective Human Factors Intervention Matrix (HFIX) tool to assist
with the development of targeted programs by identifying and assessing intervention
strategies in a comprehensive and systematic manner. Future research might also look at
evaluating the HFACS-MVC framework with other data sets including both MVCs in the
military and civilian populations. Future benefits could also be achieved by developing
data collection tools that allow investigators to quickly and easily capture the information
necessary for complete and thorough classification with the HFACS-MVC framework.
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APPENDIX A: TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS
TERMS
Motor Vehicle
Two Wheeled (2W)
Motor Vehicle
Four Wheeled (4W)
Motor Vehicle
Motor Vehicle Crash
(MVC)
Crash Demographics
Road Traffic Fatality
Permanent
Disability

Total

Permanent
Disability
Mishap

Partial

Class A
Class B

Class C

DEFINITIONS
a privately owned non-government, non-commercial vehicle that
can be operated on public highways (USAF, 2008); includes
motorcycles, passenger vehicles, and light trucks
a powered motor vehicle with two wheels; includes cruisers,
sport, touring, standard, and dual-purpose motorcycles
a powered motor vehicle with four wheels; includes cars and light
trucks
an event in which a motor vehicle in motion collides with
obstacle(s) in the environment resulting in injury and/or property
damage
characteristics capturing the setting of a MVC such as location
(rural or urban) and temporal information (month, day, and time)
death of a person due to injuries sustained in a MVC within 30
days of the event (WHO, 2009)
permanent nonfatal incapacitation that prevents a service member
from keeping gainful employment after losing multiple body parts
(hands, feet, eyes); also includes non-medically induced coma
(USAF, 2008)
permanent nonfatal impairment that restricts a service member’s
range of motion after losing the use of body part(s) (USAF, 2008)
an unplanned event or chain of events caused by unidentified or
uncorrected hazards that result in property damage, injury, or
death (DoN, 2005); includes afloat, ground, industrial, motor
vehicle categories of mishaps (USAF, 2008)
a mishap resulting in property damage costs in excess of
$1,000,000, the loss of a destroyed DoD aircraft, or the permanent
total disability or death of a service member (DoN, 2005)
a mishap resulting in property damage costs between $200,000
and $1,000,000, the inpatient hospitalization of three or more
service members for care, or the permanent partial disability of a
service member (DoN, 2005)
a mishap resulting in property damage costs between $20,000 and
$200,000 or a loss of work days for a service member (DoN,
2005)
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APPENDIX B: HFACS-MVC FRAMEWORK AND NANOCODE GUIDE
UNSAFE ACTS
Skill Based Errors: Occur during highly automated tasks, often without thought;
Vulnerable to attention, memory, and/or technique failures
Attention Failures (ATT)
1.
Forgot to check blind spot
2.
Forgot to use communication device (e.g. horn or turn signal)
3.
Didn’t keep eyes on the road
4.
Inadvertent operation of wrong control (e.g. pressed gas instead of brake, put
vehicle into reverse instead of drive)
5.
Inadvertently drifted out of lane (note: not due to falling asleep)
Postural Error (POS)
1.
Operated vehicle from an awkward position/posture
Technique Error (TQ)
1.
Improper passing maneuver (e.g. passed without looking at the road situation –
enough room, vehicle approaching, etc.)
2.
Improper application of acceleration or brakes
3.
Usual method of executing procedure is flawed/improper/imperfect
4.
Failed to maintain a sufficient following distance (due to speed and/or distance
between vehicles; not due to misjudgment of distance or speed)
5.
Over-steered/overcorrected when avoiding collision
6.
Over-steered/overcorrected when attempting to regain position on roadway
7.
Failed to negotiate curve/turn/bend/ramp
8.
Failed to negotiate lane change/passing maneuver
Timing Error (TM)
1.
Reacted too slowly
2.
Reacted too quickly
Lost Control due to Unknown Reason (LCU)
Skill Based Error – Other (SO)
Decision Errors: Occur when chosen action is inadequate or inappropriate for the
situation; “Honest mistake”, poor choice; often due to inadequate knowledge
Information Processing (IP)
1.
Misinterpreted information
2.
Selected a poor or unfamiliar route for travel (e.g. selected a shorter route)
Prioritization (PRI)
1.
Misplaced prioritization (e.g. swerved into traffic to avoid a small animal)
2.
Ignored caution or recommendation (e.g. from a friend)
3.
Wrong response to abnormal situation
Procedural Decision Error (DPRO)
1.
Failed to give way/yield
2.
Inappropriate behavior/maneuver
3.
Improper passing or lane change (without adequate passing room, within a turn, in
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UNSAFE ACTS
oncoming lane of traffic, etc.)
Situational Assessment (SA)
1.
Failed to recognize hazardous conditions
2.
Failed to modify behavior to protect against potentially hazardous conditions
(tactical planning decisions on the road like pressing on when tired)
Vehicular Decision Error (DPMV)
1.
Inadvertently exceeded capabilities of vehicle
2.
Inadequate loading/securing of items within vehicle
3.
Improper loading/securing of items on top of vehicle
4.
Poor maintenance of PMV (e.g. failure to change oil regularly)
5.
Inadvertently used defective/inadequate vehicle
Decision Error – Other (DO)
Perceptual Errors: Occur when degraded or “unusual” sensory input lead to an error.
Perceptual Error (PE)
1.
Misjudged distance
2.
Misjudged speed
3.
Misjudged depth
4.
Misjudged height
5.
Misjudged surface conditions
6.
Missed information due to degraded sensory input (e.g. sensory information led to
misreading a sign or equipment)
7.
Misheard traffic cue (e.g. horn) due to noise issues/degradation
Perceptual Error – Other (PEO)
Violations: Conscious decisions to bend/break existing rules/regulations
Procedural Violations (VPRO)
0.
Speeding – unknown illegal speed (over the limit)
1.
Speeding 10-19 mph over the speed limit
2.
Speeding 20-29 mph over the speed limit
3.
Speeding 30-39 mph over the speed limit
4.
Speeding 40+ mph over the speed limit
5.
Illegal passing or lane changing behavior
6.
Reckless/erratic operation of PMV
7.
Racing with another vehicle
8.
Excessive risk taking
9.
Violation of training rules/laws
10.
Disregard of traffic signals
Knowledge Violations (VKNO)
1.
Operated vehicle without a valid license/endorsement
2.
Entry into unauthorized areas
Drunk Driving – BAC ≥ 0.08% (VDD)
Violation – Other (VO)
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PRECONDITIONS FOR UNSAFE ACTS
Physical Environment: Operational and ambient environment.
Surface Conditions (SC)
1.
Slippery road surface (e.g. due to ice, rain)
2.
Debris on road surface (e.g. dirt, loose rocks, mud)
3.
Inadequate maintenance of road surface (e.g. potholes, ruts)
Visibility (VIS)
1.
Inadequate visibility due to sun/sun glare, rain, snow, or fog
2.
Inadequate visibility due to insufficient lighting
3.
Obscured view of traffic due to interaction of vehicle and environment (e.g.
obscured view of environment due small vehicle, like a motorcycle, travelling
behind larger vehicle, like a truck or bus)
Miscellaneous (MIS)
1.
Clutter/loose items inside vehicle
2.
Congestion due to traffic
3.
Noisy environment
4.
Wind
Physical Environment – Other (PHYO)
Technological Environment: Vehicle and road environment.
Protective Devices on the Road (PPE)
1.
Median: inadequate or missing
2.
Guardrail: inadequate or missing
3.
Traffic control: inadequate/defective or missing; poor location
4.
Signs (informational/warning): inadequate/defective or missing; poor location
Vehicle (TPMV)
1.
Defective or dysfunctional vehicle
2.
Defective or dysfunctional vehicular equipment
3.
Inadequately maintained vehicle/vehicular equipment
Design (DES)
1.
Inadequate design of control systems/signs/displays
2.
Inadequate road design (e.g. extremely curvy, too narrow, etc.)
3.
Inadequate road gradient
4.
Inadequate shoulder for road (e.g. missing or very narrow)
5.
Inadequate placement of objects alongside the road
6.
Inadequate ergonomic design/Poor man-system interface (in vehicle)
Technical Environment – Other (TEO)
Adverse Mental States: Mental conditions of the operator that affect performance.
Attitude (A)
1.
Overconfidence/Lack of confidence
2.
Get-home-it is
3.
“It won’t happen to me” attitude
4.
Complacency
5.
Overaggressive
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PRECONDITIONS FOR UNSAFE ACTS
6.
Frustration
7.
Stress
8.
Focus/attitude towards task
Awareness (AW)
1.
Attention (inattention, distraction, channelized attention, task fixation,
preoccupation with problems, etc.)
2.
Time pressure (perceived haste to complete task/rushing)
3.
Confusion
4.
Boredom
5.
Extreme concentration/perception demands
6.
Inappropriate peer pressure
Mental Fatigue (AMF)
1.
Drowsy driving (e.g. mental fatigue after a taxing workday; note: differs from fell
asleep)
Psychology (PSY)
1.
Personality style
2.
Pre-existing personality disorder
3.
Fears or phobias
4.
Emotional overload
Adverse Mental State – Other (AMO)
Adverse Physiological States: Medical/physiological conditions of the operator that affect
performance.
Physiological Condition (PC)
1.
Visual illusions
2.
Impairment due to drugs or alcohol
3.
Overexertion of physical activities
Medical Condition (MC)
1.
Medical illness
2.
Dehydration
3.
Inability to sustain body position
4.
Previous injury or illness
5.
Influenced by medication
Incapacitation (INC)
1.
Fainted/passed out
2.
Fell asleep
Adverse Physiological State – Other (APO)
Physical/Mental Limitations: Occur when situation exceeds the capabilities of the
operator.
Mental Limitations (ML)
1.
Pre-existing psychological disorder
2.
Incompatible intelligence/aptitude
3.
Not familiar with job performance standards
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PRECONDITIONS FOR UNSAFE ACTS
4.
Limited experience/proficiency
Sensory Deficiencies (SD)
1.
Visual limitations or deficiencies
2.
Hearing limitations or deficiencies
Physical Limitations (PL)
1.
Lack of competency
2.
Lack of proficiency
3.
Incompatible physical capabilities
4.
Inadequate practice of skills
5.
Musculoskeletal disorder
6.
Inability to sustain body movement
7.
Restricted range of body movement
8.
Inappropriate height, weight, size, strength, etc.
9.
Motor skill, coordination, or timing deficiencies
10.
Substance sensitivities or allergies
Physical/Mental Limitation – Other (PMO)
Communication, Coordination, and Planning: Poor coordination/communication between
road users (vehicle operators, passengers, bicyclists, pedestrians) and planning prior to
operating the vehicle.
Coordination (COR)
1.
Failed to use all available resources
2.
Lack of teamwork
Communication (COM)
1.
Ineffective/no communication methods
2.
Misunderstood instructions (e.g. verbal training or writing manuals)
3.
Inadequate communication of hazards
4.
Incorrect instructions provided
5.
Inadequate knowledge transfer
Planning (PLA)
1.
Poor travel planning (e.g. starting a long trip at 02:00, without adequate rest)
Communication, Coordination, Planning – Other (CCPO)
Personal Readiness: Activities performed prior to operating a vehicle that affect
performance.
Personal Readiness (PR)
1.
Inadequate rest requirements
2.
Self-medication
3.
Use of illicit drugs and alcohol
4.
Hung-over
5.
Inadequate nutrition/diet
6.
Overexertion off duty
7.
Lack of sleep
Personal Readiness – Other (PRO)
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UNSAFE SUPERVISION
Inadequate Supervision (IS)
1. Training
2. Guidance/Oversight
Inadequate Supervision – Other (ISO)
Planned Inappropriate Operations (PI)
1. Scheduling
2. Task Assignment
Planned Inappropriate – Other (PIO)
Failed to Correct Known Problem (FC)
1. Deficiencies not addressed
2. Deficiencies inadequately addressed
Failed to Correct – Other (FCO)
Supervisory Violations (SV)
1. Violated rules and regulations
2. Failed to enforce rules and regulations
Supervisory Violations – Other (SVO)
ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES
Resource Management (RM)
1. Human resources
2. Monetary/budget resources
3. Equipment/facility resources
Resource Management – Other (RMO)
Organizational Climate (OC)
1. Structure
2. Policies
3. Culture
Organizational Climate – Other (OCO)
Organizational Process (OP)
1. Operations
2. Procedures
3. Oversight
Organizational Process – Other (OPO)
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OUTSIDE INFLUENCES
Outside Influences: Causes completely outside the control of the military motor vehicle
operator; Often due to other drivers/riders not following safe road procedures.
Outside Influences (OI)
 Civilian operator entered roadway on which military operator travelling
 Civilian operator changed lanes or merged while travelling in the same direction on
roadway as military operator
 Civilian operator exited roadway on which military operator travelling
 Civilian operator failed to yield right of way at intersection
 Civilian operator travelled in wrong direction/opposite direction of traffic; military
operator struck head-on by civilian operator
 Rear-ended by civilian operator
 Civilian operator performed a U-turn in path of travel
 Civilian operator intoxicated

218

APPENDIX C: HFACS DRIVING SAMPLES
Causal Factor
While waiting to turn onto the highway, a driver started
to inch forward when he saw an oncoming truck in the
right lane of traffic. He tried to stop the vehicle, but
accidentally hit the gas instead forcing the truck to
swerve to avoid a collision.
The driver failed to adjust his braking technique to
accommodate for the icy road conditions and slid into the
car in front of him at the stop sign.
Late one night a driver opted to take an unfamiliar
shortcut to get home. He realized his mistake when the
shortcut took him on a small, curvy road with no
lighting.
At an intersection, a driver misjudged his distance from
an approaching motorcycle. It was actually closer than
the driver thought, but the motorcycle’s single headlight
provided poor visual cues regarding its position.
The driver drove 10 to 15 mph over the posted speed
limit on the highway.
With a school bus dropping kids off ahead, a driver opted
to pass illegally instead of stopping the vehicle at least 10
feet behind the bus.
There were patches of black ice on the road.
One of the car’s headlights was burned out.
On his way home, a driver became frustrated by
everyone driving too slowly.
The driver was physically impaired after going out for a
few drinks.
The driver’s eyesight was so poor that he could not
navigate his vehicle safely.
A driver went to an all-night party the night before a
long-distance drive.
The driver received no indication that a truck was
merging from an entrance lane on his right because the
truck’s left blinker was not flashing.
A driver departed for a long road trip over winter
vacation without checking traffic or weather forecasts.
A driving school instructor did not consistently provide
adequate training. From time to time, he took personal
calls while a student was driving.
The driving school instructor told his student to drive in
219

HFACS Causal Category
Skill Based Error

Skill Based Error
Decision Error

Perceptual Error

Violation
Violation
Physical Environment
Technical Environment
Adverse Mental State
Adverse Physiological State
Physical/Mental Limitation
Personal Readiness
Communication/Coordination
and Planning
Communication/Coordination
and Planning
Inadequate Supervision
Planned

Inappropriate

Causal Factor
traffic on the highway during her first lesson.
Several accidents and near misses occurred at a particular
intersection but local police had not yet put up a stop
sign.
Though considered an authority figure, an officer drove
his police vehicle faster than the posted speed limit and
did not signal before changing lanes.
The state did not allocate adequate funding for road
maintenance or sufficient highway patrol.
Police in county A were pressured to issue a specified
weekly quota of tickets for particular violations (e.g.
speeding or not wearing a seatbelt.)
Due to the lack of standardization in traffic laws, drivers
who moved from one state to another were able to
transfer licensure without showing proficiency in state
laws.
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HFACS Causal Category
Operation
Failed to Correct Known
Problem
Supervisory Violation
Resource Management
Organizational Climate
Organizational Process

APPENDIX D: HFACS-MVC DRIVING SAMPLES
Causal Factor

HFACS Causal HFACS-MVC
Category
Nanocode
While waiting to turn onto the Skill Based Error ATT4 Inadvertent operation of
highway, a driver started to inch
wrong control
forward when he saw an oncoming
truck in the right lane of traffic. He
tried to stop the vehicle, but
accidentally hit the gas instead
forcing the truck to swerve to avoid
a collision.
The driver failed to adjust his Skill Based Error TQ2 Improper application of
braking technique to accommodate
acceleration or brakes
for the icy road conditions and slid
into the car in front of him at the
stop sign.
Late one night a driver opted to Decision Error
SA2 Failed to modify behavior
take an unfamiliar shortcut to get
to protect against potentially
home. He realized his mistake
hazardous conditions
when the shortcut took him on a
small, curvy road with no lighting.
At an intersection, a driver Perceptual Error PE1 Misjudged distance
misjudged his distance from an
approaching motorcycle. It was
actually closer than the driver
thought, but the motorcycle’s single
headlight provided poor visual cues
regarding its position.
The driver drove 10 to 15 mph over Violation
VPRO1 Speeding 10-19 mph
the posted speed limit on the
over the speed limit
highway.
With a school bus dropping kids off Violation
VPRO5 Illegal passing or lane
ahead, a driver opted to pass
changing behavior
illegally instead of stopping the
vehicle at least 10 feet behind the
bus.
There were patches of black ice on Physical
SC1 Slippery road surface
the road.
Environment
One of the car’s headlights was Technical
TPMV3
Inadequately
burned out.
Environment
maintained vehicle/vehicular
equipment
On his way home, a driver became Adverse Mental A6 Frustration
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Causal Factor

HFACS Causal HFACS-MVC
Category
Nanocode
frustrated by everyone driving too State
slowly.
The driver was physically impaired Adverse
PC2 Impairment due to drugs
after going out for a few drinks.
Physiological
or alcohol
State
The driver’s eyesight was so poor Physical/Mental PL3 Incompatible physical
that he could not navigate his Limitation
capabilities
vehicle safely.
A driver went to an all-night party Personal
PR7 Lack of sleep
the night before a long-distance Readiness
drive.
The driver received no indication Communication/ COM1 Inadequate or lack of
that a truck was merging from an Coordination and communication between road
entrance lane on his right because Planning
users
the truck’s left blinker was not
flashing.
A driver departed for a long road Communication/ PLA2 Selected a poor or
trip over winter vacation without Coordination and unfamiliar route for travel (e.g.
checking traffic or weather Planning
selected a route that was
forecasts.
shorter, faster, etc.)
A driving school instructor did not Inadequate
IS
consistently
provide
adequate Supervision
training. From time to time, he took
personal calls while a student was
driving.
The driving school instructor told Planned
PIO
his student to drive in traffic on the Inappropriate
highway during her first lesson.
Operation
Several accidents and near misses Failed to Correct FC
occurred at a particular intersection Known Problem
but local police had not yet put up a
stop sign.
Though considered an authority Supervisory
SV
figure, an officer drove his police Violation
vehicle faster than the posted speed
limit and did not signal before
changing lanes.
The state did not allocate adequate Resource
RM
funding for road maintenance or Management
sufficient highway patrol.
Police in county A were pressured Organizational
OC
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Causal Factor

HFACS Causal HFACS-MVC
Category
Nanocode
to issue a specified weekly quota of Climate
tickets for particular violations (e.g.
speeding or not wearing a seatbelt.)
Due to the lack of standardization Organizational
OP
in traffic laws, drivers who moved Process
from one state to another were able
to transfer licensure without
showing proficiency in state laws.
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APPENDIX E: MISHAP NARRATIVE SAMPLES
Sample
1

2

3

4

Narrative
Summary: Vehicle crossed centerline, left highway and impacted tree.
Narrative: [Servicemember] was traveling to residence and was involved in a
single car accident. There were no witnesses to the accident so it is difficult to
determine any specific cause. Currently awaiting police investigation report to
help determine possible causes so that unit can try and prevent any further
incidents of this nature. Upon receipt of the final police investigation report, an
update will be made to this [sic] report with lessons learned and
recommendations.
Summary: SNM was in a motorcycle accident.
Narrative: Be aware of your surroundings at all times. SNM suffers from a
punctured lung, broken wrist, dislocated jaw and a fractured pelivc bone. SNM is
still in the hospital release date to return to work is still unknown.
Narrative: Servicemember lost control of his vehicle while negotiating a curve in
the road. The vehicle slid off of the road, collided with a tree and burst into
flames. Driver and one of the passengers died of severe smoke inhalation and
thermal burns. The other passenger died of cervical spine fracture and skull
fracture. Although it is unknow how much sleep the driver had gotten prior to the
accident, it is known that he was at a party with his passengers the night before
the accident and that there was a percentage of blood alcohol in his system. The
driver was also apparently drinking underage. Alcohol and probably a lack of
sleep contributed to this incident. Another servicemember is under investigation
by civilian authorities for providing alcohol to a minor. The Commanding Officer
personally conducted a brief with each of the five shift sections (both staff and
student) which included the details of the police report to again reeemphasize the
consequences of drinking and driving and the importance of operational risk
management in their personal lives.
Narrative: [Servicemember] was involved in a single vehicle mishap while on
liberty. [Servicemember] was the only occupant of his vehicle. The police report
stated that [servicemember] drove at approximately 80 MPH over train tracks and
through an intersection. The vehicle struck a ditch and rolled multiple times.
Upon impact, [servicemember] was ejected from the vehicle. [Servicemember]
was not wearing a seat belt at the time. He was pronounced dead at the scene by
local authorities. The coronoer cited massive brain herniation as the cause of
death. Alcohol has not been determined, still waiting on toxicology report.
[Servicemember] received safety briefs from four levels of his chain of
command. His squad leader asked if any members of the unit planned to travel
outside of the local area. [Servicemember] did not reveal his plans to travel out of
the 300 mile liberty limits. He rented a vehicle that night and drove 515 miles
straight to his girlfriend's residence in GA. Two days later, he began driving back
to base. He was the only occupant of his rented vehicle. [Servicemember]
stopped and cited for speeding and not wearing seat belt at 2355 in SC. The
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Sample

5

Narrative
citing officer stated he was traveling over 80 MPH. He was again stopped and
cited for speeding at 0135 in SC. The citing officer stated he was traveling 20
MPH over the speed limit. Each officer warned him to slow down and reduced
the speeding violations to 9 MPH the speed limit. He continued to drive probably
fatigued and at excessive speeds until the mishap occurred. He ran over train
tracks and continued through the stop required intersection. The high speed
crossing of the train tracks caused the vehicle to veer right and impact the right
ditch on the far side. The vehicle continued to roll for 340 feet after the initial
point of impact. He was not wearing his seat belt at the time of the mishap and
was ejected.
Summary: Operator 1 (O1) was traveling in PMV 1 (2001 Pontiac Grand Prix)
northbound on [sic] Boulevard at a high rate of speed and under the influence of
alcohol. Operator 2 (O2) was traveling in PMV 2 (2001 Chrysler Concord LXI)
southbound. O1 lost control of PMV 1 and collided with PMV 2.
Narrative: This mishap was [originally] reported as a class B and the report was
released. [Subsequently], Operator 1 died from his injuries. [On the day of the
mishap], O1 had spent an unknown amount of time at a local bar with classmates.
At approximately 2333 hours, O1 left the bar and was traveling in PMV 1
northbound in the 2800 block of [sic] Boulevard. O1 was traveling at a high rate
of speed, attempted to pass a vehicle that was also heading northbound, crossed
the centerline, and lost control of PMV 1, sliding sideways directly into the path
of PMV 2. O2 was unable to react in time and PMV 2 collided with PMV 1 on
the passenger side. O1 was initially transported to a local emergency room but
was later flown by care flight to a [local] hospital due to a ruptured aorta and a
ruptured bladder and will undergo surgery when able. O2 was the designated
driver for PMV 2 and was transporting five friends to a local club. O2 suffered a
bruised right wrist and was treated and released. Passenger 1 (P1) was sitting in
the rear seat passenger side by the door and suffered a kidney injury that required
removal of the kidney, head injuries, and a lacerated liver; P1 was placed on
quarters after surgery. Passenger 2 (P2) was also in the rear seat sitting on the left
side of P1. P2 was admitted to the hospital for exploratory surgery where they
found a lacerated kidney; P2 was placed on quarters after surgery. PMV 2 was
equipped for five persons; therefore, P1 and P2 were seat belted together with
one seatbelt which contributed to the severity of their injuries. Passenger 3 (P3)
was seated in the rear seat behind the driver and suffered a laceration to the
forehead and received 16 stitches to close the wound. P3 also sustained a mild
concussion and was kept in the hospital for one day for observation. Passenger 4
(P4) was seated in the rear seat to the right of P3. P4 received nine stitches to the
chin and was released. Passenger 5 (P5) was seated in the front passenger seat
and suffered a laceration to the left side of the forehead from the airbag, was
treated, and was released. Investigation and Analysis: O1's 72-hour history was
found to be uneventful. O1 had a check ride flight on Wednesday which he
passed. O1 did not fly on Thursday or Friday. The 12-hour crew rest policy was
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Narrative
enforced. O1 and roommate went home on Friday and O1 cooked dinner and had
a undetermined amount of alcohol. O1 and roommate then went to a local bar
where they had an undetermined amount of drinks and signed up for a local
motorcycle rally. O1 and roommate proceeded to the final destination bar at
approximately 2200 hours. O1 had a lot of interaction with people at the bar and
gave no indication of internal distractions. O1 and classmates frequent this
particular establishment. Roommate stated that the person that is usually their
designated driver was not available on this weekend so their plan was to take a
taxicab home. Witnesses in the bar stated that O1 was having drinks at several
different tables, but were unable to state how many drinks O1 consumed. O1's
roommate stated that O1 had said he was not having a good time but made no
indication to him that he was leaving. A short time later, the roommate saw O1
leaving the bar in PMV 1. The following factors were investigated and found not
to be contributory to this mishap: road/weather conditions: the 2800 block of
[sic] Boulevard is a two-lane asphalt road with no median and posted 35 mph
zone. The road was in good condition. Residential areas border the east and west
side of the roadway. The roadway is well marked with a yellow dashed center
line. The weather was clear and the roadway was dry. Lighting in mishap area:
although not contributory, the 2800 block of [sic] Boulevard has very poor
lighting with only infrequent lamp post lighting. Personal protective equipment
used: O1 was wearing a seat belt; PMV 1's airbag deployed. Vehicle condition:
PMV 1 seemed to have been in good condition prior to the accident, with good
tread life on the tires. O1 was cited for driving while intoxicated and toxicology
results for O1 is .25 BAC.
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APPENDIX F: CONTINGENCY TABLES BY MILITARY BRANCH
Cell Contents:

Count
Expected Count

ANALYSES FOR EACH CATEGORY: Found significant differences for 7 categories
(SBE, VIO, PhyE, TechE, AMS, PML, CCP)
Skill Based Error
0
Branch
AF
130
110.0
MC
30
39.3
N
99
109.7
Pearson Chi-Square=9.743, DF=2, P-Value=0.008

1
245
265.0
104
94.7
275
264.3

Decision Error
0
Branch
AF
254
267.1
MC
100
95.5
N
275
266.4
Pearson Chi-Square=3.957, DF=2, P-Value=0.138

1
121
107.9
34
38.5
99
107.6

Violation
0
Branch
AF
133
172.4
MC
79
61.6
N
194
172.0
Pearson Chi-Square=30.997, DF=2, P-Value=0.000

1
242
202.6
55
72.4
180
202.0
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Significant

Insignificant

Significant

Physical Environment
0
Branch
AF
290
306.6
MC
112
109.6
N
320
305.8
Pearson Chi-Square=8.852, DF=2, P-Value=0.012

1
85
68.4
134
134.0
54
68.2

Technological Environment
0
Branch
AF
348
359.7
MC
134
128.5
N
365
358.8
Pearson Chi-Square=17.716, DF=2, P-Value=0.000

1
27
15.3
0
5.5
9
15.2

Adverse Mental State
0
Branch
AF
234
294.3
MC
118
105.2
N
341
293.5
Pearson Chi-Square=100.399, DF=2, P-Value=0.000

1
141
80.7
16
28.8
33
80.5

Adverse Physiological State
0
Branch
AF
239
245.0
MC
99
87.6
N
239
244.4
Pearson Chi-Square=5.084, DF=2, P-Value=0.079

1
136
130.0
35
46.4
135
129.6
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Significant

Significant

Significant

Significant

Physical/Mental Limitation
0
Branch
AF
306
328.6
MC
127
117.3
N
340
327.4
Pearson Chi-Square=22.459, DF=2, P-Value=0.000

1
69
46.7
7
16.7
34
46.6
Significant

Communication, Coordination, and Planning
0
1
Branch
AF
344
31
357.2
17.8
MC
129
5
127.6
6.4
N
368
6
356.2
17.8
Pearson Chi-Square=18.713, DF=2, P-Value=0.000
Significant
SUBSEQUENT ANALYSES FOR SIGNIFICANT CATEGORIES: SBE, VIO, PhyE, TechE,
AMS, PML, and CCP
Skill Based Error
0
Branch
AF
130
117.9
MC
30
42.1
Pearson Chi-Square=6.906, DF=1, P-Value=0.009

229

1
245
257.1
104
91.9
Significant

Skill Based Error
0
Branch
MC
30
34.0
N
99
95.0
Pearson Chi-Square=0.868, DF=1, P-Value=0.352

1
104
100.0
275
279.0

Skill Based Error
0
Branch
AF
130
114.7
N
99
114.3
Pearson Chi-Square=5.926, DF=1, P-Value=0.015

1
245
260.3
275
259.7

Violation
0
Branch
AF
133
156.19
MC
79
55.81
Pearson Chi-Square=22.412, DF=1, P-Value=0.000

1
242
218.81
55
78.19

Violation
0
Branch
MC
79
72.01
N
194
200.99
Pearson Chi-Square=1.991, DF=1, P-Value=0.158

1
55
61.99
180
173.01

230

Insignificant

Significant

Significant

Insignificant

Violation
0
Branch
AF
133
163.7
N
194
163.3
Pearson Chi-Square=20.487, DF=1, P-Value=0.000

1
242
211.3
180
210.7

Physical Environment
0
Branch
AF
290
296.2
MC
112
105.8
Pearson Chi-Square=2.322, DF=1, P-Value=0.128

1
85
78.8
22
28.2

Physical Environment
0
Branch
MC
112
114.0
N
320
318.0
Pearson Chi-Square=0.304, DF=1, P-Value=0.581

1
22
20.0
54
56.0

Physical Environment
0
Branch
AF
290
305.4
N
320
304.6
Pearson Chi-Square=8.388, DF=1, P-Value=0.004

1
85
69.6
54
69.4

231

Significant

Insignificant

Insignificant

Significant

Technological Environment
0
Branch
AF
348
355.1
MC
134
126.9
Pearson Chi-Square=10.188, DF=1, P-Value=0.001

1
27
19.9
0
7.1

Technological Environment
0
Branch
MC
134
131.63
N
365
367.37
Pearson Chi-Square=3.283, DF=1, P-Value=0.070

1
0
2.37
9
6.63

Technological Environment
0
Branch
AF
348
357.0
N
365
356.0
Pearson Chi-Square=9.404, DF=1, P-Value=0.002

1
27
18.0
9
18.0

Adverse Mental State
0
Branch
AF
234
259.3
MC
118
92.7
Pearson Chi-Square=30.473, DF=1, P-Value=0.000

1
141
115.7
16
41.3

232

Significant

Insignificant

Significant

Significant

Adverse Mental State
0
Branch
MC
118
121.1
N
341
337.9
Pearson Chi-Square=1.100, DF=1, P-Value=0.294

1
16
12.9
33
36.1

Adverse Mental State
0
Branch
AF
234
287.9
N
341
287.1
Pearson Chi-Square=86.945, DF=1, P-Value=0.000

1
141
87.1
33
86.9

Physical/Mental Limitation
0
Branch
AF
306
319.0
MC
127
114.0
Pearson Chi-Square=13.494, DF=1, P-Value=0.000

1
69
56.0
7
20.0

Physical/Mental Limitation
0
Branch
MC
127
123.2
N
340
343.8
Pearson Chi-Square=1.988, DF=1, P-Value=0.159

1
7
10.8
34
30.2

233

Insignificant

Significant

Significant

Insignificant

Physical/Mental Limitation
0
Branch
AF
306
323.4
N
340
322.6
Pearson Chi-Square=13.681, DF=1, P-Value=0.000

1
69
51.6
34
51.4
Significant

Communication, Coordination, and Planning
0
1
Branch
AF
344
31
348.5
26.5
MC
129
5
124.5
9.5
Pearson Chi-Square=3.090, DF=1, P-Value=0.079
Insignificant
Communication, Coordination, and Planning
0
1
Branch
MC
129
5
131.10
2.90
N
368
6
365.90
8.10
Pearson Chi-Square=2.107, DF=1, P-Value=0.287
F
’
: P-Value=0.527691
Insignificant
Communication, Coordination, and Planning
0
1
Branch
AF
344
31
356.5
18.5
N
368
6
355.5
18.5
Pearson Chi-Square=17.700, DF=1, P-Value=0.000
Significant

234

APPENDIX G: CONTINGENCY TABLES BY VEHICLE TYPE
Cell Contents:

Count
Expected Count

ANALYSES FOR EACH CATEGORY: Found significant differences for 5 categories
(PhyE, AMS, APS, PML, CCP)
Skill Based Error
0
Number of Wheels 2W
93
98.3
4W
166
160.7
Pearson Chi-Square=0.642, DF=1, P-Value=0.423

1
242
236.7
382
387.3

Decision Error
0
Number of Wheels 2W
233
238.6
4W
396
390.4
Pearson Chi-Square=0.745, DF=1, P-Value=0.388

1
102
96.4
152
157.6

Violation
0
Number of Wheels 2W
149
154.0
4W
257
252.0
Pearson Chi-Square=0.490, DF=1, P-Value=0.484

1
186
181.0
291
296.0

Physical Environment
0
Number of Wheels 2W
288
273.9
4W
434
448.1
Pearson Chi-Square=6.397, DF=1, P-Value=0.011

1
47
61.1
114
99.9

235

Insignificant

Insignificant

Insignificant

Significant

Technological Environment
0
Number of Wheels 2W
319
321.3
4W
528
525.7
Pearson Chi-Square=0.675, DF=1, P-Value=0.411

1
16
13.7
20
22.3

Adverse Mental State
0
Number of Wheels 2W
275
262.9
4W
418
430.1
Pearson Chi-Square=4.159, DF=1, P-Value=0.041

1
60
72.1
130
117.9

Adverse Physiological State
0
Number of Wheels 2W
271
218.9
4W
306
358.1
Pearson Chi-Square=57.639, DF=1, P-Value=0.000

1
64
116.1
242
189.9

Physical/Mental Limitation
0
Number of Wheels 2W
248
293.3
4W
525
479.7
Pearson Chi-Square=90.376, DF=1, P-Value=0.000

1
87
41.7
23
68.3

236

Insignificant

Significant

Significant

Significant

Communication, Coordination, and Planning
0
1
Number of Wheels 2W
327
8
319.1
15.9
4W
514
34
521.9
26.1
Pearson Chi-Square=6.684, DF=1, P-Value=0.010
Significant

237

APPENDIX H: CONTINGENCY TABLES BY PAYGRADE
Cell Contents:

Count
Expected Count

ANALYSES FOR EACH CATEGORY: Found significant difference for 1 category (VIO)
Skill Based Error
0
Paygrade
E
208
211.9
O
19
15.1
Pearson Chi-Square=1.584, DF=1, P-Value=0.208

1
481
477.1
30
33.9

Decision Error
0
Paygrade
E
491
487.3
O
31
34.7
Pearson Chi-Square=1.413, DF=1, P-Value=0.235

1
198
201.7
18
14.3

Violation
0
Paygrade
E
293
300.62
O
29
21.38
Pearson Chi-Square=5.162, DF=1, P-Value=0.023

1
396
388.38
20
27.62

Physical Environment
0
Paygrade
E
563
560.2
O
37
39.8
Pearson Chi-Square=1.158, DF=1, P-Value=0.282

1
126
128.6
12
9.2

238

Insignificant

Insignificant

Significant

Insignificant

Technical Environment
0
Paygrade
E
655
655.39
O
47
46.61
Pearson Chi-Square=0.072, DF=1, P-Value=0.789
F
’
: P-Value=1

1
34
33.61
2
2.39
Insignificant

Adverse Mental State
0
Paygrade
E
525
527.5
O
40
37.5
Pearson Chi-Square=0.753, DF=1, P-Value=0.386

1
164
161.5
9
11.5

Adverse Physiological State
0
Paygrade
E
435
438.8
O
35
31.2
Pearson Chi-Square=1.361, DF=1, P-Value=0.243

1
254
250.2
14
17.2

Physical/Mental Limitation
0
Paygrade
E
590
592.84
O
45
42.16
Pearson Chi-Square=1.467, DF=1, P-Value=0.226

1
99
96.16
4
6.84

Insignificant

Insignificant

Insignificant

Communication, Coordination, and Planning
0
1
Paygrade
E
656
33
654.46
34.54
O
45
4
46.54
2.46
Pearson Chi-Square=1.093, DF=1, P-Value=0.296
F
’
: P-Value=0.299239
Insignificant
239

APPENDIX I: CONTINGENCY TABLES BY AGE GROUP
Cell Contents:

Count
Expected Count

ANALYSES FOR EACH CATEGORY: Found significant differences for 2 categories
(VIO and APS)
Skill Based Error
0
Age
17-20 48
44.94
21-25 105
98.75
26-30 33
40.97
31-35 20
21.71
36-40 15
12.87
>40
8
9.78
Pearson Chi-Square=4.286, DF=5, P-Value=0.509

1
99
102.06
218
224.25
101
93.03
51
49.29
27
29.16
24
22.22

Decision Error
0
Age
17-20 98
103.82
21-25 229
228.13
26-30 98
94.64
31-35 54
50.15
36-40 30
29.66
>40
20
22.60
Pearson Chi-Square=3.570, DF=5, P-Value=0.613

1
49
43.18
94
94.87
36
39.36
17
20.85
12
12.34
12
9.40

240

Insignificant

Insignificant

Violation
0
Age
17-20 71
64.18
21-25 117
141.02
26-30 65
58.50
31-35 31
31.00
36-40 20
18.34
>40
23
13.97
Pearson Chi-Square=20.453, DF=5, P-Value=0.001

1
76
82.82
206
181.98
69
75.50
40
40.00
22
23.66
9
18.03

Physical Environment
0
Age
17-20 117
119.72
21-25 262
263.06
26-30 115
109.13
31-35 61
57.82
36-40 29
34.21
>40
26
26.06
Pearson Chi-Square=7.266, DF=5, P-Value=0.202

1
30
27.28
61
59.94
19
24.87
10
13.18
13
7.79
6
5.94

241

Significant

Insignificant

Technological Environment
0
Age
17-20 143
139.93
21-25 303
307.48
26-30 129
127.56
31-35 67
67.59
36-40 40
39.98
>40
31
30.46
Pearson Chi-Square=3.395, DF=5, P-Value=0.639
*NOTE* 3 cells with expected counts less than 5
Adverse Mental State
0
Age
17-20 111
112.85
21-25 242
247.96
26-30 103
102.87
31-35 61
54.51
36-40 33
32.24
>40
25
24.57
Pearson Chi-Square=4.189, DF=5, P-Value=0.523

242

1
4
7.07
20
15.52
5
6.44
4
3.41
2
2.02
1
1.54
Insignificant

1
36
34.15
81
75.04
31
31.13
10
16.49
9
9.76
7
7.43
Insignificant

Adverse Physiological State
0
Age
17-20 103
93.81
21-25 192
206.13
26-30 92
85.52
31-35 46
45.31
36-40 20
26.80
>40
25
20.42
Pearson Chi-Square=14.162, DF=5, P-Value=0.015

1
44
53.19
131
116.87
42
48.48
25
25.69
22
15.20
7
11.58

Physical/Mental Limitation
0
Age
17-20 121
126.79
21-25 281
278.58
26-30 113
115.57
31-35 64
61.24
36-40 37
36.22
>40
30
27.60
Pearson Chi-Square=5.035, DF=5, P-Value=0.412

1
26
20.21
42
44.42
21
18.43
7
9.76
5
5.78
2
4.40

243

Significant

Insignificant

Communication, Coordination, and Planning
0
1
Age
17-20 139
8
139.74
7.26
21-25 299
24
307.04
15.96
26-30 132
2
127.38
6.62
31-35 70
1
67.49
3.51
36-40 41
1
39.93
2.07
>40
31
1
30.42
1.58
Pearson Chi-Square=10.432, DF=5, P-Value=0.064
Insignificant
*NOTE* 3 cells with expected counts less than 5
SUBSEQUENT ANALYSES FOR SIGNIFICANT CATEGORIES: VIO and APS
Violation
0
Age
17-20 71
58.80
21-25 117
129.20
Pearson Chi-Square=6.139, DF=1, P-Value=0.013

1
76
88.20
206
193.80

Violation
0
Age
17-20 71
71.15
26-30 65
64.85
Pearson Chi-Square=0.001, DF=1, P-Value=0.972

1
76
75.85
69
69.15

244

Significant

Insignificant

Violation
0
Age
17-20 71
68.78
31-35 31
33.22
Pearson Chi-Square=0.414, DF=1, P-Value=0.520

1
76
78.22
40
37.78

Violation
0
Age
17-20 71
70.78
36-40 20
20.22
Pearson Chi-Square=0.006, DF=1, P-Value=0.938

1
76
76.22
22
21.78

Violation
0
Age
17-20 71
77.20
>40
23
16.80
Pearson Chi-Square=5.857, DF=1, P-Value=0.016

1
76
69.80
9
15.20

Violation
0
Age
21-25 117
128.63
26-30 65
53.37
Pearson Chi-Square=5.964, DF=1, P-Value=0.015

1
206
194.37
69
80.63

=

245

Insignificant

Insignificant

Significant

Significant

Violation
0
Age
21-25 117
121.33
31-35 31
26.67
Pearson Chi-Square=1.373, DF=1, P-Value=0.241

1
206
201.67
40
44.33

Violation
0
Age
21-25 117
121.24
36-40 20
15.76
Pearson Chi-Square=2.059, DF=1, P-Value=0.151

1
206
201.76
22
26.24

Violation
0
Age
21-25 117
127.38
>40
23
12.62
Pearson Chi-Square=15.495, DF=1, P-Value=0.000

1
206
195.62
9
19.38

Violation
0
Age
26-30 65
61.66
31-35 31
33.25
Pearson Chi-Square=0.438, DF=1, P-Value=0.508

1
69
72.34
40
37.75

Violation
0
Age
26-30 65
64.72
36-40 20
20.28
Pearson Chi-Square=0.010, DF=1, P-Value=0.920

1
69
69.28
22
21.72

246

Insignificant

Insignificant

Significant

Insignificant

Insignificant

Violation
0
Age
26-30 65
71.04
>40
23
16.96
Pearson Chi-Square=5.663 DF=1, P-Value=0.017

1
69
62.96
9
15.04

Violation
0
Age
31-35 31
32.04
36-40 20
18.96
Pearson Chi-Square=0.167, DF=1, P-Value=0.683

1
40
38.96
22
23.04

Violation
0
Age
31-35 31
37.22
>40
23
16.78
Pearson Chi-Square=7.040, DF=1, P-Value=0.008

1
40
33.78
9
15.22

Violation
0
Age
36-40 20
24.41
>40
23
18.59
Pearson Chi-Square=4.390, DF=1, P-Value=0.036

1
22
17.59
9
13.41

247

Significant

Insignificant

Significant

Significant

Adverse Physiological State
0
Age
17-20 103
92.3
21-25 192
202.7
Pearson Chi-Square=4.880, DF=1, P-Value=0.027

1
44
54.7
131
120.3

Adverse Physiological State
0
Age
17-20 103
102.0
26-30 92
93.0
Pearson Chi-Square=0.066, DF=1, P-Value=0.798

1
44
45.0
42
41.0

Adverse Physiological State
0
Age
17-20 103
100.47
31-35 46
48.53
Pearson Chi-Square=0.617, DF=1, P-Value=0.432

1
44
46.53
25
22.47

Adverse Physiological State
0
Age
17-20 103
95.67
36-40 20
27.33
Pearson Chi-Square=7.244, DF=1, P-Value=0.007

1
44
51.33
22
14.67

248

Significant

Insignificant

Insignificant

Significant

Adverse Physiological State
0
Age
17-20 103
105.12
>40
25
22,88
Pearson Chi-Square=0.837, DF=1, P-Value=0.360

1
44
41.88
7
9.12

Adverse Physiological State
0
Age
21-25 192
200.7
26-30 92
83.3
Pearson Chi-Square=3.418, DF=1, P-Value=0.064

1
131
122.3
42
50.7

Adverse Physiological State
0
Age
21-25 192
195.1
31-35 46
42.9
Pearson Chi-Square=0.696, DF=1, P-Value=0.404

1
131
127.9
25
28.1

Adverse Physiological State
0
Age
21-25 192
187.6
36-40 20
24.4
Pearson Chi-Square=2.134, DF=1, P-Value=0.144

1
131
135.4
22
17.6

Adverse Physiological State
0
Age
21-25 192
197.4
>40
25
19.6
Pearson Chi-Square=4.277, DF=1, P-Value=0.039

1
131
125.6
7
12.4

249

Insignificant

Insignificant

Insignificant

Insignificant

Significant

Adverse Physiological State
0
Age
26-30 92
90.20
31-35 46
47.80
Pearson Chi-Square=0.316, DF=1, P-Value=0.574

1
42
43.80
25
23.20

Adverse Physiological State
0
Age
26-30 92
85.27
36-40 20
26.73
Pearson Chi-Square=6.116, DF=1, P-Value=0.013

1
42
48.73
22
15.27

Adverse Physiological State
0
Age
26-30 92
94.45
>40
25
22.55
Pearson Chi-Square=1.113, DF=1, P-Value=0.291

1
42
39.55
7
9.45

Adverse Physiological State
0
Age
31-35 46
41.47
36-40 20
24.53
Pearson Chi-Square=3.202, DF=1, P-Value=0.074

1
25
29.53
22
17.47

Adverse Physiological State
0
Age
31-35 46
48.94
>40
25
22.06
Pearson Chi-Square=1.832, DF=1, P-Value=0.176

1
25
22.06
7
9.94

250

Insignificant

Significant

Insignificant

Insignificant

Insignificant

Adverse Physiological State
0
Age
36-40 20
25.54
>40
25
19.46
Pearson Chi-Square=7.092, DF=1, P-Value=0.008

251

1
22
16.46
7
12.54
Significant
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